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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF RELEASES IN PROPERTY
INSURANCE CLAIMS
JAY M. FEINMAN*

***
This article discusses the contexts in which disputes arise
over the execution of liability releases by the property holder in the
course of settling property loss claims. The article analyzes two
conflicting interpretations of these disputes, each of which yields a
markedly different result. The article explains the nature of this
conflict, rooted in principles of contract law and insurance law,
before outlining the arguments favoring full indemnification for the
claimant and the counter arguments for the insurer in seeking to
avoid additional liability. Put another way, the public policy interest
in the full payment of insurance claims is pitted against the insurer’s
interest in the final resolution of disputes. The article concludes by
siding with the claimant in arguing that most releases, should they
be deemed enforceable, actually encourage improper claim
practices and, as such, should be held unenforceable as a matter of
public policy.
***
A property owner suffers accidental damage to its property and
makes a claim for the loss under its insurance policy. The insurance
company sends an adjuster to determine whether the loss is covered, scope
the damage, and estimate the cost of repair. The adjuster and the owner
inspect the property and discuss the issues, perhaps with the assistance of
experts. The adjuster offers an amount to settle the claim and the owner
accepts payment of that amount. In some but not all cases, the adjuster may
ask or require the owner to execute a release as a condition of payment.
Subsequently the owner discovers that the assessment of the loss at the
time payment was made failed to account for all of the damage for which it
was entitled to indemnity under the policy. The owner files a claim with
*

Distinguished Professor of Law and Member of the Rutgers Center for Risk
and Responsibility, Rutgers School of Law, Camden.
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the company for additional compensation, and the company proffers the
release as a defense to any further liability. Is the company obligated to
pay, or does the release bar any further claim?
The answer to this question illustrates a common situation in
insurance law. The answer begins with an ordinary contract law doctrine—
the pre-existing duty rule. But insurance law is not simply contract law,1
and the application of the pre-existing duty rule implicates two potentially
conflicting policies and two different interpretations of the underlying
facts. The nature of insurance is to provide full compensation for covered
losses, which favors the owner’s further claim, but the public policy
favoring the final resolution of disputes and the enforcement of settlements
agreed to favors the company’s attempt to enforce the release. Which of
these policies is most salient in a particular case depends on whether the
process yielding the payment is seen as part of the fluid process of
adjusting the claim, in which case the process is not final at the point of
payment and the release is not enforceable, or as the resolution of a dispute
about the amount the company owes, so that the release is binding.
This article discusses the contexts in which disputes such as this
arise and the rules and policies that determine whether and when releases
in those contexts are enforceable. Part I of the article explains the process
of adjusting property losses and how releases are sometimes used in that
process. Part II discusses the application of the pre-existing duty rule to
this process. The rule makes a release ineffective unless it is given as part
of the resolution of a good faith, genuine dispute between insurer and
insured; in the ordinary case of adjusting a loss there is no good faith,
genuine dispute so a release is unenforceable. Part III addresses issues of
public policy. It concludes that the application of the pre-existing duty rule
to releases in ordinary property loss adjusting situations is supported by the
strong public policy favoring the payment of insurance claims in full, and
the public policy favoring the settlement of disputes is not relevant in those
situations.
I.

RELEASES IN PROPERTY INSURANCE CLAIMS

When an insured under a homeowners’ policy or other property
policy suffers a loss potentially covered by the policy, the formal steps in
1

“What do they know of the law of the insurance contract who only the law
of contract know?” EDWIN H. WOODRUFF, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE 5 (2d ed. 1924).
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adjusting the loss are outlined in the policy itself. Under the HO-5
homeowners’ policy, for example, the policyholder must give the company
prompt notice of the loss, keep an accurate record of any repair expenses,
cooperate in the investigation of the claim, prepare an inventory of and
document the loss of personal property, submit to an examination under
oath, and submit a proof of loss. 2 The company may not require the
policyholder to perform every duty in every case, such as submit to an
examination under oath, and other duties may be required in particular
circumstances, such as reporting a theft loss to the police. The company
has fewer specified duties in the event of loss. If the parties fail to agree on
the amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal to which the other
party must submit. 3 Ultimately, the company has a duty to pay for a
covered loss within sixty days of agreement with the policyholder,
appraisal, or judgment.4
The formal steps outlined in the policy are only the skeleton on
which the body of property loss adjusting is constructed. Once the
policyholder reports a loss, the policyholder and the company jointly
embark on a process of investigating and verifying the facts of the loss and
the extent of coverage for it.5 Investigating the facts and verifying the loss
in turn require determining the scope of damage and pricing the costs of
repair or replacement.6 The policyholder may be assisted in the process by
a public adjuster or an attorney, and the company may be represented by its
own claims personnel or an independent adjuster. Either or both parties
may call on contractors, engineers, or other experts to provide technical
assistance in scoping and estimating the claim, and on lawyers in
interpreting the policy.
Sometimes the policyholder and company are unable to reach a
satisfactory resolution of the claim and litigation ensues. In the
overwhelming majority of claims, however, the parties arrive at a mutual
understanding on the extent of the covered loss and the amount needed to
indemnify the policyholder, and the insurance company pays the claim.
The company may simply pay the claim or it may accompany the payment
2

Homeowners 5 – Comprehensive Form, NEV. DEP’T OF INS. 13 (1999),
http://doi.nv.gov/scs/HomeownersPolicyForms/HartfordForms/Hartford_HO_00_
05_10_00.pdf.
3
Id. at 15.
4
Id.
5
1 PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING 209 (James J. Markham ed., 2d ed. 1995).
6
2 PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING 1 (James J. Markham ed., 2d ed. 1995).
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with a request or demand that the policyholder execute a release, even
though the policy does not require that the policyholder execute a release
as a condition of payment.
In many cases, the amount paid to the policyholder is sufficient to
effect repair or replacement, no further damage is discovered, and the
insurance policy has served its purposes of easing the burden of financial
loss and providing peace of mind for the insured. In some cases, however,
after the time when initial payment is made on the claim, the insured
discovers damage that was not apparent earlier, the extent of damage is
greater than previously understood, or the amount paid is insufficient to
effect repair or replacement. Then the insured may go back to the company
and ask for a further amount due under the policy. The company may
recognize the validity of its further obligation and pay an additional
amount, or it may refuse and, in instances in which it has received a release
along with its payment, proffer the release as a bar to the further claim.
It is difficult to document when a release is demanded as a
condition of payment of claim and when payment is made without a
release. Certainly not all companies demand releases on payment of every
claim. Anecdotally, practitioners report that requiring releases has become
more common and that they tend to be used more often by some
companies than others, in larger claims, and following catastrophes. It is
clear that they are used in some large claims, and when they are used, they
are sweeping. The language can be simple, framed as a receipt with broad
language of release:
Received from Hartford Ins. Co. the sum of $763,066.67
in full payment, release and discharge of all claims or
demands against the said Company, arising from or
connected with any loss or damage on or to Building &
Loss of Rents at 5601-5611 Georgia Ave., N.W.,
Washington, D.C., Property Owned by GLM Partnership
which loss or damage arose or occurred on or about the 5th
day of August 1993.7
Or it can be more detailed:
For and in consideration of the total sum of [$149,203.16
paid to plaintiffs, plaintiffs] forever compromise, release,
7

GLM P’ship v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C. App. 2000).
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acquit, and discharge General Star Indemnity Company . .
. from any and all claims [plaintiffs] ha[ve] or may have
against the Released Parties under General Star Indemnity
Company Policy Number IAG360043 . . . whether for
building or contents loss or damage, or any other insured
and covered loss and damages . . . and any and all other
claims and damages of whatsoever kind or nature without
limitation whatsoever arising out of the application for
insurance, the binding of insurance, the issuance of a
policy of insurance, the policy of insurance itself, or out of
the hail storm and resulting loss and damage to the
aforesaid insured premises and property located thereon,
which occurred on or about January 23, 2000 (“the
Incident”), as well as of and from any and all claims
arising out of the claim itself . . . and, indeed, any and all
other claims resulting from, related to, or arising out of or
arising from said hail storm whether known or unknown,
and whether they have occurred or may occur or become
manifest at some future date, without any limitation
whatsoever.8
The release may be general, as above, or it may specifically address the
possibility of undiscovered losses:
[T]he undersigned hereto understand and acknowledge that
they may discover facts different from, or in addition to,
those which they now know or believe to be true with
respect to the subject matters encompassed by this
Release, and agree that this Release shall be and remain
effective in all respects notwithstanding any subsequent
discovery of different and/or additional facts.9
8

Tulane Prop., Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. Civ. A. 02-2020, 2003 WL
1824705 (E.D. La. 2003).
9
Bonita Villas Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., No. 09-21887CIV, 2010 WL 2541763, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2010). California law expressly
authorizes the waiver of future claims in a release. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 10, §
2695.4(e)(2) (2013). Following Hurricane Andrew, the Florida insurance
department “request[ed] that insurers limit the use of general releases to those
settlements for which they are appropriate, and insert in said releases language to
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Whether the language of the release is general or specific, concise
or florid, the fundamental question faced by policyholders and insurers
when the subsequent claim arises is whether the release is enforceable. The
determination of enforceability rests not on the language of the release but
on the law as applied to the context in which the release is executed.
II.

THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE

The fundamental principle governing the enforceability of a
release is an ordinary rule of contract law—the pre-existing duty rule. The
pre-existing duty rule states, “[p]erformance of a legal duty owed to a
promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not
consideration.”10 Under the rule, a release is effective if the releasing party
(here, the policyholder) agrees to accept a payment in full satisfaction of its
claim and therefore to release the released party (the insurance company)
from any further obligation to pay; the consideration for that promise is the
company’s payment and its own agreement not to assert that it has an
obligation to pay less than the agreed amount.
A different doctrinal approach is to treat the execution and
performance of the release as an accord and satisfaction. A release satisfies
an existing contractual obligation. An accord and satisfaction, by contrast,
substitutes a new obligation for the existing obligation under the original
contract; the promise to pay is the accord and the payment itself is the
satisfaction.11 The law on the enforceability of an accord and satisfaction is
the same as the consideration analysis. The difference in treatment is only
relevant where the parties arguably have agreed to a compromise payment
but the compromise has not actually been paid, and that situation rarely
arises.12
the effect that the release shall not constitute a final waiver of claims which are
reasonably unforeseen on the date of the release.” Fla. Information Bulletin 93005, 1993 WL 13545478 (Mar. 24, 1993).
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL DUTY §
73 (1981). See also 66 AM. JUR. 2D Release § 11 (2013); 46A C.J.S. Insurance §
1881 (2013). For examples of the rule’s use in insurance cases, see, for example,
Keller v. State Farm Ins. Co., 536 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. App. 1989) (property
insurance settlement) and Hoffman v. Geico Ins. Co., 347 Fed. Appx. 295, 296-97
(9th Cir. 2009) (underinsured motorist insurance).
11
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.24 (4th ed. 2004).
12
Different still are the cases in which the insured executes a release and
subsequently sues the insurer for fraud in connection with the claim payment.
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Accordingly, the policyholder’s promise to release the company
from any further obligation is not supported by consideration if it is only
given in return for the company paying something that it already owes
under the policy. This result is an application of the oldest instance of the
pre-existing duty rule, first announced by Lord Coke in Pinnel’s Case13 in
1602 and enshrined in the doctrine of consideration in 1884 by the House
of Lords in Foakes v. Beer.14
Under the pre-existing duty rule, a release is enforceable only if
two conditions are met: First, the company’s promise to pay and
subsequent payment is not the performance of a duty it already owes under
the policy. Second, the company’s obligation to pay the amount promised
is doubtful or the subject of an honest dispute (i.e., if it is a good faith
dispute). Conversely, the release lacks consideration and is unenforceable
if the company’s promise to pay and subsequent payment is only the
performance of a duty it already owed under the policy, or if the
company’s obligation to pay the amount promised is neither doubtful nor
the subject of an honest dispute (i.e., if it is not a good faith dispute).
Many early cases applied the doctrine to cases involving life
insurance policies, dealt with under doctrines of release, accord and
satisfaction, or surrender and rescission. 15 Results variously favored
insurers and policyholders, but courts consistently adhered to the
requirement that there be a genuine dispute to make a release enforceable.
In The Praetorians v. Taunton, for example, the Florida Supreme Court
applied the pre-existing duty rule to render ineffective a release where the
life insurance company had paid the beneficiary less than the value of the
policy.16 Where “the amount due under the terms of the policy has been
paid and a receipt delivered and received acknowledging receipt in full and
release of the balance due,” the release was enforceable only if there was a

Some courts require rescission of the release and return of the payment prior to the
bringing or the successful conclusion of the fraud action. See Vill. Northridge
Homeowners Ass’n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 237 P.3d 598 (Cal. 2010).
13
Pinnel’s Case, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 237; 5 Co. Rep. 117a (“Payment of a
less sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater, cannot be any satisfaction for the
whole.”)
14
Foakes v. Beer, [1884] 9 H.L. 605 (Eng.).
15
See Note, Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the
Overreaching Debtor, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 99 (1948).
16
The Praetorians v. Taunton, 160 So. 676, 676-677 (Fla. 1935).
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dispute, as where there was a “valid foundation” or “bona fide cause” for
the insurer’s denial of liability “in good faith.”17
Even where courts focused in a relatively formal manner on the
presence of an agreement to release claims, a dispute was required. In
Lehaney v. New York Life Insurance Co., for example, the insurer disputed
whether the insured had died from an accident, which would have entitled
the beneficiary to double indemnity, or partly from illness, in which case
only the face amount of the policy would be due.18 The Michigan Supreme
Court focused on the beneficiary’s endorsement of checks that stated “in
full settlement of all claims” as resolving the issue, although it noted that
that result would follow only if there was a bona fide dispute resulting in
an unliquidated claim.19
A.

THE DUTY OWED

The first step in determining the enforceability of a release is to
determine what duty the company owes under the policy, because
performance of a duty owed fails to provide consideration for a release. In
many respects this issue is tied into the second—whether the claim is
doubtful or the subject of an honest dispute. But there is the independent
issue of the company’s obligation to pay even if it does not receive a
release from the policyholder.
An insurance company’s basic obligation is to pay a claim within
the terms of the policy. A company could expressly condition its obligation
to pay on receipt of a release from the insured, but policies typically do not
do so. The standard homeowners’ policies, for example, in their statement
of “Conditions,” includes duties of the policyholder such as giving written
notice of an occurrence and filing proof of loss, but they do not require the
execution of a release as a condition of payment.20
17

Id.
Lehaney v. New York Life Ins. Co., 11 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. 1943). See also
Woodbery v. New York Life Ins. Co., 227 N.Y.S. 699 (App. Div. 1928).
19
Lehaney, 11 N.W.2d at 832. See also Hallmark v. United Fid. Life Ins. Co.,
286 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1956) (reviewing authorities).
20
E.g., INS. SERV. OFFICE, HOMEOWNERS 3 – SPECIAL FORM 20-21 (1999),
available
at
http://doi.nv.gov/scs/HomeownersPolicyForms/HartfordForms/
Hartford_HO_00_03_10_00.pdf; INS. SERV. OFFICE, HOMEOWNERS 5 –
COMPREHENSIVE FORM 21 (1999), available at http://doi.nv.gov/scs/Homeowners
PolicyForms/CSAAForms/AAA_HO_00_05_10_00.pdf.
18
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That a policy’s express terms do not condition the company’s duty
to pay on the execution of a release also prevents the interpretation of the
policy to imply such a condition. The policy expressly states that the
policyholder must take several defined steps in pursuing a claim, such as
giving notice of an occurrence, filing a proof of loss and, in the event of
dispute over the value of a loss, submitting to appraisal. A fundamental
maxim of interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alterius—“the
expression of one is the exclusion of others.” The specification of certain
requirements in the policy drafted by the company excludes by implication
any other requirements.
The law of tender provides a useful analogy. A tender is an
unconditional act made to satisfy an obligation or a condition,
distinguished from a proposal, which is a conditional offer. The tenderer is
under an obligation to render performance without condition; for example,
if a tender of payment is accompanied by a demand for a release or even
for a receipt, it is ineffective.21 The Nebraska Supreme Court applied the
analogy to an insurance case, stating,
As there is no affirmative provision therein which
expressly or by necessary implication requires the
execution of a receipt in full by the assured on payment of
a loss under the terms of the policy, no such requirement
may be lawfully exacted. The demand for a “receipt in
full” relied upon in the instant case was wholly
unsupported by the agreement or by authority of law.22
This understanding of the company’s duty to fully pay a claim
demonstrates the error made by a few courts in regarding the payment as a
choice among alternatives that satisfies the requirement of consideration.
In GLM Partnership v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., for example, the
court found consideration for a release because the policy gave the insurer
the option in the event of loss to either (1) Pay the value of lost or damaged
property; (2) Pay the cost of repairing or replacing the lost or damaged
property; (3) Take all or any part of the property at an agreed or appraised
value; or (4) Repair, rebuild or replace the property with other property of
like kind and quality.23
21

86 C.J.S. Tender § 26 (2013).
Jensen v. Lincoln Hail Ins. Co., 249 N.W. 94, 98 (Neb. 1933).
23
753 A.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
22
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Hartford’s choice to pay the claim under option (1) and to forgo
the other means of satisfying its obligation was held to provide
consideration for the policyholder’s promise to release further claims. The
court cited in support the revision of Corbin on Contracts, which states the
rule about choosing among alternative performances as consideration. 24
But the finding of consideration and the citation are inapt. Choosing among
alternative performances provides consideration only where the
performance rendered fully satisfies the duty chosen. The treatise offers the
example of a contract under which A is bound to deliver either a specified
car or truck to B; the delivery of the car instead of the truck is
consideration for B’s promise to pay additional compensation. If A
delivers a car that does not conform to the contract, however, its choice to
forego delivering the truck is not consideration. Similarly, an insurance
company’s choice to pay rather than to actually repair is consideration only
if the payment constitutes all that actually is due under the policy.
The insurance company also is obligated to pay without
demanding a release because of its duty to perform under the policy in
good faith. It is axiomatic that there is a duty of good faith implied in every
contract including, of course, insurance contracts.25 In most jurisdictions
24

Id. (citing 2 JOSEPH PERILLO & HELEN BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
7.12 (rev. ed. 1995)) (“If one has an option between two performances, the giving
up of this option, or the exercise of it in one way rather than the other, is
consideration for a return promise given in exchange. If one has the privilege of
performing in one way rather than another . . . the forbearance to exercise the
privilege . . . can be consideration.”)
25
An early case is Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y.
1914); leading third-party and first-party cases declaring the principle are
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973), and
Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Wis. 1978).
Statutory statements of the obligation include COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1113
(2006) (“In any civil action for damages founded upon contract, or tort, or both
against an insurance company, the trier of fact may be instructed that the insurer
owes its insured the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which duty is breached if
the insurer delays or denies payment without a reasonable basis for its delay or
denial.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220 (A) (2007) (“An insurer, including but
not limited to a foreign line and surplus line insurer, owes to his insured a duty of
good faith and fair dealing.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.01.030 (West 2012)
(“The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that all
persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and practice honesty
and equity in all insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the insured, their providers,
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there is a cause of action for bad faith breach of an insurance contract, and
the cause of action may lie in contract or tort or as a statutory remedy. But
that cause of action is only a particular product of the general duty of good
faith. The general duty is broader in scope although it provides narrower
remedies.26 The obligation of good faith both gives content to the express
terms of the contract and supplies terms omitted from the contract.
The most egregious violation of the obligation of good faith is
opportunistic behavior.27
Opportunism is typically defined as taking selfish advantage of
circumstances without regard for principle or prior commitment, such as
the commitment made by contract.28 In entering into a contract, a party
limits its future freedom of action in exchange for the benefits it receives
under the contract. A deliberate attempt to retain those benefits while
avoiding the limits on its own freedom violates the essential nature of the
contract.29 One device for operationalizing this approach is the hypothetical
contract; the good faith obligation is “a stab at approximating the terms the
parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that
have given rise to their dispute.”30

and their representatives rests the duty of preserving inviolate the integrity of
insurance.”).
26
The damages available for breach of the good faith obligation are ordinary
contract damages and therefore do not include such items as emotional distress,
attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages, and, for insurance contracts, may not even
include consequential damages. In the release cases, the typical remedy will be the
amount to which the policyholder is entitled under the policy, which constitutes
the general expectation damages. The difference in remedy is both a disadvantage
and an advantage to the policyholder; it is a disadvantage because the potential
recovery is less, but it is an advantage because the cause of action can be brought
without regard to the procedural and substantive restrictions on the bad faith cause
of action. See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond
Bad Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL PRACTICE & INS. L.J. 693 (2012).
27
See Market St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner,
J.) (“The office of the doctrine of good faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic
behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship might enable in the
absence of rule.”).
28
See Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 97 (1993).
29
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 373-78 (1980).
30
Mkt. St. Assoc., 941 F.2d at 595.
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Therefore, the use of a release most clearly violates the duty of
good faith when it arises from a deliberate attempt to avoid the company’s
obligation to pay what it owes. At the moment it sold the policy, the
company defined the extent of its obligation by the terms of the policy; it is
a violation of good faith to attempt to recapture the opportunity to pay less
than it owes by demanding and enforcing a release. The parties surely
would not have agreed that the company could use the release in such a
way to avoid its obligations. If the company demands or enforces a release
with the intent of limiting its obligation to a policyholder, either in an
individual case or as part of a general scheme, it is not performing in good
faith.
More broadly, an insurer’s use of a release violates the duty of
good faith if it is not in accord with the reasonable expectations of the
policyholder. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states in an
approach to good faith that has been widely adopted, “Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party.”31
The most fundamental expectation of a policyholder is that if a loss
occurs, the insurance company will pay what it owes under the policy, no
more but no less.32 Companies present themselves on this basis; among the
iconic slogans of American advertising are expressions of this
expectation—Allstate’s “You’re in good hands with Allstate” and the
image of cradling hands, State Farm’s “Like a good neighbor, State Farm
is there,” and Nationwide’s promise, represented by a security blanket, that
“Nationwide is on your side.” Therefore, as courts have recognized, in
acting on a claim the company has an “almost adjudicatory responsibility.
The insurer evaluates the claim, determines whether it falls within the
coverage provided, assesses its monetary value, decides on its validity and
passes on payment.”33
31

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (2012).
“Insureds buy financial protection and peace of mind against fortuitous
losses. They pay the requisite premiums and put their faith and trust in their
insurers to pay policy benefits promptly and fairly when the insured event occurs.
Good faith and fair dealing is their expectation. It is the very essence of the
insurer-insured relationship.” Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d
409, 415 (Utah 2004) (quoting ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 2-8 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 2D § 8.7 (2d ed. 1996)).
33
Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P. 2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986).
32
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The use of a release to bar a policyholder from recovering all that
it is owed under the policy violates the policyholder’s reasonable
expectations. If a company evaluates a claim and demands a release as a
condition of its payment and the policyholder later discovers that the
payment was not for the full value to which it is entitled under the policy,
either through error by the company or worse, the company fails to act in
good faith if it uses the release to prevent paying what it owes.
B.

THE REQUIREMENT OF A DISPUTE

The second step in determining the enforceability of a release
under the pre-existing duty rule is to determine whether the release was the
product of an honest, good faith dispute. The pre-existing duty rule does
not bar the enforcement of a release that is the product of the settlement in
good faith of a genuine dispute.34 Where the parties settle an honest, good
faith dispute, each party gives up the valuable right to assert its full claim,
so their subsequent performances do not constitute the performance of preexisting duties. However, this exception only applies where there is a
settlement of a genuine dispute or a doubtful claim, or where the
surrendering party (here, the insurance company) has a genuine, good faith
belief that the claim is doubtful, or both.35
The authorities differ on the precise statement of the requirements
of honesty and good faith, but the core concept is that the dispute be
genuine, so that the insurer is actually giving up something of value—its
ability to assert a smaller obligation owed to the insured—in return for the
release. Couch on Insurance lists several of the common formulations:
* A dispute in good faith after a reasonable investigation.
* An honest difference between the parties.
* An honest doubt between the parties as to the amount
due on a policy, whereupon the beneficiary accepts in full
satisfaction the amount which the insurer concedes to be
due.
34

Vasconcellos v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 853 N.E.2d 571, 575 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2006).
35
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. b, § 74(1) (1981);
1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 46 (2013); FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, §4.23;
15 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 215:8, :29, :31,
:34, :35, 216:22 (3d ed. 2012).
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* A doubtful bona fide claim which is the subject of a
bona fide dispute, and concerning which the parties are on
equal footing as to knowledge or want of knowledge of the
facts.36
All of these situations are contrasted with a case in which the dispute is
“raised by the insurer in bad faith and without any reasonable ground
therefor in law or fact . . . [f]or example, where the position of the insurer
is attained only by asserting a legal conclusion which is manifestly
wrong.”37
The key to determining the application of the pre-existing duty rule
and so the enforceability of a release in a particular case is to assess
whether or not the release is the product of the resolution of a genuine,
good faith dispute. This issue in turn depends on an understanding of the
nature of property loss adjusting.
Courts have sometimes characterized the insurance relation as a
special relationship of a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary nature. 38 The
insurance relationship is not truly fiduciary, but these characterizations
emphasize that adjusting is not an adversarial relationship, but one in
which the insurer must reasonably take account of the insured’s interests.
For example, the company must be forthcoming with information and
assist the insured in processing the claim, 39 advise the insured of the
coverage available and the procedure needed to invoke that coverage,40 and
assist the insured in complying with policy conditions and the insurer’s
requirements.41 The company has a duty to investigate a claim adequately
and objectively, 42 including to seek evidence that potentially supports a
36

15 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 35, § 215:34; see also §§ 215:35, 215:8,
216:21.
37
Id. § 215:34.
38
Id. § 198:7.
39
Bowler v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 250 A.2d 580, 588 (N.J. 1969).
40
See, e.g., 10 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2695.4(a) (2012) (“Every insurer
shall disclose to a first party claimant all benefits, coverages, time limits or other
provisions that may apply to the claim.”); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-15.41(507B)
(2012).
41
See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:2-17.6 (2012).
42
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. 1998)
(investigation must be objective and not “outcome-oriented”); Indus. Indem. Co.
of the Nw., Inc. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 526 (Wash. 1990) (“An insurer does
not have a reasonable basis for denying coverage and, therefore, acts without
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claim, not just evidence that favors a denial,43 and to investigate bases for
coverage even beyond those advanced by the insured.44
Given this relationship, the typical case of loss adjusting is a
process through which the policyholder and the adjuster arrive at a joint
conclusion about the proper payment due under the policy; it is not a
bargained settlement between parties who are disputing the amount owed.
The steps in the process are the policyholder’s reporting of a loss, the
investigation of the facts and the coverage, and the verification of the
extent of loss.45 Investigating the facts and verifying the loss in turn require
determining the scope of damage and pricing the costs of repair. 46 The
complexity of this process varies with the extent and complexity of the
loss, and the more complex, the more likely that the parties may not agree
on the applicable coverages, the scope of damage, or the cost of repair. As
classic texts used to train claims personnel state, “The value of most
insurance claims is uncertain or must be determined with an element of
judgment.”47 “Estimating is not an exact science, and legitimate differences
are common.” 48 “[D]ifferences may arise from consciously stated
positions, but they are more likely to result from unspoken assumptions
and misunderstandings.” 49 “A difference need not be a disagreement,

reasonable justification when it denies coverage based upon suspicion and
conjecture.”).
43
See Bernstein v. Travelers Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1112 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (“As these articulations of a carrier’s duty indicate, a carrier can be found
liable on a bad faith theory for conducting an investigation that is unjustifiably
superficial or perfunctory or that looks only in one self-serving direction for
evidence about the source, nature, or extent of the claimed losses.” (emphasis in
original)); 15 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 35, § 207:25 (“Implicit in the duty to
investigate is the requirement that the investigation be adequate and fair.
Adequacy and fairness means that the insurer has a duty to diligently search for
evidence which supports insured’s claim and not merely seek evidence upholding
its own interests.”); DORIS HOOPES, THE CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT 10.7 (2000)
(“Claims representatives should investigate in an unbiased way, pursuing all
relevant evidence, especially that which establishes the legitimacy of a claim.”).
44
Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 319 (Ct. App. 2007).
45
1 PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING 209 (James J. Markham ed., 2d ed. 1995).
46
2 PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING 1 (James J. Markham ed., 2d ed. 1995).
47
JAMES J. MARKHAM ET AL., THE CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT 176 (1st ed. 1993).
48
Id. at 176.
49
Id. at 176.
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although it often is. A difference exists whenever there is a lack of
agreement between the parties.”50
Differences that arise during the course of adjusting ordinarily are
resolved by a process of sharing information and educating each other
about the scope of damage or the cost of repair. They also may be resolved
by negotiation between the policyholder and the adjuster, but negotiation
in itself does not indicate the presence of a dispute that must be
compromised. Instead, negotiation is part of the process of give-and-take
that occurs as the parties exchange information, make arguments, and
concede points to resolve different understanding of the situation.
“Negotiation need not imply an adversarial transaction; it can be
cooperative and informative.” 51 Therefore, in the typical case, at the
conclusion of the process of loss adjusting there is no actual dispute, even
if a release accompanies the claim payment, so the company is not giving
up a right to assert a lower value of a claim and its payment does not
provide consideration for the policyholder’s release.
Payment in the absence of a genuine dispute does not provide
consideration for a release, and this result is particularly clear in two types
of cases. One instance is where the insurer makes a partial payment
admittedly due under the policy; under the basic application of the preexisting duty rule that payment of a lesser sum cannot be satisfaction for
the whole, the partial payment is not consideration for release of any
further claim.52 Another instance arises under valued policy laws where a
settlement for less than the face value of the policy is not enforceable; here
the valued policy law makes the entire face value due, so payment of only
a part lacks consideration and violates the public policy underlying the
valued policy law.53
Sometimes, of course, the differences that arise in the loss
adjustment process cannot be resolved, the parties deadlock, and the
deadlock is resolved by the policyholder accepting a smaller payment than
it believes it is entitled to in exchange for the insurer making a larger
50

Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
52
Hallmark v. United Fid. Life Ins. Co., 286 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. 1956);
Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Walker, 81 S.W.2d 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Scott v.
Missouri Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
53
E.g., Britton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 721 P.2d 303, 307 (Mont. 1985);
Gimbels Midwest, Inc. v. N.W. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 240 N.W.2d 140
(Wis. 1976).
51

2013

ENFORCEABILITY OF RELEASES

267

payment than it believes it owes.54 It is only in those cases in which the
pre-existing duty rule does not apply and a release demanded by the insurer
is enforceable to bar a subsequent claim by the insured.
III.

EVALUATING THE APPLICATION OF THE PRE-EXISTING
DUTY RULE

The pre-existing duty rule has come in for criticism, and
deservedly so. As the Restatement comments point out, the rule “has been
much criticized as resting on scholastic logic.”55 The rule has been rejected
in some jurisdictions, either by judicial decision or statute 56 and the
Uniform Commercial Code abandons it for sale of goods cases. 57
Nevertheless, the modern understanding of the rule and the exceptions to it
actually support the application of the rule to prevent the enforcement of an
insurance release that is the product of the ordinary loss adjusting process.
A.

PURPOSES OF THE RULE

“The fundamental goal of contract modification law is to promote
enforcement of freely-made alterations of existing contractual
arrangements and to deny enforcement of coerced modifications.” 58 In
carrying out this goal, the modern rationale of the pre-existing duty rule is
to serve a policing function. The Farnsworth treatise, for example,
discusses the rule, including its application to claims settlements, under the
topic “Policing of Modification and Discharge.” The rule and its
exceptions distinguish between cases in which the parties have made “an
equitable adjustment” in their relationship and those in which they have
not.59
54

E.g., Jones v. Admiral Ins. Co., 395 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. App. 1990) (insurer
paid maximum despite skepticism about amount of loss).
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. c. See also Frye v.
Hubbell, 68 A. 325, 332 (1907) (“the absurdity of the results of the rule . . . has
been commented upon in case after case, but persistence in error . . . still calls that
right which is recognized to be wrong.”)
56
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.25.
57
See U.C.C. § 2-209.
58
Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification under the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 681 (1982).
59
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. c. (1981).
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Parties to a contract may agree to modify their contract for
legitimate commercial reasons, and the modern exceptions to the preexisting duty rule make such promises enforceable. One example is
unanticipated circumstances arising during the course of performance that
would render one party’s performance unfairly burdensome. If a builder’s
cost of performance increases dramatically because of a subsurface
condition of which the builder did not know or have reason to know at the
time of contracting, the owner’s promise to pay the additional cost is not
held unenforceable for lack of consideration.60 The Uniform Commercial
Code has abrogated the rule entirely in sales cases; § 2-209 provides that a
modification needs no consideration to be binding. A buyer may, for
example, agree to accept goods of a lesser quantity or quality than was
contracted for, and the fact that the seller is already under a duty to perform
a greater obligation is no bar to enforcement of the buyer’s promise; the
law recognizes the commercial reality that a contracting party may value a
bird in the hand more than two in the bush. However, the power to create
an enforceable modification under the Code is not unlimited; the
modification is policed by the requirement of good faith, which requires
that the new agreement be honest and in accord with “reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”61
On the other hand, modifications or (as in the insurance release
cases) discharges that are not commercially reasonable attempts to adjust
the relationship or to make the best of a bad situation do not deserve to be
enforced. In these cases the pre-existing duty rule serves an appropriate
policing function in two ways.
First, it embodies the essential definition of contract law as the
body of law that enforces exchanges.62 Exchange is the foundation of the
doctrine of consideration, which makes enforceable only those promises
that are bargained for.63 By definition, an exchange is two-sided, and the
pre-existing duty rule enforces that definition. Where nothing in legal
contemplation is exchanged on one side—where a party such as an
insurance company does no more than make a payment it is otherwise
obligated to make—there is no exchange and therefore no enforceable
promise.

60

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(20); 2-209 cmt. 2. (1977).
62
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 1.1 at 4.
63
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979).
61
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Second, in some cases one party will take advantage of the lack of
expertise or leverage of the other party to obtain a modification or
discharge that is unfair or disproportionate. Other policing doctrines such
as fraud and duress may not provide a remedy because courts
understandably do not apply those doctrines expansively. In those cases,
the pre-existing duty rule provides a backstop to prevent the enforcement
of modifications or discharges that were unfairly obtained, are
unreasonable, or lack business efficacy.
B.

PUBLIC POLICIES

One of the criticisms of the pre-existing duty rule is that it upsets
the resolution of disputes parties have achieved themselves and permits
litigation that reopens settled claims. This effect is at odds with the strong
public policy favoring the settlement of disputes, a policy that grants a
presumption of validity to releases.64 The policy favoring settlement has
several roots. From the contract law perspective, it reflects the value of
personal autonomy and choice that is a core value of contract law. From
the legal system perspective, it permits parties to avoid the costs and
uncertainties of litigation and reduces the social expenditure on litigation.
In fact, as properly stated the public policy favoring settlement is
entirely consistent with the application of the pre-existing duty rule to
insurance releases. The public policy, prosaically stated, is as follows:
The purpose of compromise is to avoid trial of
sharply disputed issues and to dispense with wasteful
litigation. The settlement of cases serves the dual and
valuable purposes of reducing the strain on scarce judicial
resources and preventing the parties from incurring
significant litigation costs.
The law and public policy generally supports a
presumption in favor of voluntary settlement of litigation,
and settlement agreements should therefore be upheld
whenever equitable and policy considerations so permit.65
...

64
65

66 AM. JUR. 2D, Release § 2 (2011).
15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 1 (2013).
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A compromise agreement fairly made, based on
good consideration, and assented to by both parties, is
valid and binding on both.66
There are three relevant elements to this policy.
First, it is only implicated if there is a controversy or dispute to be
resolved. That requirement parallels the pre-existing duty rule’s
requirement of a genuine, good faith dispute to render a release
enforceable.
Second, it applies only to releases that are “fairly made” and
“assented to by both parties.” This is a statement about the process of
arriving at a settlement, not a substantive review of its fairness. It requires
that both parties have reason to know of the nature of the dispute and of the
effect of the release.
Both of these elements become problematic when the release is
given in the ordinary process of adjusting. In that process the parties arrive
at a common understanding of the loss, which is not the same as resolving
a dispute, and the policyholder has no reason to understand the situation in
any other way.
Third, the policy favoring settlement must be balanced against any
conflicting public policy. In the release cases, that policy is the broad
public policy underlying the provision and regulation of insurance.
As a risk management tool, the purchase of insurance is a
transaction through which the insured trades a small, certain loss (the
premium) to protect against a larger, uncertain loss (the risk insured
against). For many policyholders, particularly consumers and small
businesses, insurance is seen more broadly as a vehicle to secure oneself
against financial catastrophe. The Arizona Supreme Court was one among
many courts to recognize the dual role of insurance:
In delineating the benefits which flow from an insurance
contract relationship we must recognize that in buying
insurance an insured usually does not seek to realize a
commercial advantage but, instead, seeks protection and
security from economic catastrophe. Thus, the insured's
object in buying the company’s express covenant to pay
claims is security from financial loss which he may sustain
from claims against him and protection against economic
66

15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 4 (2013).
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catastrophe in those situations in which he may be the
victim. In both cases, he seeks peace of mind from the
fears that accompany such exposure.”67
Requiring the insurance company to fully perform its obligations is
particularly important because of the lack of an available substitute if the
company fails to perform. In a typical contract, if one party does not
perform, the other party can procure a substitute performance, sue for any
added cost, and, at least in concept, be made whole by the provision of
damages. But if a property owner suffers a loss and its insurance company
fails to pay the claim in full, there is no adequate substitute, as no company
will sell insurance to compensate for a loss that has already occurred.68
Therefore, there is a strong public policy favoring the provision of
insurance and the payment of claims in full. The policy is embodied
throughout insurance law.69 Interpretation doctrines state that ambiguities
in policies should be construed against the insurance company, that grants
of coverage should be interpreted broadly and exclusions narrowly, and, in
many jurisdictions, the reasonable expectations of policyholders are
protected even in the face of contrary policy language. 70 Doctrines of
waiver and estoppel lead to payment of claims that would not necessarily
67

Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 569-71 (Ariz. 1986) (citations
omitted); See also Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Colo., Inc., 931 P.2d 436,
443 (Colo. 1997) (“[A]n insured who enters into a contract of insurance seeks to
obtain ‘financial security and protection against calamity.’”) (quoting Farmers
Grp., Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Colo. 1984)); Andrew Jackson Life
Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1179 n.9 (Miss. 1990) (“[A]n insured
bargains for more than mere eventual monetary proceeds of a policy; insureds
bargain for such intangibles as risk aversion, [and] peace of mind.”) (alteration in
original).
68
See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988) (“[A]
breach in the employment context does not place the employee in the same
economic dilemma that an insured faces when an insurer in bad faith refuses to
pay a claim or to accept a settlement offer within policy limits. When an insurer
takes such actions, the insured cannot turn to the marketplace to find another
insurance company willing to pay for the loss already incurred.”).
69
See Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test
Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 574 (1998-89).
70
See, e.g., Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 905-08
(Iowa 1973) (explaining the reasonable expectations doctrines in insurance law).
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be covered otherwise.71 Statutes impose requirements of intent to deceive
or materiality on misrepresentations by insureds before the insurer can use
the misrepresentation as a basis for avoiding the claim.72 In a variety of
cases courts interpret particular policy conditions favorably to coverage,
sometimes more favorably than their plain meaning or drafting history
might justify. 73 The Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act
promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and
adopted in most states requires insurers to attempt “in good faith to
effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims submitted in
which liability has become reasonably clear” and not “for less than the
amount that a reasonable person would believe the insured or beneficiary
was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising material
accompanying or made part of an application.”74
In ordinary property loss adjusting cases, the public policy
favoring settlement is not relevant. Only where a release follows the
resolution of a genuine dispute in good faith is the policy properly applied
and not inconsistent with the public policy favoring insurance coverage.
Moreover, the principal reason courts refuse to enforce a contract on the
grounds of public policy is to discourage undesirable conduct. Enforcing a
release would actually encourage improper claim practices. The release
operates to limit a company’s ultimate liability in cases in which it
underpays claims due to simple error, negligence, failure to train or employ
qualified personnel, bias, or even a systematic strategy of denying valid
claims in whole or part. If releases could be demanded as a condition of the
payment of claims and were enforceable, the economic benefits of
requiring releases would become apparent. A company then would be
encouraged to require a release as a condition of payment of a claim in
every case. And given market pressures to limit costs, all companies would
have an incentive to act in the same way. These effects would undermine
71

See, e.g., Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682
P.2d 388, 395 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); Jenkins v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 205
A.2d 780, 783-84 (Conn. 1964).
72
E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 2001) (effective July 1, 2009);
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175 § 186 (West 2007) (effective Feb. 5, 2009).
73
See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994)
(discussing trigger of coverage in asbestos cases); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins.
Co., 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1992) (dealing with emotional harm as bodily injury);
Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603 (N.J. 1978) (dealing with an
intentional act in liability policy).
74
MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4 (NAIC 2007).
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the nature of insurance and the requirement of fair claim practices. As a
result, there would be more cases in which policyholders did not receive
the benefits they had contracted for and to which they were entitled.
Therefore, a release that is required as a condition of payment of a claim
and that is not the product of settlement of a genuine, good faith dispute,
should be held unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The essential obligation of an insurance company is to pay what it
owes under the policy if its insured suffers a loss. In property loss cases,
that obligation is effectuated through a fluid process of adjusting that
involves uncertainty, expertise, and judgment. Most of the time, that
process results in an agreement on the amount owed. Because the process
is uncertain, that amount may turn out to be incorrect, and if it is, the
company cannot avoid its essential obligation to the policyholder by
claiming that a release signed at the time of payment—a release that it is
not entitled to demand under the policy—limits its obligation. A hoary rule
of contract law and the public policy that recognizes the value of insurance
coalesce to dictate this result.
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AUTO INSURANCE AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
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***
Now that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) individual health
insurance mandate has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, it
is an opportune time to examine precedents for the individual mandate that
were not considered in the legislative debate or litigation about the ACA’s
constitutionality, particularly auto insurance mandates. Although
opponents’ arguments were cast largely as Commerce Clause claims, the
arguments have a deeper foundation as claims about liberty and coercion
which go far beyond the Commerce Clause. Although auto insurance
mandates are obviously different, particularly in that they are state rather
than federal, auto insurance mandates can help us understand what
Congress was doing, and why, when it enacted the ACA reforms and the
individual mandate. Auto insurance mandates are relevant because they
are a ubiquitous example of risk-spreading through a combination of
private markets and public regulation, which is the same broad approach
taken by the ACA individual mandate. This article shows that auto
insurance mandates are an important precedent for the ACA individual
mandate, and have four significant parallels with the ACA provision. First,
both arose from challenging situations where there are compelling reasons
for mandates. Second, both types of mandate order that people insure
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themselves against risks they might want to bear themselves. Both types
require that risks be transferred and spread, which is an essential aspect of
what insurance does. Last, both require people to buy something from a
private seller. Both mandates are similar policy responses to important
public policy dilemmas involving physical harm or illness and how to
finance needed redress or treatment.
The article turns to the common rejoinder that auto insurance
mandates are fundamentally different because driving is a choice and so
regulation is acceptable, in contrast to the ACA mandate which regulates
living itself, not an acceptable thing for government to do. This argument
is specious for at least three reasons. First, driving is not always a choice.
Second, the Supreme Court’s decision shows that the ACA mandate
actually does create a choice. Third, auto insurance mandates actually are
far more coercive than the ACA individual mandate.
Finally, the article unearths and highlights pertinent aspects of the
history of auto insurance mandates. Opponents fought mandates for six
decades using arguments about freedom and American values to oppose
them, much as ACA mandate opponents do today. Doubts about and
challenges to the constitutionality of mandates were consistently resolved
in their favor particularly in light of the public welfare aspects of
insurance. “Freedom” arguments have faded over time and auto insurance
mandates have proven themselves a workable, widely accepted, very
American way of dealing with risk.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, all of
the justices of the United States Supreme Court viewed the Affordable
Care Act’s (ACA’s) individual health insurance mandate as legislation
aimed to influence individual conduct.1 The justices disagreed on the legal
implications of that conclusion. Justice Roberts’ majority opinion treated
the mandate as a constitutionally permissible tax on the decision to not buy
health insurance but not as permissible under the commerce power.2 Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion would have found the mandate constitutional under
1
2

Nat. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2576-601.
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either power,3 and the four dissenting justices would have rejected the
mandate’s constitutionality.4 But despite these disagreements, all of the
justices seem to agree that the mandate’s focus on individual regulation is
central to the case. In their opinions and in their questions at oral argument,
some of the justices seemed to suggest that by taking this step toward
regulating individual behavior, Congress was doing something new, legally
questionable and perhaps even dangerous.5
The ACA and the mandate are likely to be with us for some time.
And there may well be other circumstances in which Congress or state
legislatures might consider adopting similar individual mandates.
Consequently, now is an opportune time to examine important precedents
for the individual mandate that were largely overlooked in the debate about
its constitutionality.6 Of these precedents, none is more important than auto
insurance mandates, as this Article shows.
Auto insurance mandates are obviously different in some ways
from the health insurance mandate. Importantly, they are creations of state
law, and Commerce Clause issues therefore do not arise.7 Nevertheless,
they are still absolutely relevant. Underlying the constitutional challenge
was the idea that the ACA’s requirement that someone buy health
insurance, regardless of the reason for the requirement, was a frightening,

3

Id. at 2609-42.
Id. at 2642-77.
5
Some of the questions at oral arguments over potential types of mandates,
such as being compelled to join an exercise club, Transcript of Oral Argument at
40, NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393), to buy broccoli, id. at
13, or to buy burial insurance, id. at 7, are examples. Justice Alito’s questions
seemed to indicate deep skepticism about the basic risk-sharing characteristics of
insurance and the mandate, id. at 7-8. Justice Scalia wrote, “[i]f Congress can
reach out and command even those furthest removed from an interstate market to
participate in the market, then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited
power.” See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646.
6
Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s decision, the issue of auto insurance
mandates as precedents has resurfaced, with Representative Michelle Bachmann
claiming on CNN that auto insurance mandates are totally different from the
ACA’s individual mandate. Piers Morgan Tonight, Clips From Last Night:
Michele Bachmann on Car Insurance Versus Health Insurance, CNN (July 7,
2012),
http://piersmorgan.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/03/clips-from-last-nightmichelle-bachman-on-car-insurance-versus-health-insurance-glenn-frey-onchanges-in-the-music-industry/.
7
Justice Roberts stated, “[a]ny police power to regulate individuals as such, as
opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States.” NFIB,132 S. Ct. at 2591.
4
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unjustifiable, and unprecedented intrusion on personal liberty.8 Although
this argument was not explicitly made, it was an essential backdrop to the
litigation in general and to the Commerce Clause argument in particular.9
This focus of mandate opponents on ideas of liberty and coercion, with a
visceral opposition to government mandates, is likely to endure despite the
ACA mandate’s having been upheld. The vehicle for the liberty and
coercion arguments in Sibelius was the Commerce Clause, and in the
future another constitutional provision may be pressed into service to make
similar or even broader arguments.10 Our experience with auto insurance
mandates should help us evaluate whether these arguments have merit.
At a more basic level, understanding the role of individual
mandates in automobile insurance can help us understand what Congress
8

As Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Marcus noted in his dissent in
Florida v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv’s., “implicit in the plaintiffs’
Commerce Clause challenge…is the deeply rooted fear that the federal
government is infringing upon the individual’s right to be let alone-a fear that is
intertwined with a visceral aversion to the government’s making us do something
we do not want to do.” Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Serv’s., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566. See also, William P.
Marshall, National Healthcare and American Constitutional Culture, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 144-47 (2012) (noting particularly American distrust of
government). Charles Fried blogged shortly after the Sibelius decision: “the
energy behind the broccoli argument was about personal liberty, and no litigant
ventured that the mandate violated the liberty clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/
the-june-surprises-balls-strikes-and-the-fog-of-war/. For an explanation of the
“broccoli argument,” see infra note 23.
9
See supra note 5. See also, e.g., Fried, supra note 8.
10
Charles Fried wrote in his blog post shortly after the decision: “Of course,
the real shadow of impropriety on everyone’s mind but studiously omitted from
the argument and justifications is the supposed intrusion on individual liberty
implicated in Congress’s scheme: the offense to liberty in requiring someone to
enter the market and buy something from a nongovernmental purveyor… But the
argument was not made because it would have had to be made under the Liberty
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and this would have carried over to the similar
clause in the Fourteenth and therefore rendered any such a scheme enacted by a
state, such as Massachusetts, similarly invalid.” See Fried, supra note 8.
Massachusetts and New Jersey passed individual health insurance mandates before
the ACA was passed. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111M § 2 (West 2006) and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:15-2 (West 2009). The constitutionality of these mandates
has not been challenged to date.
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was doing, and why, when it enacted the individual mandate. Auto
insurance mandates are a ubiquitous example of risk-sharing through a
combination of private markets and public regulation, which is the same
broad approach taken by the ACA individual mandate.11 They also are an
important example, like the ACA individual mandate, of using private
insurance to tackle complex and wide-ranging problems involving illness
and injury which have significant public dimensions. While our society
uses private insurance to respond to many economic challenges, insurance
and insurance principles are often ignored or not understood by the public,
whether the subject is health, auto, or other insurance.12 That common lack
of understanding in turn creates fertile grounds for sweeping arguments
about individual liberty—arguments that nearly overturned the ACA and
that might well gain even greater traction in future debates. It is an ideal
time to examine what auto insurance mandates can tell us about the ACA
individual insurance mandate and about insurance mandates more
generally. These questions are largely unexamined in academic literature
and political discourse, perhaps because the ACA’s advocates and

11

See infra Part II.
According to one study by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), nearly 60 percent of Americans feel confident about
making insurance decisions concerning auto, home, and life insurance, but after
taking a 10 question “insurance IQ test” the majority of responders to the survey
received a failing score of 40 percent. Americans Believe They’re Savvy About
Insurance, But NAIC Insurance IQ Tells Different Story, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/insurance_
iq.htm. The NAIC also conducted a survey of 1,000 Americans concerning their
awareness of car insurance which revealed that “some of the basics of auto
insurance are not well understood, even though it is one of the most commonly
purchased types of insurance by people of all ages and demographics.” New NAIC
Insurance IQ Study Reveals Americans Lacking in Confidence, Knowledge of
Insurance Choice, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2010_docs/iiq_new.htm. This same survey also
found that “86 percent of respondents said they do not understand all of the terms
being used in the current discussion on health care reform.” Id. The Arizona
Department of Transportation released a report in 2004 regarding trends in
insurance coverage which notes that “many people do not understand the
difference between liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage.” Lisa
Markkula, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists: Trends in Policy and
Enforcement, ARIZ. DEP’T OF TRANSP., (June 2004), http://www.azdot.gov/tpd/
atrc/publications/project_reports/pdf/az548.pdf.
12
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defenders did not emphasize them, 13 and perhaps because insurance
principles are not widely understood.14 That absence of examination leaves
a significant gap in the literature which this Article endeavors to fill.
13

Auto insurance mandates were rarely mentioned in the litigation concerning
the ACA or in the legislative discussions of it. In its opening brief, the federal
government defended the health care individual mandate in part by referring to
state auto insurance mandates, but did not develop the argument. It wrote that:
“States have mandated insurance when (as here) an individual’s lack of insurance
shifts risk to others.” See 1 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 1:50
(rev. ed. 2009) (discussing mandatory automobile insurance laws). Congress
therefore acted well within its constitutional authority by adopting a means of
regulation parallel to insurance measures enacted by the states to address
comparable risk-shifting.” Brief for Petitioner at 36, NFIB v, Sebelius (U.S. Jun.
28, 2012) (No. 11-393). Auto insurance mandates were touched on superficially in
the oral argument, Transcript of Oral Argument at 65, NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-393). Sixth Circuit Judge Sutton noted the “related and
familiar mandate of the states-that most adults must purchase car insurance” in his
opinion supporting the constitutionality of the individual mandate, but did not
explore this point in detail. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,
565 (6th Cir. 2011).
President Obama mentioned car insurance mandates as precedents but neither
he nor other proponents of the mandates made a detailed argument based on these
mandates. In remarks to Congress, the President in 2009 described the necessity of
everyone participating in a health insurance pool, and explained as follows: “Now,
even if we provide these affordable options [like insurance provided through
exchanges meant to foster competition] there may be those-especially the young
and the healthy-who still want to take the risk and go without coverage…The
problem is, such irresponsible behavior costs all the rest of us money. If there are
affordable options and people still don’t sign up for health insurance, it means we
pay for those people’s expensive emergency room visits…. Unless everybody does
their part, many of the insurance reforms we seek-especially requiring insurance
companies to cover preexisting conditions-just can’t be achieved. And that’s why
under my plan, individuals will be required to carry basic health insurance-just as
most states require you to carry auto insurance.” President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9,
2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-toa-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky,
Health Reform is Constitutional, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 2009, 4:59 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28620.html
(mentioning
auto
insurance as a precedent). The idea of a federal individual mandate originated with
the Heritage Foundation over twenty years ago. A 1989 Heritage Foundation
publication, which endorsed the idea of an individual mandate, cited auto
insurance as a precedent, stating that a National Health Plan should: “Mandate all
households to obtain adequate insurance. Many [states] require anybody driving a
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This Article, in Part I, makes the argument that auto insurance
mandates are pertinent precedents and draws four important parallels
between auto insurance mandates and the ACA individual mandate. Both
were developed to tackle complex, challenging public policy situations
involving physical harm or illness and how to pay for needed redress or
treatment; they devised similar policy responses to seemingly intractable
dilemmas.15 Both require people to insure themselves against risks they
may want to bear themselves.16 Both require risk-spreading, which is
fundamentally what insurance does.17 Finally, both require people to buy
something from a private seller rather than having a government program
tackle the problems at which the mandates are aimed; they both embody a
public-private policy approach.18
Part II discusses the most common rejoinder to the claim that auto
insurance mandates are pertinent precedents, which is that auto insurance is
irrelevant because driving is a choice while living is not. This Part shows
that choice and coercion are much harder to distinguish in this context than
opponents contend. Driving is not always a choice,19 the Supreme Court’s
decision made clear that the decision whether to purchase insurance for

car to have liability insurance. But neither the federal government nor any state
requires all households to protect themselves from the potentially catastrophic
costs of a serious accident or illness. Under the Heritage [Foundation] plan, there
would be such a requirement.” Stuart M. Butler, Assuring Affordable Health Care
for All Americans, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LECTURE NO. 218 (Oct. 1, 1989) at 6.
Mandate opponents Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and Todd Graziano,
representing a later and very different Heritage Foundation position, wrote a
memorandum in 2009 preemptively deriding the idea of a parallel. Randy Barnett,
Nathaniel Stewart, & Todd Graziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health
Insurance is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 49
(Dec. 9, 2009) (hereinafter Barnett/Heritage Memo). Although the parts of the
article dealing with car insurance were inaccurate, there was no systematic
response to that part of the memorandum until 2012. See Jennifer Wriggins, Is the
Health Insurance Individual Mandate “Unprecedented?”: The Case of Auto
Insurance Mandates, SSRN (Feb. 25, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011025.
14
See supra note 12.
15
See infra Part I.A.
16
See infra Part I.B.
17
See infra Part I.C.
18
See infra Part I.D.
19
See infra Part II.A.
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those subject to the mandate actually is a choice,20 and auto insurance
mandates in fact are more coercive than the ACA mandate.21
Finally, the Article in Part III turns to two aspects of the history of
auto insurance mandates. One is the complex evolution of mandates, which
took place over a six decade period.22 Now forgotten but relevant today is
that opponents of mandates fought against them for decades, using
arguments about freedom and American values similar to the ‘broccoli
argument’ used today.23 Yet, in the battle over how to pay for injuries
connected with car accidents, governments did not take over the risk and
publicly fund car accident costs, but rather left the situation to a regulated
market—a market that required individual participation and that broadened
coverage through mandates ordering companies to cover high risk
individuals. The insurance industry developed insurance products to keep
risk privatized and adjusted successfully to the mandates. Not surprisingly,
‘freedom’ arguments lack resonance today in the auto insurance context.
Also forgotten but relevant is the legal history of auto insurance mandates
and auto insurance regulation.24 The constitutionality of auto insurance
mandates was doubted and challenged all the way to the United States
Supreme Court.25 The Supreme Court and other courts recognized that
insurance laws affecting individuals’ and companies’ freedom, such as
requiring individuals to buy insurance or companies to cover high risk
drivers, were permissible regulation especially in view of the public
welfare aspect of insurance. With constitutional doubts laid to rest, the
current public-private auto insurance regulation regime, with mandates
20

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
22
See infra Part III.
23
See infra Part III.A. The “broccoli argument” was a slippery-slope
argument advanced to support the position that the health insurance mandate in the
ACA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. According to
the ”broccoli argument,” if Congress has the power to require individuals to
purchase health insurance because it improves their health, which in turn affects
interstate commerce, then Congress could also require individuals to engage in
other health behavior like purchasing broccoli, which seems absurd. See NFIB v.
Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588-89 (2012). But see id. at 2619 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting in part) (responding to broccoli argument). See also Fried, supra note 8
(discussing broccoli argument).
24
See infra Part III.B.
25
See Ex parte Poresky, 54 S. Ct. 3, 4 (1933); Calif. State Auto. Assoc. InterInsurance Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 107 (1951), discussed infra at Part
III.B.
21
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coupled with private competition, has thrived for decades, to the benefit of
consumers. This history suggests that the ACA individual mandate may
gain more acceptance as the ‘freedom’ arguments lose resonance and the
benefits of the ACA become clearer.
This article shows that the ACA mandate is not the anomalous
outlier that its opponents claim and that it follows an American tradition of
tackling a huge problem by a public-private approach of insurance
regulation and mandates. Individual insurance mandates in both the auto
and health contexts are a reasonable approach to widespread problems
through economic regulation, rather than a frightening infringement on
personal freedom.
II.

MAKING THE ARGUMENT: PARALLELS BETWEEN THE
ACA AND AUTO INSURANCE INDIVIDUAL MANDATES

This section systematically draws parallels between the
characteristics of auto insurance mandates and the ACA’s individual
mandate. Obviously, health insurance and auto insurance are very
different, and insuring people’s health raises different issues from insuring
against losses associated with cars.26 Public policy debates about the two
issues have gone on for decades, although the battle over universal health
care has had a higher profile.27 Auto insurance mandates are not
26

See generally ROBERT JERRY & DOUGLAS RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 64[C], at 918 (5th ed. 2012); Deborah Stone, The Struggle for
the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L., 287 (1993);
Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Why It’s Called the Affordable Care Act, 110
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1 (2011) (reforms aimed at myriad problems
with U.S. health care system); Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and
Responsibility after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1577 (describing Affordable Care Act as creating a new social contract).
Issues of health care costs and health insurance in the U.S. are tremendously
complex. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 30030 (3d ed. 2000); Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory
Critique of ACA, 36 J. OF CORP. L. (2011); Brief of Amici Curiae Economic
Scholars in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on the Minimum Coverage
Issue, Health and Human Services v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398)
(describing unique features of health care finance and insurance).
27
See generally Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile
Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge to the Social Order in the Inter-War
Years: 1919-1941, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 525 (1997-1998) (describing history of
spread of autos, injuries, and regulatory responses); Bagley & Horwitz, supra note
26, at 8 (battle over universal health coverage has lasted almost 100 years); THEDA
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monolithic; there are several different types of commonly mandated auto
insurance.28 Yet, both mandates essentially devised the same policy
response to a huge public policy problem involving how to pay for
treatment or redress for physical illness or harm. The significant
similarities between the mandates are outlined next.
A.

BOTH TYPES OF MANDATES APPLY TO COMPLEX,
CHALLENGING SITUATIONS WHERE THERE ARE STRONG POLICY
REASONS FOR MANDATES
1. ACA Individual Mandate

One of the goals of the ACA was to increase health insurance
coverage, and the ACA individual mandate is an important means to that
goal.29 At the time the ACA was passed, there was bipartisan consensus
that extensive reform of the extremely complex U.S. health insurance
system was urgent.30 The ACA individual mandate was modeled on
Massachusetts’ individual mandate that passed in 2006, although the ACA
is a far broader and more complex law than the Massachusetts reforms.31
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 180-93 (1992) (describing early and mid
twentieth century political debates concerning universal health care).
28
Liability insurance, uninsured motorist coverage, Med-pay coverage, and
underinsured motorist coverage are the most common types of auto insurance;
some states have adopted partial no-fault reforms. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note
26, § 130. State mandates for each are enumerated at text accompanying notes 7279.
29
42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(2)(C), 18091(2)(I) (2006 & Supp. IV). See generally
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, HEALTH CARE SUPPLEMENT TO
ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 12 (5th ed. 2010).
30
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 6.
31
Michael Isikoff, White House used Mitt Romney health-care law as
blueprint for federal law, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/44854320/ns/politics-decision_2012/t/; Health Care: Mass
Observation: Health reform in Massachusetts, the Model for Barack Obama’s
version, still has a long way to go before it proves itself, ECONOMIST, June 25,
2011, at 37. ROBERT W. SIEFERT & ANDREW P. COHEN, RE-FORMING REFORM:
WHAT THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEANS FOR
MASSACHUSETTS 48 (U. Mass. Medical Center for Health Law and Economics &
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Foundation 2010) (federal law modeled
on Massachusetts’ law); 111 Cong. Rec. H 13119 (Nov. 18, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Stearns) (“In Massachusetts, for example—the public option here in
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Major problems that drove the national reform were the large number of
uninsured Americans, the increasing costs and spending, and the uneven
quality of health care in the U.S.32 Millions of uninsured people receive
health care for free, since laws, customs, and professional obligations have
long mandated hospitals and providers provide care even if a patient cannot
pay.33 Their bills often are uncollectible.34 These costs are passed on to the
government and private insurers; private insurers raise their premiums.35
As Justice Ginsberg stated: “The net result: Those with health insurance
subsidize the medical care of those without it. As economists would
describe what happens, the uninsured ‘free ride’ on those who pay for
health insurance.”36 Moreover, those without health insurance often do not
get preventive medical care that could reduce their health care costs later
on.37 States had not and would not be able to solve the problems.38 The
Congress is patterned after Massachusetts.”). See also 111 Cong. Rec. S 11990
(Nov. 30, 2009) (Statement of Sen. Enzi (“[a]t the beginning of this process, the
majority staff of the HELP Committee decided they were going to draft a partisan
bill based on the reforms that had recently been adopted in Massachusetts.”); 111
Cong. Rec. H 12192 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2009) (statement of Rep. Roe) (“The
Massachusetts plan had a noble goal, which was to try to cover as many of its
citizens as possible. That’s absolutely what we should try to do in an affordable
way. In Massachusetts now, they’re at around 97 percent coverage.”). Some
information, including a statement by former Governor Romney, indicates that the
Massachusetts health insurance mandate was based on its car insurance mandate.
David A. Fahrenthold, Mass. Bill Requires Health Coverage, State Set to Use Auto
Insurance as a Model, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006 (“Romney said the bill, modeled
on the state’s policy of requiring auto insurance, is intended to end an era in which
550,000 go without insurance and their hospital and doctor visits are paid for in
part with public funds. ‘We insist that everybody who drives a car has insurance,’
Romney said in an interview. ‘And cars are a lot less expensive than people.’”).
32
The Census Bureau estimates that 48.6 million Americans were uninsured
in 2011. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C.
SMITH, CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012
pubs/p60-243.pdf; BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40517, HEALTH CARE
REFORM, AN INTRODUCTION (Apr. 14, 2009). Over forty million Americans did
not have health insurance during some part of 2007. Id. at 1.
33
NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 2611.
37
Id. at 2611-12.
38
Id. at 2612.
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mandate went along with other important reforms which prohibited
insurance companies from denying coverage for preexisting conditions or
charging more to insure unhealthy than healthy people.39 Increasing health
insurance coverage made eminent sense as a reform goal.40
The idea of a federal individual mandate had long been suggested
as a way to expand coverage--it was initially proposed by the domestic
policy director of the Heritage Foundation in a 1989 lecture published by
the Heritage Foundation. 41 The Heritage lecture recognized health
insurance as different from other sorts of insurance in that it raised
compelling moral issues of societal responsibility. The lecture claimed:
[H]ealth care is different. If a man is struck down by a
heart attack in the street, Americans will care for him
whether or not he has insurance. If we find that he has
spent his money on other things rather than insurance,
we may be angry but we will not deny him services—
even if that means more prudent citizens end up
picking up the tab. A mandate on individuals
recognizes this implicit contract. Society does feel a
moral obligation to insure that its citizens do not
suffer from the unavailability of health care. But on
the other hand, each household has the obligation, to

39

These are known as the “guaranteed-issue” and “community rating”
provisions. NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
40
There was not the political will for a single-payer system or a public option.
See infra note 86. The Affordable Care Act obviously was a political compromise
which did not fundamentally change the structure of U.S. insurance markets and
did not aggressively tackle issues of quality or cost. See generally ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 29 at 12-13, 20-21. “Moral hazard” is an important
insurance concept that comes into play here. Tom Baker states that the term
“‘moral hazard’ typically is used to refer to the theoretical tendency for insurance
to reduce incentives (1) to minimize loss or (2) to minimize the cost of a loss.”
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY 4 (2d ed. 2008). The second type, known
as “ex post moral hazard,” is implicated here. Abraham and Schwarcz outline the
“ex post moral hazard concern” of health insurance, which is “the risk that
individuals who become sick will over-consume health care because they do not
pay the full cost of such care,” ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 9-10.
The ACA has experimental programs to try to control costs but does little to
change the ex post moral hazard connected with costs. Id. at 21.
41
Butler, supra note 13.
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the extent that it is able, to avoid placing demands on
society by protecting itself.42
President Obama also observed that “[U]nless everybody does their part,
many of the insurance reforms we seek—especially requiring insurance
companies to cover preexisting conditions—just can’t be achieved,” thus
describing it as a way for people to be required to pay their fair share.43
There are compelling, insurance-related reasons, often lost in the
debate, for having the mandate be one of the ways to increase coverage.
The key insurance-related reason for it is to combat “adverse selection,”
which is the tendency for people who are disproportionately likely to
experience an insured-against event to buy insurance for that event.44 This
leads to a heightened number of claims and increased costs.45 Adverse
selection is a phenomenon in insurance generally and had been common in
the individual health insurance market prior to the ACA’s passage.46 This
led companies to have broad exclusions in policies for pre-existing
conditions which greatly limited coverage supplied by policies.47 In the
health insurance context, the general adverse selection concern is that
people who were healthy would not buy insurance until they thought they
were getting sick, and insurance companies extending insurance would not
know the buyers’ exact health status; then cost projections would be
42

Butler, supra note 13, at 6. Butler stated immediately before the passage
quoted above that the Heritage proposed federal individual mandate “assumes that
there is an implicit contract between households and society, based on the notion
that health insurance is not like other forms of insurance protection. If a young
man wrecks his Porsche and has not had the foresight to obtain insurance, we may
commiserate but society feels no obligation to repair his car. But health care is
different.” Id.
43
President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health
Care (Sept. 10, 2009), supra note 13.
44
BAKER, supra note 40, at 6 (noting that adverse selection in this context
generally refers to “the (theoretical) tendency for high-risk people to be more
interested in insurance than low-risk people.” Mark Hall, Commerce Clause
Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PENN. L. REV 1825, 1841 (2011)
(mandate essential to combat adverse selection). ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra
note 29, at 12 (purpose of mandate is to combat adverse selection).
45
BAKER, supra note 40, at 6.
46
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 11 (In the individual market,
prior to the ACA, because of adverse selection concerns, almost all policies had
preexisting condition exclusions.).
47
Id. at 5, 11.
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inaccurate, payouts would be excessive, and costs would skyrocket.48 The
ACA itself explains:
[I]f there were no requirement, many individuals would
wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care.
By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act,
will minimize the adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement is
essential to creating effective health insurance markets in
which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage for preexisting conditions can be sold.49
In other words, the mandate’s goal, which was part of the larger reforms, is
to broaden the risk pool so that insurance markets can work better for the
benefit of consumers.50
This broadening of the risk pool was well explained by Justice
Ginsburg:
In the fullness of time…today’s young and healthy will
become society’s old and infirm. Viewed over a lifespan
the costs and benefits even out: The young who pay more
than their fair share currently will pay less than their fair
share when they become senior citizens…And even if, as
undoubtedly will be the case, some individuals, over their
lifespans, will pay more for health insurance than they
receive in health services, they have little to complain
about, for that is how insurance works. Every insured
person of the covered class will ultimately need that
protection.51
48

Hall, supra note 44, at 1841.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2010). ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra
note 29, at 20.
50
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2010). See generally Bagley &
Horwitz, supra note 26.
51
NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2620 (2012). The Commerce Clause
section of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in which this language is found is of course a
dissent, but it is relevant here both because the mandate was upheld and because
her analysis focuses on the health insurance aspects of the Affordable Care Act
49
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The ACA mandate arose from an urgent situation where reform was
needed for many reasons; these reasons included a huge number of
uninsured people and the costs imposed on the insured by the uninsured.52
Having a mandate that gives an incentive for people to purchase health
insurance, in order to extend coverage and reduce adverse selection, was a
positive policy reform.
2. Auto Insurance Mandates
Auto insurance mandates, which developed over decades, have a
variety of goals.53 The goals include protecting drivers from tort judgments
for damages caused by their negligence, making a pool of money available
to compensate for injuries caused by negligently driven automobiles,
compensating drivers for injuries caused by uninsured and underinsured
drivers, and making sure medical expenses from car accidents are paid
for.54 The development and spread of cars in the United States in the first
half of the twentieth century created many challenges.55 Cars, in addition to
being wonderful instruments of transportation, were mobile instruments of
destruction which easily could kill or maim.56 Injuries and death caused by
cars were legion, and the best way to encourage safety, provide financial
security for drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, and compensate for
injuries caused by cars was not obvious.57 After decades of legislative
experimentation and industry opposition, the current web of mandates
developed to deal with cars—an expensive and injury-causing necessity.58
which is pertinent to this article. Id. at 2617-18. In contrast, the majority sees
insurance as simply another product. Id. at 2586-87, 2590-91.
52
See supra text accompanying notes 29-40.
53
See discussion infra Part III (discussing the history of auto insurance
mandates).
54
See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY:
INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 85-104 (2008)
[hereinafter LIABILITY]; Simon, supra note 27.
55
See generally LIABILITY, supra note 54.
56
See generally Simon, supra note 27. In fact some thought there should be
strict liability for auto injuries under a dangerous instrumentality theory. Id. at 562.
S. Lochlann Jain, “Dangerous Instrumentality”: The Bystander as Subject in
Automobility, 19 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 61-94 (2004). Most people
lacked health and disability insurance and injuries were common, so that injuries
were likely to be calamitous. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 72-73.
57
Simon, supra note 27.
58
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 78-103.
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Mandates have proven to be a workable policy approach to the complex
issues presented by the injuries caused by cars.59
Driving can lead to injuries that have costs of various types,
including injuries that a careless driver causes and injuries that a faultless
driver suffers. These injuries are hard to predict in advance and their costs
may be astronomical. Other than a very few rich people, no one can be
certain that she has the money available to cover those unexpected events.
Mandatory auto insurance turns many accidents that would be financial
disasters into mere inconveniences.60
Without mandates, adverse selection, described above, can occur.
61
People who know they are most at risk for a particular harm will tend to
buy insurance, while those who are at lower risk will tend not to buy it.
What then can happen is that insurance companies’ costs are higher than
expected, which results in rate increases or company failure.62
In the auto insurance context, adverse selection is rarely discussed
because of auto insurance individual mandates which by definition
minimize adverse selection.63 But if there were no individual mandates,
adverse selection could easily arise -- dangerous but wealthy drivers who
fear tort judgments might seek liability insurance to protect their assets in
case they injure someone through their carelessness. At the same time,
people who are confident in their own carefulness might choose not to buy
liability insurance. That might make the liability insurance pool more full
of risky drivers than insurance companies anticipated, resulting in higher-

59

Id. at 102. This is not to say that mandates are perfect. See infra note 65.
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102.
61
See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
62
See supra p. 34.
63
Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of
One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 888 (1986) (noting that since
car insurance is mandatory, adverse selection concerns are lessened); See Robert
Hockett, Making Sense of the Health-Care Reform Debate, 53 CHALLENGE 28, 44
(Jan-Feb 2010) (“[A] principal means of avoiding the adverse selection problem is
by requiring participation by all, in order that no particular inference need be
drawn from somebody’s seeking to participate. But only the state has authority to
require that people participate in insurance pools—as states routinely do, for
example, with driver’s insurance, social security, and Medicare…[I]n requiring
participation in such insurance pools, government is doing more than addressing
the adverse-selection obstacle to well-functioning insurance arrangements. It is
also preventing a form of free-riding—for example, that of uninsured motorists
upon the coverage of insured motorists.”).
60
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than-predicted costs.64 This could further result in skyrocketing rates and
insurance company failure. Further, if many drivers do not buy insurance,
rates go up for those who do, and the victims of many accidents go
uncompensated, which spreads the costs throughout society. But even very
careful drivers must buy auto liability insurance. After all, they might be
careless and cause an accident that they could not pay for – even though
that is unlikely. Their liability insurance keeps them from financial ruin
and helps compensate the injured person. If the careful driver’s insurance
does not cover the accident costs, and the driver cannot afford those costs
out-of-pocket, the costs fall only on the victim or are passed on to society.
Combating adverse selection through individual auto insurance mandates
which allow competition and comparison shopping has proven to be
workable, successful policy.65

64

Since there are mandates this is necessarily hypothetical, but it logically
follows from the concept of adverse selection. Wortham, supra note 63 (noting
that since car insurance is mandatory, adverse selection concerns are lessened).
65
Of course, auto insurance mandates are not a perfect solution to the
problems they tackle; nor is there a perfect solution. They may have inflationary
effects on health costs. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 103. They may lead to more
accidents than there would be without insurance because of the “moral hazard”
effect of having liability coverage. Alma Cohen & Rajeeve Dehejia, The Effect of
Auto Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON.
357, 357 (2004) (arguing that auto insurance mandates have led to increases in
fatalities due to moral hazard effect of insurance). For discussion of “moral
hazard” concept, see supra note 40. Auto insurance mandates (and the way they
are priced) may encourage more driving than is environmentally beneficial. See
generally Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies:
Driving, Insurance, Torts, and Changing the ‘Choice Architecture’ of Auto
Insurance Pricing, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV 69, 73-80 (2010). There are persistent
equity issues in the way insurance companies classify risk. See, e.g., King v.
Meese, 743 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1987) (classification by insurance companies of safe
drivers who live in South Central Los Angeles as high risk drivers, and requiring
them therefore to pay more is constitutional). See generally KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTING RISK]; Regina Austin, The Insurance
Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (1983); Wortham, supra note
63.
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BOTH TYPES OF MANDATE REQUIRE PEOPLE TO INSURE
THEMSELVES AGAINST RISKS THEY MAY WANT TO BEAR
THEMSELVES
1. ACA individual mandate

A person may want to set aside the money that she may need to
pay medical and hospital bills if she becomes ill or has an accident, rather
than purchase insurance in advance. This is known as self-insuring.66 For
example, Kaj Ahlberg, one of the individual plaintiffs in Florida v. U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, which was also decided as part
of NFIB v. Sibelius, filed a declaration stating he has no health insurance
and has “no desire or intention to buy health insurance in the future, as I
am now and reasonably expect to remain, financially capable of paying for
my and my family’s health care services out of my own resources as
needed.”67 Plaintiff Ahlberg also stated that he thought health insurance
was not a “sensible or acceptable” use of his financial resources.68 This
idea that a person should be able to self-insure for medical costs deeply
resonates with the freedom and coercion arguments that underlay the
plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause arguments.69 But if a person is one of those
affected by the ACA individual mandate, her choice to self-insure will
have a cost—she will have to either buy health insurance or make the
66

Robert Jerry and Douglas Richmond explain as follows: “Sometimes people
cope with risk through self-insurance. For example, a restaurant owner, cognizant
of the possibility that a person may contract food poisoning, is likely to take
substantial preventive measures to limit the risk of such an occurrence. After
taking such steps, a remote risk nonetheless exists that a customer might be
poisoned. The owner may calculate that such an event will rarely occur and may
conclude that if it does occur the damages associated with such an event could
easily be paid from the owner’s assets. Alternatively, the owner may choose to set
aside a portion of each year’s profits into a reserve fund designated to pay the loss
should it occur. In either case, the owner chooses to bear the risk. This is the
essence of self-insurance.” JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 10.
67
Declaration of Kaj Ahlburg in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, ¶ 4, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Case No,:
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, U.S.D.C., N.D. Fla. Pensacola, Order Granting Summary
Judgment, 15. Similarly, Mary Brown’s declaration stated that she “is subject to
the individual mandate and objects to being required to comply as she does not
believe the cost of health insurance is a wise or acceptable use of her resources.”
Id. at 14 (quoting Mary Brown’s declaration).
68
Ahlburg declaration, supra note 67, at ¶ 7.
69
See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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Shared Responsibility Payment.70 For those to whom the ACA mandate
applies, the government is telling people they are not allowed to “freely”
bear risks that they might want to, and might be perfectly capable of,
bearing themselves.
2. Auto insurance individual mandates
A driver may want to set aside the money that she will have to pay
if she injures someone through negligence rather than purchase insurance
to cover that risk. She may currently be able to, and expect to remain able
to pay for harm she might cause through her carelessness, so she may want
to self-insure against that risk. But the requirements in 49 states that she
buy liability insurance before registering a car and driving, on pain of civil
or criminal penalties,71 covering what she would have to pay if she injured
someone through negligence, deny her that “free” choice of setting aside
the funds in advance.72
70

See infra text accompanying notes 122-27 (discussing the Shared
Responsibility Payment); see infra Part II (discussing choice and coercion as ways
to distinguish between auto insurance mandates and the ACA mandate).
71
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Compulsory Auto/Uninsured
Motorists (Feb. 2013), http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/compulsory
(49 states and the District of Columbia in 2012 had mandatory liability auto
insurance). State laws require drivers to purchase liability coverage in specified
minimum amounts. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 132. New Hampshire
does not require every driver to purchase liability insurance but does require all
drivers to show they are financially responsible and requires drivers who have
been convicted of driving under the influence to purchase liability insurance. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 264 (LexisNexis 2011). According to one treatise published in
1974, around the time many insurance mandates were passed, liability insurance is
aimed at alleviating two major problems: “1. Protecting the tortfeasor of an
automobile accident from financial disaster resulting from a judgment rendered
against him in a court of law. 2. Providing compensation for the victim of an
accident for injuries received from the accident.” M.G. WOODRUFF III, JOHN R.
FONSECA & ALPHONSE M. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT
LAW § 3:1 (1974). See CALVIN H. BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 16
(Richard D. Irwin, Inc. ed., 1961) (liability coverage has dual purpose of
protecting the finances of the insured and the victim).
72
Liability insurance “pays proceeds to a third party to whom an insured
becomes liable.” BAKER, supra note 40, at 23. Liability insurance pays, on behalf
of a negligent driver, money that the negligent driver owes to his victim up to a set
limit purchased in advance. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 924.
Enforcement is through the torts system. Id.
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Similarly, this same driver may want to set aside the money for a
different risk, namely the risk that she or a passenger will suffer injuries
from a negligent driver who does not have insurance or who is a hit-andrun driver. This driver who wants to self-insure may think that the risk of
being injured by a hit-and-run or uninsured driver is low, that she has
sufficient resources to cover her and her passengers’ injuries in that kind of
a situation, and that purchasing insurance to cover that risk is a waste of
money.73 However, laws in twenty-two jurisdictions require that this driver
buy insurance for the risk to herself and her passengers from being struck
by an uninsured or hit-and-run driver; this is known as uninsured motorist
coverage.74
Laws in a few states will tell this same motorist that even if she
does not want to buy insurance coverage for her own or her passengers’
medical bills, she must buy it (up to a certain limit).75 And laws in eight
states tell this driver that she also must buy insurance to cover the risk that
she (or her passengers) will be injured by a driver who does not have

73

Perhaps she has excellent health insurance and disability insurance, and she
would rather self-insure against these risks than purchase insurance for them.
74
Insurance protecting drivers from risks created by other drivers who may
lack insurance is known as uninsured motorist coverage. ALAN I. WIDISS &
JEFFREY E. THOMAS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 8
(3d ed. 2005). Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia require drivers to
purchase it. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Compulsory
Auto/Uninsured
Motorists
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/compulsory;
Memo
from
Christopher Harmon to Jennifer Wriggins August 24, 2012 (twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia require uninsured motorists coverage; Insurance
Information Institute Memo does not list Connecticut) (on file with the author);
WIDISS & THOMAS, supra, at 8; 6 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY
EDITION § 61.02[3][a][ii] (Christopher J. Robinette ed. 2012). For more detail on
uninsured motorist coverage and its historical development see infra note 159.
75
This is known as Med-Pay coverage. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 79-80. It
is required for all drivers in Colorado, Maine, and Pennsylvania. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-4-635 (2012) (passed in 2004), ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29 § 1605-A (2012)
(Maine, passed in 1997), 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1711 (West 2006) (passed in
1984). New Hampshire requires that auto liability policies contain Med-Pay
coverage, although New Hampshire is the only state that does not require all
drivers to purchase liability coverage. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:16 (LexisNexis
2011) (passed in 1971). See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 79-80 (noting Med-Pay
coverage began in mid-twentieth century and allowed coverage of medical
expenses before health insurance became widespread).
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sufficient insurance to cover her or her passengers’ injuries.76 Finally, laws
in sixteen states require her to buy “no-fault” coverage that covers part of
accident expenses regardless of driver carelessness.77 Again, even if this
driver is currently, and expects to remain able to cover the potential costs,
she is not allowed to do that without risking civil or criminal penalties in
the states where this coverage is required.
States have long legislated that individuals may not decide to selfinsure against many risks of auto use, including risks to themselves, their
passengers, or their own assets. While some of these are risks to others,
some are risks to the driver herself. Mandatory car insurance, in all its
various forms,78 is an example of the government telling drivers that they
are not allowed to bear risks that they might want to, and might be
perfectly capable of, bearing themselves.79
C.

BOTH TYPES OF MANDATES REQUIRE THAT RISKS BE
TRANSFERRED AND SPREAD, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTALLY
WHAT INSURANCE DOES

The various mandates require transfer and spreading of risk, which
are essential yet often forgotten aspects of insurance.80
76

This is known as “underinsured motorist coverage.” WIDISS & THOMAS,
supra note 74, § 31.4. Eight states mandate that drivers buy this coverage, so that
if they are harmed by a careless driver who does not have sufficient liability
insurance to cover their injuries, they will have sufficient coverage under their
own ‘underinsured motorist’ coverage. NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra
note 74, at VOL. 6 § 61.02[3][a][ii].
77
See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 74. This no-fault
coverage often is known as Personal Injury Protection (PIP) and can cover medical
expenses, lost wages, and rehabilitation expenses depending on the state. JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 132.
78
The forms mentioned above are liability insurance, uninsured motorist
coverage, Med-Pay coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, and no-fault
elements. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
79
For discussion of choice and coercion in the two contexts, see infra Part II.
80
According to insurance scholar Tom Baker, “[A] risk transfer is…a
transaction or institutional arrangement that transfers, or shifts, risk from one
person or entity to another…[R]isk spreading occurs whenever an entity takes on
risk and parcels it out to a group of people. Insurance is the paradigmatic riskspreading institution. Many people pay relatively small amounts of money so that
there is a large pot of money to cover the costs of the unfortunate few who suffer a
loss.” BAKER, supra note 40, at 2. Insurance scholar Kenneth Abraham describes
the same process with somewhat different terminology: “[I]nsurance is a method
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1. ACA individual mandate
Congress chose to approach health care reform with a private
insurance framework rather than public funding; this meant that risksharing between individuals was an essential aspect of the plan. If I am one
of those affected by the mandate, the premiums that someone else pays
may end up benefitting me if I become a victim of a disease or injury.81
Those premiums will help pay the hospitals and doctors that provide
medical care for me, and they may total much, much more than the cost of
my premiums. Correlatively, health insurance premiums that I pay may
wind up benefitting not me but someone else who is a victim of a disease
or injury. This pooling and transferring of risk is the essence of insurance.82
2. Auto insurance individual mandates
States have chosen to respond to the myriad injury problems
caused by autos through a private insurance framework rather than public
funding. Having liability insurance means that other people’s premiums
may end up benefitting me if I cause an accident through carelessness,
because the premiums other people have paid for their liability insurance
may be used to help pay the judgment or settlement that compensates for
the injury I caused through carelessness.83 Also, other people’s premiums
may help me if I am a victim of an accident caused by someone else’s
carelessness, since those premiums will help pay for the compensation I
receive from the injurer’s liability policy. Alternatively, my premiums may
of managing risk by distributing it among large numbers of individuals or
enterprises.” ABRAHAM, supra note 65. See NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2620 (2012) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting “that is how insurance works.”).
81
As Tom Baker explains, “[m]any, perhaps most, people in the United States
never realize that, if they are lucky, most of their premiums for most forms of
insurance will go to pay other people’s claims. Indeed, one of the most common
images of insurance is quite similar to that of a savings account….[People] often
expect that over the course of a lifetime the deposits made by each person should
roughly equal the withdrawals on that person’s insurance account….[W]hen it
comes to health, disability, property, and term life insurance, if your withdrawals
equal your deposits, you have had, at least in some respects, a very unfortunate
life. If you are fortunate, your insurance dollars go to pay other people’s claims.”
BAKER, supra note 40, at 14.
82
Id. at 2, 14.
83
Id. at 14 (describing how one’s insurance premium dollars may go to pay
others’ claims, or vice versa).
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end up benefitting not me but someone who negligently causes an accident
or a victim who suffers an injury from someone else’s carelessness. This
sharing and shifting of risk is what insurance does.
D.

BOTH TYPES OF MANDATE REQUIRE
SOMETHING FROM A PRIVATE SELLER

PEOPLE

TO

BUY

Both mandates require people to buy something from a private
seller since they are based on the very American idea that competition
among insurance companies, combined with laws requiring coverage, will
benefit consumers more than having a government program alone deal
with the situation.84
1. ACA individual mandate
Congress could have chosen to fund health care costs in a
different way, for example through universal public insurance funded
through its power to tax. It could have expanded existing government
health care funding such as the Medicare and Medicaid programs that
currently provide health care to millions who fit specific eligibility criteria
84

Workers compensation legislation takes a somewhat similar, private-public
approach to insurance for workers’ injuries. In every state but Texas, employers of
a certain size must participate. 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §
2.06, at 2-12 (MATTHEW BENDER & CO. 2009), VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN
GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 651 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that
participation in Texas is optional but encouraged). In most states, employers
obtain insurance through the private market. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 60.
Fourteen states have a “public option” of state-run insurance that competes with
private insurers, while six states have government-run funds that monopolize the
field of coverage. Id. at 60-61. The large majority of states allow employers to
self-insure for groups. Christine Fuge, The Workers Compensation Self-Insurance
Decision, INT’L RISK MGM’T INS. (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2001/fuge08.aspx. This approach to workers
compensation is what Professor Abraham calls a “mixed public-private insurance
approach,” and contrasts with systems in other countries where workplace injury
costs are compensated through their social welfare systems. LIABILITY, supra note
38, at 61. See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 27, at 285-302 (describing history of
workers compensation reforms and particularly the failure of more comprehensive
policies), JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
(2004) (outlining history of workers compensation legislation). For further
discussion of workers compensation law history, see infra note 180.
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to cover everyone.85 But that would have been dramatically different from
the ACA, which largely leaves the system of governmental provision of
health insurance in place and adopts a mostly privatized system for health
care not covered by governmental programs.86 One of the goals of the
ACA and the mandate was to increase competition and choice for the
benefit of consumers.87 It will use a system of state exchanges which will
allow variations between states as to basic requirements for policies and
will allow consumers to comparison shop for policies that are most
beneficial for them and their families.88 Since the mandate does not go into
effect until 2014, at the present one cannot point to existing increased
competition for customers.
2. Auto insurance individual mandates
It would be possible to have the losses caused by car accidents be
paid for in a totally different way, perhaps through a no-fault insurance
plan or government programs funded by tax revenue.89 But legislatures
have decided that mandates setting a floor for coverage and mandates that
85

ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 5.
Id. The mandate was far from a single-payer system and did not even
include a public option. Shalagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, Senate Democrats
Largely Support Health Care Deal that Drops Public Option, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 2009, at A1; see also Dems Make Deal to Drop Public Option, CBS NEWS
(Dec. 9, 2009, 12:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-5943452.html.
87
See Putting Americans in Control of Their Health Care, WHITEHOUSE, Title
I. Quality, Affordable Health Care for all Americans, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal/titlei (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (
“Americans without insurance coverage will be able to choose the insurance
coverage that works best for them in a new open competitive insurance market—
the same insurance market that every member of Congress will be required to use
for their insurance...”).
88
See supra note 87; Louise Radnofsky, Puzzling Over What to Call State
Insurance Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2012, at A7; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ,
supra note 29, at 15.
89
In fact, a no-fault plan modeled on workers compensation insurance (known
as the Columbia Plan) was proposed in 1932 by prominent experts but it never
became law in any state. Simon, supra note 27, at 585-87; LIABILITY, supra note
54, at 4-7. Other efforts to replace the liability system for auto accidents with a nofault system did not lead to comprehensive reform. Id. at 92-100. For a recent
analysis of the failure of no-fault to spread more widely, see Nora Freeman
Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61 DEPAUL L.
REV. 303 (2012).
86
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companies cover high-risk drivers, together with competition among
companies and the common law theory of negligence liability are the best
way to approach the funding of the costs of accidents.90 Auto insurance
mandates have led to fierce competition and continued innovation.91 They
exemplify how government mandates coupled with private competition
have resulted in a successful system which extends coverage and shares
risk very broadly, bringing many benefits to consumers. 92
E.

CONCLUSION

There are significant similarities between the mandates. First, they
both are ways to tackle public policy dilemmas that have no easy solution,
and there are strong policy reasons for mandates in each context. Second,
they direct people to insure themselves against risks they may want to
handle through setting money aside rather than through buying insurance.
Third, they require that risks be pooled and transferred, which is a
fundamental function of insurance. Fourth, they both are based on the very
American idea that, rather than a government takeover of a problem,
competition among private companies, together with laws requiring
coverage and regulating insurance, will benefit the public more. In the auto
context, mandates have developed into system which is so workable and
widely accepted that most people do not think about it much.93 The
parallels between the two types of requirements are striking, and show that
90

Each state has a high risk plan which requires insurance companies to offer
coverage to drivers considered too risky to insure. See infra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text. Liability for car accidents has long been based on the common
law theory of negligence. Simon, supra note 27, at 561; JERRY & RICHMOND,
supra note 26, at §§ 131-32. However, cases almost always settle and treatment of
claims is generally routinized and without deep inquiry into fault. See generally
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight & Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805
(2011) (describing how routinization distances damage determinations from fault
determinations).
91
See e.g., Deregulating Auto Insurance: Hearing Before H. Comm. on
Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation (Aug. 1, 2001)
(statement of Robert E. Litan, Vice President, Economic Studies Program at
Brookings
Institution),
available
at
http://.www.brookings.edu/testimony/2001/0801business_litan.aspx
(testimony
stating that insurance for automobiles is a competitive market, and with the advent
of the internet it will be more so); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 918-19
(describing pay-as-you-drive developments). See infra note 169.
92
See infra pp. 37-39.
93
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102.

300

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.2

the ACA individual mandate is neither the anomaly nor the unprecedented
intrusion on individual freedom which its opponents claim.94 This in turn
leads which leads to discussion of the claim that auto insurance mandates
are completely distinguishable because driving is a choice.
III.

CHOICE, FREEDOM, AND COERCION

The most common response to the example of car insurance
mandates as precedents is that auto insurance mandates are totally different
because driving is a choice.95 This “choice rejoinder” of mandate critics
asserts that one can choose to drive or not to drive and government can
regulate because driving is a choice.96 By contrast, there is no choice in the
ACA mandate context; one must buy the insurance simply because one is
alive.97 Critics claim that the ACA mandate is deeply coercive, in contrast
to auto insurance mandates 98 This Part will show that the line between
choice and coercion does not track the two kinds of mandates in that way.
First, driving often is not a choice but a necessity, as cases and statutes
94

See, e.g., Barnett/Heritage Memo, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Michael Tanner, Individual Mandates for Health Insurance:
Slippery Slope to National Health Care, CATO INSTITUTE (Policy Analysis No.
568), Apr. 5, 2006, at 10 n.13 (“If one does not like the regulations, including an
insurance mandate, one can choose not to drive. A health insurance mandate
would not generally give people such a choice.”); Barnett/Heritage Memo, supra
note 13, at 6; America’s Newsroom, Interview by Bill Henner with George Pataki,
former N.Y. Governor (FOX Television Broadcast Sept. 6, 2010) (Former
Governor George Pataki of New York was asked in a September 2010 interview,
‘what’s the difference between being required to carry auto insurance and the
requirement to carry health insurance?’ He responded: The difference is, if you
want to drive a car on a public street in this country, you are asking the
government for the right to do something. You don’t have a right to go on a public
highway. And when you do go on a public road, you can pose [] risk to someone
else out there. So clearly the government has the right to say that you should know
how to drive and you should have insurance if you do. But the health-care bill
says, if you don’t want to do anything, if you just want to sit home and not
participate, we’re going to fine you, because we’re going to make you participate
in this program,’ Interviewer: ‘So, it is mandatory participation, it’s not voluntary
as is the case when you choose to drive a car?’ Mr. Pataki: ‘When you choose to
drive.’).
96
See supra note 95.
97
See supra note 95.
98
See, e.g., Barnett/Heritage Memo supra note 13, at 6; Tanner, supra note
95; America’s Newsroom, supra note 95.
95
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have long recognized.99 Second, for those to whom the ACA mandate
might apply, there is a choice between buying insurance and making a
Shared Responsibility Payment, which is not different in kind from other
government incentives and taxes.100 Third, auto insurance mandates
actually are more coercive than the ACA mandate.101 In short, the ACA
mandate involves less coercion and more choice than its opponents claim,
and car mandates involve more coercion and less choice than is commonly
recognized. Therefore, the ACA mandate cannot be dismissed as coercive
while accepting car insurance mandates as not coercive.
A.

DRIVING IS NOT A PURE “CHOICE”

Characterizing driving as a pure choice has no footing in the reality
of most Americans’ lives. Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney
articulated this in a 2011 interview: “[T]he government of course has a lot
of mandates, and I know folks don’t like that—mandates kids go to school,
mandates they have to have auto insurance if they have an automobile. And
my conservative friends say, well, we don’t have to have automobiles; well
what state do you live in? Of course you have to have automobiles in this
nation.”102 Romney’s point is simply that automobiles and driving are
necessities in the U.S. Driving is very often not a pure choice but rather is
essential for making a living and just for living; it is a constrained decision
shaped not only by individuals and households but by government policy
at all levels.103
Cases and statutes have long recognized that driving is not an
‘extra’ or a choice, but that it is necessary for people to be able to earn a
living. For example, in the context of drivers’ licenses, the United States
Supreme Court wrote that once the state issues licenses, “their continued

99

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
101
See infra Part II.C.
102
The O’Reilly Factor, Interview by Bill O’Reilly with Former Governor Mitt
Romney, Presidential Candidate (FOX Television Broadcast, Sept. 13, 2011).
103
It is true that in some parts of the United States such as Manhattan in New
York City, driving is not essential. But those parts are the exception and tend to be
expensive. See Genevieve Guiliano & Susan Hanson, Managing the Auto, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 385 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve
Guiliano, eds., 3d ed. 2004) (“The U.S. has the highest rate of private vehicle
ownership, the highest level of daily miles traveled and the lowest rates of tripmaking by modes other than the auto [in the world.]”).
100
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possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” 104
Therefore, procedural due process must be given before a license may be
suspended.105 If the ability to drive had not been an element of “life,
liberty, or property,” in this case property, no process would have been
due.106 The Supreme Court also has recognized that many are dependent on
driving in order to make a living.107
The Supreme Court of Michigan considered driving to be a
necessity when determining the constitutionality of comprehensive auto
insurance reform in the 1978 case of Shavers v. Kelley.108 Upholding the
reforms in general but specifying that auto insurance had to be provided at
equitable and fair rates, the court explained as follows:
In Michigan the independent mobility provided by an
automobile is a crucial, practical necessity; it is undeniable
that whether or not a person can obtain a driver's license or
register and operate his motor vehicle profoundly affects
important aspects of his day-to-day life.109
The court noted that under the law, without insurance, a person could not
register her vehicle, and “the interest in registering and operating a vehicle
is as significant as the interest in the use of a driver’s license.”110
Therefore, the state’s auto insurance laws had to guarantee that rates were
not arbitrary or unfair in order to be constitutional.111
Every state’s laws treat driving as more of a necessity than a
choice since every state has a requirement that auto insurers cover high risk

104

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
According to Laurence Tribe, the court’s decisions in this area have largely
abandoned “whatever had remained of the rights-privileges distinction.”
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988). See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
106
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107
See Calif. State Auto. Assoc. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105,
107 (1951), discussed infra at Part III.B.
108
Shavers v. Kelley, 402 Mich. 554, 598 (1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 934
(1979).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 599.
111
Id. at 600. The court’s decision gave the legislature and the state
commissioner eighteen months to ensure that rates were equitable and fair. The
Supreme Court denied cert, and there is no further history. See supra note 108.
105
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individuals so that those individuals can drive.112 This is a mandate on
insurance companies. Rather than simply allowing insurance companies to
deny coverage to risky drivers so that they cannot drive, all states have
developed a plan so that high risk drivers can get behind the wheel, backed
by insurance.113 As noted in one treatise: “[t]he need for such a plan is
instantly recognizable. The only alternatives are either to impose a
disproportionate number of bad risks upon a few insurers . . . or to disallow
these [bad] risks the opportunity to drive. Neither alternative is acceptable
to the parties involved.”114 If driving
was seen as merely optional, this universal market regulation would never
have developed.115 As insurance law professor Kenneth Abraham explains,
[t]he current emphasis on various kinds of residual markets
in the automobile insurance field reveals a great deal about
the centrality of the automobile in our culture. The use of
an automobile at a tolerable cost has become almost a
fundamental right; the maintenance of residual markets
that assure all drivers minimum insurance coverage
follows from and reflects this development.116
Although it would be reasonable to exclude high-risk drivers from
coverage and thus from driving, no state agrees because of the importance
of driving and car access.
On any given day, over two-thirds of Americans aged fifteen and

112

‘[A]ll states have some kind of high-risk or “residual market plan” through
which automobile insurance is sold to people unable to obtain insurance in the
voluntary market. The most common mechanism in the states is the “assigned risk
plan” under which insurers doing business in a state are required to insure some
portion of otherwise uninsurable risks.’ JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, §
22[e]. This is also known as the involuntary market. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst.
(Jan. 25, 2011), www.iii.org/issue_updates/residual-markets.htm. These
requirements and their history are discussed more fully at infra Part III.A;
litigation about the constitutionality of one state’s high risk plan is discussed more
fully at infra Part III.B.
113
See infra Part III.
114
WOODRUFF, FONSECA, & SQUILLANTE, supra note 71, § 3:35, at 99
(emphasis added).
115
See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 65, at 216, 219. See infra
Part III.
116
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 65, at 219.
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older are behind the wheel of a car for at least an hour.117 Roughly 80% of
adult Americans have a drivers’ license.118 The “free choice” to drive is
affected by state and federal transportation policy as well as local zoning
laws, all of which have a significant impact on the form and character of
cities, suburbs, and rural areas.119 Being able to drive a working car is
essential for suburban and rural transportation in the U.S.120 The respective
locations of work, schools, shopping, medical care and housing often
leave individuals with no real choice as to whether or not to drive.121
117

Spotlight on Statistics: Automobiles, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2011/auto (Oct. 2011).
118
Press release, National Safety Council, Licensed Drivers and Number in
Accidents by Age: 2009 (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with the author) (211 million
Americans have drivers licenses).
119
See Michael Lewyn, How Government Regulation Forces Americans Into
Their Cars: A Case Study, 19 WIDENER L. J. 839, 839-40 (2007) (showing how
zoning and other regulations disadvantage pedestrians); John Pucher, Public
Transportation, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 202, 217 (Susan
Hanson & Genevieve Guiliano, eds., 3d. ed. 2004); ANDRES DUANY, ELIZABETH
PLATER-ZYBECK, & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM xiii (2000). The Federal policies include
the federal guarantee of home mortgages, the home mortgage interest deduction,
and federal road building and utility subsidies. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s
Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1842-49 (2007). State policies include zoning for
building type, separate use zoning, and lack of regional planning. Id. at 1846-50.
120
DUANY, ET AL., supra note 119, at 25 (cars are essential for life in
suburbs); Lisa R. Pruitt, Missing the Mark: Welfare Reform and Rural Poverty, 10
J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 439, 454-58 (2007) (detailing transportation issues for
rural women).
121
See DUANY ET AL., supra note 119. The exact causal mechanisms of sprawl
are disputed. See, e.g., ROBERT BRUEGMAN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY
(2005), JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN
TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE (2006). Regardless of the exact
causal mechanism, major structural factors sharply constrain individuals’ choice.
See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Wal-Mart’s Other Woman Problem: Sprawl and
Work-Family Balance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1713 (2007). Moreover, when gas prices
rise, polls find many Americans suffer hardship, revealing the speciousness of the
notion that driving is an optional activity. See Gary Langer & Gregory Holyk, Gas
Prices Slam Mobility and Obama’s Popularity, ABC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gas-prices-slam-drivers-obamas-pollnumbers/story?id=13453640 (“with gas prices up 26% to an average of $3.88 a
gallon, seven in ten Americans in this ABC News/Washington Post poll report
financial hardship as a result, six in 10 say they have cut back on driving.”);
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THE ACA INDIVIDUAL MANDATE CREATES A CHOICE

The ACA mandate gives those who are subject to it a choice
between obtaining health insurance and paying the ‘Shared Responsibility
Payment,’ which is by statute always less than the cost of the insurance.122
Justice Roberts concluded that the Shared Responsibility Payment was for
constitutional purposes a valid tax, and asserted that “imposition of a
tax…leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or not do a certain
act.”123 The lack of additional consequences was significant in determining
that the mandate could validly be seen as a tax. He noted that “[n]either the
Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying
health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. The government .
. . confirm[s] that if someone chooses to pay [the Shared Responsibility
Payment] rather than obtain health insurance, they have fully complied
with the law.”124 The Shared Responsibility Payment, as Justice Roberts
explained, is like many other types of government policy aimed to
influence behavior.125 It makes the decision to self-insure for medical
expenses more costly than it would be otherwise.126 He explained in a
Michael D. Shear, High Gas Prices Give G.O.P. Issue to Attack Obama, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2012). Proposals to increase the gas tax, which has not been raised
since 1993, consistently have met with defeat because of political opposition.
Brian D. Taylor, The Geography of Urban Transportation Finance, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 294, 307-10. Gas prices in Europe are
roughly four times higher than in the U.S., and the large majority of the
differential is due to higher gas prices. John Pucher, Public Transportation, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 207, 217. These responses show that
driving is seen as a necessity, as indeed it is. Further, they demonstrate how
vacuous it is to assert that the decision whether or not to drive is a pure choice.
122
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-96 (2012). The shared
responsibility payment per individual will be either $695 indexed for inflation in
later years, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A) (2010), or 2.5% of household income. Id.
at § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(iii). For more information see DAVID NEWMAN,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND RELATED
INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS
UNDER
PPACA
8-11
(2011),
http://healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/CRSreportonPPACAug2011.pdf.
For instance, a single individual with no dependents with an income of $40,000
will pay about $750 in 2016, whereas the same individual with $100,000 in annual
income will pay about $2,500. Id.
123
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
124
Id. at 2597.
125
Id. at 2596.
126
Id. at 2597.
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footnote:
Of course, individuals do not have a lawful choice not to pay a tax
due, and may sometimes face prosecution for failing to do so
(although not for declining to make the shared responsibility
payment, see 26 U.S.C. §5000A(g)(2)). But that does not show
that the tax restricts the lawful choice whether to undertake or
forgo the activity on which the tax is predicated. Those subject to
the individual mandate may lawfully forgo health insurance and
pay higher taxes, or buy health insurance and pay lower taxes. The
only thing they may not lawfully do is not buy health insurance
and not pay the resulting tax.127
The ACA individual mandate will impose financial costs on some, as do
many government activities, but that is a different matter from taking away
individual choice.
C.

AUTO INSURANCE MANDATES ARE FAR MORE COERCIVE
THAN THE ACA INDIVIDUAL MANDATE.

States’ auto insurance mandates actually are more coercive than
the ACA individual mandate in at least two ways. First is in the reach of
the mandates. Auto insurance mandates (and they typically require the
purchase of several types of insurance) apply to everyone who is a licensed
driver and car owner, requiring drivers to buy insurance they may not want
to buy, at the risk of fines or jail sentences.128 It is probably impossible to
accurately estimate the number of people who buy auto liability and other
auto insurance solely because of mandates, but it seems safe to say that this
figure is probably in the tens of millions.129 These mandates certainly affect
the finances of those subject to them, and they may override decisions
about risk and budgets of people who must comply with them (i.e. all
127

Id. at 2600 n.11 (emphasis added). See supra Part II.
See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
129
With an estimated 211 million licensed drivers, and over 125 million
automobiles registered in 2011, this admittedly vague estimate seems fair. See
supra note 118 for an estimate of driver’s license holders. See State Motor-Vehicle
Registrations
2011,
FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.
(2012),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2011/pdf/mv1.pdf
(Estimating total number of automobiles (excluding trucks, buses) registered in
2011: 125,656,528, and estimating number of all motor vehicle registrations in
2011 to be 244,778,179).
128

2013

MANDATES, MARKETS, AND RISK

307

drivers). The ACA, by contrast, may require roughly six million
Americans to purchase insurance or make the Shared Responsibility
Payment, a far smaller number.130 Further, the ACA contains a hardship
exemption, as well as other exemptions from the usual Shared
Responsibility Payment for not obtaining insurance in the ACA.131 The
large majority of Americans do and will get their health care through
employer-provided insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or the Veterans’
Administration.132
Second, state auto insurance mandates are enforced with a wide
range of penalties, including stiff fines and criminal punishment for those
who drive without insurance in some states.133 Penalties differ from state to
state but ten states punish first time offenders with jail time, while twenty
states impose a fine.134 Upon a second infraction, penalties can increase
130

See Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/individual
_mandate_penalties-04-30.pdf (the majority of the uninsured population will not
be subject to the penalty; estimating about 4 million people will be subject to the
penalty); Linda J. Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, & Judy Feder, The Individual
Mandate
in
Perspective,
URBAN
INST.
1-2
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412533-the-individual-mandate.pdf.
131
Professor Mark Hall explains,
“[t]echnically, the mandate applies to all legal residents who
are not in prison and who do not claim a religious exemption,
but several categories of people are exempt from paying the
penalty for noncompliance. PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. §
5000A(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1A 2010). Exemptions include people
whose income is below the tax-filing threshold and people who
cannot afford coverage, which is defined as the lowest-priced
individual insurance plan costing them more than 8% of their
household income. Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)-(2).
Exemptions also extend to members of Indian tribes, to
individuals with gaps in coverage of three months or fewer, and
to those suffering general hardship as defined by the Department
of Health and Human Services. Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(3)(5).”
Hall, supra note 44, at 1830 n.20.
132
Blumberg, Buettgens, & Feder, supra note 130. 60% of Americans obtain
health insurance through their own or a family member’s employer. ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 4.
133
See infra notes 134-35.
134
Jail time for first time offenders: Alabama: ALA. CODE. § 32-7A-12 (2012)
(imposing not more than 3 months in jail); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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dramatically.135 The ACA, by contrast, as noted above, is enforceable only
by the limited Shared Responsibility Payment, generally “far less” than the
187.990 (West 2012) (imposing 90 days in jail); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 34J (West 2009) (imposing up to one year in jail); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.791 (2003) (imposing 90 days in jail); New York: N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW. § 319 (McKinney 2003) (imposing a fine of $150-1,500, a
civil penalty fine of $750 and/or 15 days in jail); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §
7-606 (2011) (imposing up to 30 days in jail); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §
56-9-80 (2011) (imposing up to 30 days in jail); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 32-35-113 (2012) (imposing a $500 fine or up to 30 days in jail); West
Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-2A-9 (2012) (imposing a $200-5,000 fine
and/or up to 15 days in jail); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-103 (West 2010)
(imposing a $250-700 fine and/or up to six months in jail). Fines for first time
offenders: See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 32-7A-16 (2000) (Class C Misdemeanor
resulting in a fine of not more than $500); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 284135 (2009) (issuing a $500 fine); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1409
(West 2010) (issuing a fine of $500); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 §
2118(s)(1) (West 1995) (issuing a fine from $1,500-2,000); District of Columbia:
D.C. CODE § 31-2413(b)(1)(A) (2011) (issuing a civil fine of $500); Hawaii: HAW.
REV. STAT. § 431:10C-117 (2006) (issuing a $500 fine); Illinois: 625 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/3-707 (West 2010) (issuing a $500-1000 fine); Iowa: IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321A.32 (West 1997) (issuing a $250-1,500 fine); Kentucky: KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 187.990 (West 2012) (issuing a $500 fine, 30 days imprisonment, or
both); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34J (West 2009) (issuing
a $500-5,000 fine and/or up to 1 year in prison); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.791 (West 2011) (issuing a $200-1,000 fine); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §
63-15-4 (West 2010) (issuing a $500 fee); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603,168 (West 2005) (issuing a fine of $100-500); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
485.187 (West 2001) (issuing a fine of $600-1,000); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:6B-2 (West 2011) (issuing a $300-1,000 fine); New York: N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. § 319 (McKinney 2003) (issuing a $150–1,500 fine); South Dakota: S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 32-35-113 (2003) (issuing a $500 fine or thirty days
imprisonment); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 800 (West 2000) (issuing a
civil penalty of $250-500); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 17d-2a-7 (West 2011)
(issuing a $200-5,000 fine and/or up to 15 days imprisonment); Wisconsin: WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 344.65 (West 2009) (Issuing a $500 fine); Wyoming: WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 31-4-103 (West 2006) (issuing a $250-750 fine and/or 15 days
imprisonment).
135
For example, Arizona requires two-time offenders to pay $750 and forgo
their driving privileges for six months; a third violation increases the fine up to
$1,000. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4135 (2012). Arkansas imposes second
time offenders $250-500 and fines subsequent offenders $500-1,000 and/or
imposes a sentence of one year in jail. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-103 (West 2011).
Colorado and Utah penalize second-time offenders with a $1,000 fine. COLO. REV.
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cost of insurance for those who can afford to buy but refuse to purchase
insurance.136 There are no other penalties.137 The ACA individual mandate
is significantly less coercive than auto insurance mandates.
D.

CONCLUSION

A common response to the example of car insurance mandates as
a relevant precedent, that driving is a choice so that auto insurance
mandates are irrelevant, falls apart under scrutiny. Driving is not a pure
choice, the ACA mandate creates a choice, and auto insurance mandates
actually are far more coercive than the ACA mandate. Dismantling the
“choice rejoinder” reinforces the point that auto insurance mandates are
relevant precedents for the ACA. The next section describes how today’s
system of auto insurance mandates labored under strikingly similar
political and legal challenges for decades before becoming the well-settled
arrangement that it is today.
IV.

THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF AUTO INSURANCE
MANDATES

This section traces the forgotten history of development of auto
insurance mandates, highlighting two aspects that are relevant to the ACA
STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1409 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (West
2007). Idaho imposes a $1,000 fine and/or up to 6 months in jail. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-1232(2) (West 2012). The District of Columbia increases its initial civil
penalty of $500 by 50% for each additional offense, D.C. CODE § 312413(b)(1)(A) (2011), while Hawaii fines two-time offenders three times as much
($1,500) for their second offense. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-117 (West 2006).
In Kansas, second-time offenders must pay $800-2,500, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 403104(g)(2) (West 2010). Minnesotans, who for the second time violate their
compulsory auto insurance mandates, must pay up $3,000. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.791 (West 2011). New Jersey also imposes a stark punishment for repeat time
offenders; they must pay up to a $500 fine, spend up to 14 days in jail, and
complete thirty days of community service. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6B-2 (West
2011). Moreover, Wyoming imposes an even greater fine ($500-1,500) and
sentences these violators up to six months in jail. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-103
(2006).
136
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597 (2012).
137
As Justice Roberts stated, “[n]either the [ACA] nor any other law attaches
negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a
payment to the IRS.” Id.
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mandate.138 First is the complex legislative evolution of mandates which
showcases both the public-private nature of how U.S. society handles the
risks of automobiles and the contingent nature of arguments about freedom
in the context of insurance mandates. Second is the constitutional history
of auto insurance mandates; in this history, the public welfare dimensions
of insurance easily have trumped claims that mandates unconstitutionally
interfere with freedom.
A.

THE COMPLEX LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF MANDATES

The spread of automobiles was an essential backdrop to the
development of auto insurance mandates. The rapid growth in the number
of vehicles on U.S. roads—the number of cars increased by ten times
between 1915 and 1930—led to huge changes in the U.S.139 The very
welcome explosion in mobility went along with tremendous increases in
injuries in the first half of the twentieth century.140 Injuries were far more
common on a per-mile basis than they are now, and health and disability
insurance was far less common, so that injuries were likely to cause
disastrous financial consequences in addition to whatever physical and
emotional injuries they caused.141 Legislative intervention was needed, and
various approaches were tried to deal with the problems caused by autos.142
In 1927, Massachusetts became the first state to adopt a compulsory
liability insurance plan.143 Its major purpose was to ensure that defendants
138

Space limitations preclude a comprehensive history of the development of
auto insurance mandates. See generally LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 70-82; Jerry
& Richmond, supra note 26, § 131; Engstrom, supra note 89; Simon, supra note
27.
139
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 70.
140
Simon, supra note 27, at 540.
141
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 72-73.
142
Most states began by passing "financial responsibility" laws, which
required drivers involved in an accident caused by their negligence to show that
they had sufficient means to pay future claims. Connecticut passed the first such
law, in 1925, and 18 states passed similar laws by 1932. LIABILITY, supra note 54,
at 72. Many drivers satisfied these requirements by buying liability insurance. Id.
at 72. But these laws did not do anything to make sure that victims of a driver’s
first negligently-caused accident would be compensated. Id. at 73.
143
See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 73; WOODRUFF, FONSECA & SQUILLANTE,
supra note 71, § 3:21, at 90. The plan required drivers to show their ability to
cover damage caused by an accident in advance, unlike other states’ financial
responsibility laws. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 72-73. The plan allowed drivers to
make a cash deposit in advance as an alternative, In re Opinion of the Justices, 147
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were solvent.144 The road to our nationwide web of auto insurance
mandates, which now includes high-risk plans in all states, liability
insurance in virtually all states, uninsured motorist coverage in twenty-two
states, and some combination of Med-Pay coverage, underinsured motorist
coverage, and no-fault elements in many states, was not smooth, quick, or
inevitable.
The auto insurance industry opposed insurance mandates for more
than six decades after the first-in-the-nation 1927 Massachusetts law took
effect.145 A major concern was that, although liability insurance mandates
obviously increase the demand for insurance, the mandates would force
companies to cover high risk drivers and reduce profitability.146 In
Massachusetts, the initial experience after compulsory liability insurance
passed was lowered profits, which stalled the momentum of those favoring
compulsory insurance and strengthened industry opposition.147 Industry
representatives used arguments based on freedom and American values to
oppose mandates.148
The opposition to mandates was articulated in terms of freedom
and free enterprise.149 For example, C.D. McVay, an insurance company
president, wrote in 1954 that mandates raised “the entire question of the
validity of private enterprise.”150 He doubted the need for such mandates
when the number of deaths from auto accidents over a nine-year period
was less than the number of deaths from household accidents in Ohio over
the same period, and questioned the legislative priority accorded to auto
N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925), but is generally referred to as “compulsory liability
insurance legislation.” LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 73.
144
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 131, at 920.
145
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 73. As Calvin Brainard wrote in his 1961
book, “[p]erhaps no other legislation has been so often proposed over so many
years and so strenuously opposed as that of compulsory auto insurance.”
BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 428.
146
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 74.
147
Id.
148
See infra notes 149-153, 163, 165, and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., C.D. McVay, The Case Against Compulsory Automobile
Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L. J. 150, 154 (1954). Calvin Brainard reports in a 1961
book that a member of the Casualty Actuarial Society told a meeting of the
National Association of Casualty and Surety Executives: “The threat of
compulsory automobile insurance is not dead. The present danger in the situation
is that we may become weary of the battle and so let ourselves be beguiled into
believing that compulsory automobile insurance is not the evil which in our hearts
we know it to be.” BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 435.
150
McVay, supra note 149, at 154.

312

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.2

accident injuries: “[i]f we are going to set out a program of compensation
for loss from accident there is no logic or justification based on the social,
economic theory in not including any and all forms of accidental injury and
death.”151 Coming as it did in 1954, and tying mandates to “social,
economic theory” and the elimination of private enterprise, he may have
been referring to the threat of socialism, although he does not say so
explicitly.152 Regardless of whether he was referring to socialism, he is
saying that mandates directly threaten freedom and capitalism since they
may lead to creating an overly controlling and protective society where all
risks are insured.153
After Massachusetts’ pioneering 1927 law and the intervening
Depression, it was not until the 1950s that a second state, New York,
passed a mandatory liability insurance law.154 During the 1930s, a proposal
for a mandatory auto insurance plan modeled on workers compensation
with a no-fault theory of compensation was developed by an expert
commission.155 It was opposed by insurance companies and did not pass in
any state.156 Reform efforts in the 1970s to change from a negligence
system to a no-fault system stalled after initial successes and have not
fundamentally changed the system.157

151

Id.
Tellingly, Calvin Brainard wrote in 1954,“[C]ritics of universal financial
responsibility through statutory compulsion fear that it will ‘lead to among other
things: administrative problems, more accidents, fraudulent claims, higher claims
costs, less insurance protection for the public, politics in rate making, the end of
the private insurance industry, and socialism.” BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 435.
See also supra note 27.
153
Calvin Brainard quotes the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Robert B.
Anderson, as stating in 1959 that the strength of the American way of life is
grounded in “reliance on the integrity, wisdom and initiative of the individual-not
the directives of an all-wise government” in a speech to the annual convention of
the National Association of Life Underwriters. BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 206.
Brainard goes on to state “compulsory insurance programs are at odds to a greater
or less extent with this statement of principle wherever individuals have it within
their means to obtain minimum protection voluntarily.” Id. at 206.
154
WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 74, §1.10, at 9.
155
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 74. This was known as “The Columbia Plan”,
and was favored by many of those considered to be “the best minds” in the field.
Id. See generally Simon, supra note 27.
156
Economic problems such as the Depression eclipsed the importance of the
issue. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 75-76.
157
See generally LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 75-76; Engstrom, supra note 89.
152
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In 1956, New York became the second state to pass a mandatory
liability insurance law; other states gradually followed New York’s
example and by 1980, auto liability insurance was mandatory in most
states, despite continuing insurance company opposition.158
While opposing mandates, the insurance industry developed auto
insurance products such as uninsured motorist coverage to fill social needs,
cover risk privately, and stave off governmental control.159 Such products
initially were optional but many states gradually mandated them.160 As
states developed legislation requiring drivers to have insurance, the
problem arose that many drivers were considered by insurance companies
to be too risky to insure. High-risk plans were gradually passed in every
state so that companies were mandated to cover a share of drivers they
thought were too risky to insure.161 These plans were at times proposed by
the insurance industry as a way to avoid government takeover of the risk,
and at times were opposed by insurance companies as a violation of their
158

See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 82.
The invention of uninsured motorist coverage by insurance companies
exemplifies this dynamic. Uninsured motorist coverage requires drivers to buy
coverage to protect themselves against the risk that they will be injured by an
uninsured or hit-and-run motorist. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 74, §1.2, at 2.
The problem of uncompensated auto injuries continued to be urgent and acute
after World War II, when auto use and auto accidents rapidly increased. Id.
Legislative pressure, especially in New York, increased for liability insurance
mandates. Insurance company opposition to liability insurance mandates and other
changes in insurance regulation remained firm. Id. §§ 1.8, 1.14, at 7, 14. Faced
with a stalemate, the New York Superintendent of Insurance asked insurance
companies for a solution that did not involve mandates, and the insurance industry
in response invented the idea of uninsured motorist coverage Id., § 1.8, at 8. The
coverage would protect the driver by putting the driver in the same position she
would have been in, had the motorist who caused her injury actually carried the
required insurance. Id. The coverage also would protect others who were
“insureds” on the policy, such as passengers. Id. Initially uninsured motorist
coverage was optional but gradually became mandatory in 21 states and the
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Businesses v. Sibelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2612 (2012). In the states where its purchase is not mandatory,
companies nonetheless are required to offer it even though they might prefer not
to. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 74, §§1.1, 1.11, 1.14, at 2, 10, 15 (noting that
uninsured motorist coverage is now the subject of mandates in 49 states; mandates
require either an uninsured motorist coverage in every policy or that such a policy
be offered to all insurance buyers).
160
WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 74, § 1.9, at 8; ROBINETTE, supra note 74.
161
See supra note 112 (explaining how every state has a high risk plan).
159
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freedom of contract.162 Cars were so central that even risky drivers must
have the opportunity to buy insurance to drive, legislatures concluded.163
Insurance companies continued to oppose insurance mandates even
until the late 1980s.164 Congress held hearings on auto insurance in 1988,
and at those hearings, a representative of the American Insurance
Association testified that the automobile insurance industry opposed
mandates “because we believe them fundamentally anathema to American
values.”165 The insurance association representative did not specify the
values to which he referred, but it seems likely that freedom of choice and
free enterprise would be among the values to which he was alluding. The
industry spokesman also blamed mandatory insurance for problems in the
insurance industry at that time and argued for repealing or reducing the
mandates.166
By 2011, auto insurance for drivers’ liability was mandatory in all
but one jurisdiction, and states had a variety of other auto insurance
mandates.167 Private insurance companies have adjusted to the auto
insurance mandates, and there is now a thriving and very competitive
market for auto insurance in the United States.168 This market continues to
innovate, as evidenced by the concept and technology of pay-as-you-

162

See Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105,
108 (1941). This constitutional challenge to California’s high risk plan reached the
Supreme Court. See infra Part III.B.
163
In the development of assigned risk plans, we also see the universal
recognition that the auto insurance market, left to its own devices, will produce an
unacceptably high number of people considered uninsurable. See Cal. State Auto.
Ass’n. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 341 U.S. at 106-07.
164
See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H. of
Rep., 100th Cong. 325 (1988) (statement of David Snyder, Am. Ins. Ass’n).
165
Id. at 325.
166
Snyder, representing the American Insurance Association, claimed “Auto
insurance problems result from legal requirements to buy automobile insurance,
unrealistically high mandatory coverages, skyrocketing losses resulting from
lawsuits, health care costs, crime and fraud, auto repair costs, preventable deaths
and injuries on our highways, and counter-productive regulatory intervention into
the private sector.” Id. at 323. He argued for the repeal or reduction of mandatory
insurance and financial responsibility requirements. Id. at 324.
167
See supra Part I.C. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST.
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/compulsory-auto-uninsuredmotorists.html.
168
See supra note 91.
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drive.169 Insurance companies have long urged more federal governmental
efforts to promote safety,170 and also have independent safety promotion
programs. 171 Price competition for customers is fierce, particularly with
the advent of internet commerce.172 Driving has become an essential part of
U.S. life, the U.S. economy, and how millions of Americans get to work,
school, medical care, and shopping. Although often overlooked, auto
insurance mandates are an important part of this picture.173 Now the
Insurance Information Institute, an influential national industry group,
states that “[t]he public generally supports compulsory insurance and
wants these laws enforced.”174 Auto insurance laws exemplify how
government mandates coupled with private competition have resulted in a
successful system which extends coverage and shares risk very broadly,
bringing many benefits to consumers.175
The twentieth-century freedom and free enterprise arguments
against auto insurance mandates are no longer made by the insurance

169

Progressive Insurance Company, for example, has a program known as
Snapshot, which promises to save good drivers up to 30% with use of a device that
is plugged into drivers’ cars and transmits information such as how and when one
drives which is used to revise drivers’ rates on a monthly basis. See How Snapshot
Works, PROGESSIVE.COM, www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-how-it-works.aspx
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013). See generally Wriggins, supra note 65 (detailing payas-you-drive auto insurance innovations and arguing such insurance would reduce
driving). Insurance companies have developed partnerships with private
environmental groups such as the Hartford’s partnership with the Sierra Club,
through which Hartford offers lower rates on hybrid vehicles. Matthew
Sturdevant, The Hartford Announces New Affiliation With Sierra Club,
COURANT.COM (June 2, 2011, 2:13 PM) http://blogs.courant.com/connecticut_
insurance/2011/06/the-hartford-announces-new-aff.html.
170
See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H. of
Rep., supra note 164, at 324.
171
Allstate Insurance Company and the affiliated Allstate Foundation have
made research on teens and risk, and teen driver safety, a priority. See, e.g.,
Chronic, A Report on the State of Teen Driving 2005 (Allstate Found.,
Northbrook, IL), 2005, available at http://www.allstate.com/content/refreshattachments/citizenship/chronic.pdf.
172
See supra note 91.
173
See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 101-103; DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note
65, at 219.
174
INS. INFO. INST., supra note 167.
175
See supra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
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industry and seem to have very little traction for most people today. As
insurance expert Kenneth Abraham observes:
For most people, paying sizable sums for auto
insurance has simply become part of the background
cost of living. The whole insurance and liability
system for dealing with auto accidents has become so
embedded in our lives that it is almost transparent.176
While most people probably do not think about auto insurance mandates
much, and do not seem to understand the specifics of mandates well,177
there is a broad recognition on the part of both insurance companies and
people that auto insurance mandates are one of the ways we deal as a
society with the risks of driving.178
B.

QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

The legality of the various kinds of auto insurance mandates is
now well-established. However, when they passed their constitutionality
was doubted and at times challenged. Decisions generally upheld them.179
The court decisions that, almost without exception, upheld them over the
last 87 years showcase the public welfare function of insurance.
Prior to passing its pioneering 1927 auto insurance mandate, the
Massachusetts legislature asked for an Advisory Opinion from the
Supreme Judicial Court of that state on twenty-nine questions concerning
its constitutionality.180 The Supreme Judicial Court pronounced the law
constitutional.181 The Court found that the dangers posed by cars presented
ample reason for requiring drivers to prove that they could cover tort
judgments, since “legal liability without financial responsibility is a barren
right to one who sustains injury by the wrongful act of another.”182 The
176

LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102.
See supra note 12.
178
See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 167.
179
See infra note 206.
180
In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925). The legislature asked
ten questions, several of which had many subsections, leading to a total of 29. The
questions ranged from whether the law’s requirements for operators were
constitutional to whether the regulation of policies (such as not allowing
termination during the term of the policy) were constitutional. Id. at 684-686.
181
See id. at 693.
182
Id. at 694.
177
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court stressed the “peculiar nature” of insurance, which subjects it to broad
government regulation since it “affects large numbers of people and is
intimately connected with the public welfare.”183 The court noted that
compulsory workers compensation insurance had been upheld against due
process challenges, and opined that workers compensation mandates were
“a greater stretch of legislative power than is contemplated by the proposed
bill.”184 The court upheld rules against cancellations and limitations on
underwriting in the legislation, noting that the law’s interference with
companies’ “freedom of contract” and its interference with drivers’
“freedom of action” were both justified.185 Judicial review of insurance
company decisions was necessary because the refusal to issue a policy
“may drive one out of business or seriously hamper his convenience.”186
As a result of that 1925 opinion, the law’s constitutionality has rarely been
challenged; the thorough Massachusetts opinion set the stage for
acceptance of other states’ mandates.187
In 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
compulsory auto liability insurance law in Massachusetts violated an
individual’s fourteenth amendment rights.188 Mr. Joseph Poresky, pro se,
claimed that “he cannot comply with the statute” although he did not say
why, and asserted that the statute violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights.189 He sought a writ of mandamus forcing the federal court in
Massachusetts to hear his application for an injunction, but the Supreme
Court simply denied the petition, citing the 1925 Massachusetts Advisory

183

Id. at 698.
Id. at 696. Workers compensation legislation began to be passed in the
United States in the early twentieth century. Laws were broadly modeled on
Britain’s and Germany’s laws which were passed in the late nineteenth century. 1
LARSON, supra note 84 at §2.06 at 2-10. See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 27, at
285-302; WITT, supra note 84. Constitutional challenges were filed to workers
compensation statutes but they were ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). See supra note 84.
185
See In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. at 701.
186
Id.
187
WOODRUFF, FONSECA & SQUILLANTE, supra note 71, §3:29, at 95.
188
Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, reh’g. denied, 366 U.S. 922 (1933).
Although the decision does not specifically mention due process, it has been
referred to as pertaining to due process rights. WOODRUFF, FONSECA &
SQUILLANTE, supra note 71, §3:29, at 95.
189
Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, reh’g. denied, 366 U.S. 922 (1933).
184
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Opinion of the Justices and other cases supporting government’s authority
to enact laws in the interest of the public safety and welfare.190
The most high-profile constitutional challenge was to California’s
high-risk plan; California State Auto Association Inter-Insurance Bureau
v. Maloney was decided in 1951 by the United States Supreme Court.191
The context was that as states gradually passed requirements that drivers
have insurance or show that they could pay for harm they caused by some
other means, many drivers were considered “high risk” by insurance
companies who refused to insure them.192 States then began passing laws
requiring insurance companies to cover a share of high-risk drivers starting
in 1938; these plans often are known as assigned risk plans.193 A California
insurance organization194 challenged the constitutionality of that state’s
assigned risk plan, passed in 1947, claiming that the law interfered with its
due process rights by requiring it to contract with people it did not want to
contract with, thereby making it less profitable.195 The challenge resulted in
190
191

Id.
See Cal. State Auto Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 107

(1951).
192

See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26 at §22[e]. Every state has such a plan.
See supra note 112. New Hampshire enacted the first assigned risk plan in 1938.
Snyder, supra note 54, at 324. New Hampshire had passed a law in 1937 requiring
motorists to deposit security or purchase insurance in a sufficient amount to pay
for a lawsuit stemming from a car accident. This type of law is known as a
‘financial security law’. See LIABILITY supra note 54, at 72. These types of laws
were precursors to the current mandatory liability laws; most drivers complied
with these laws by purchasing auto liability insurance. Id. at 72-73. Many people
were unable to deposit the necessary security because they did not have the funds,
and were unable to obtain insurance because they were considered too risky for
insurers. Id. Hence the structure was created where insurers were assigned
policyholders they simply were required to cover. Id.
194
The opinion describes the organization, California State Automobile
Association Inter-Insurance Bureau, as follows:
Appellant is an unincorporated association which the California
District Court of Appeal analogizes to a mutual insurance corporation.
The details of its organization and operation are not important here. It is
supervised by the Insurance Commissioner of California, like other
insurance companies doing a liability insurance business. It was formed
to write automobile insurance to a select group of members at a lower
cost than the then prevailing rate.
341 U.S. at 106.
195
Id. at 107.
193
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a unanimous 1951 United States Supreme Court opinion that explained the
history of assigned risk plans and upheld the California plan.196 The
mandate was on insurers rather than drivers so it is distinguishable. But the
case is significant here for several reasons. First, the mandate on
companies relates directly to individual mandates since it arose from and
was necessitated by these mandates. The case also highlights the
deferential treatment given to insurance laws in light of the strong links
between insurance, the public welfare, and government regulation, shows
how driving has long been a necessity; and illustrates the public-private
nature of legislative solutions to thorny public policy problems.
Justice Douglas, writing for the court, first described the California
law which required that all drivers show proof of financial responsibility
before they could get a driver’s license.197 Justice Douglas stated that the
law made it impossible for many people to drive since they were classified
as poor risks, rightly or wrongly, by insurance companies and did not have
the funds to show proof of financial responsibility with cash as the law
allowed.198 Douglas noted that “many hardship cases developed among
people who were dependent upon the use of the highways for a living.”199
One proposed solution was that the state itself would insure these risks.200
Instead, insurance companies responded with legislation, which the
legislature passed, authorizing the Insurance Commissioner to establish a
plan for each company to insure some of the drivers who could not obtain
insurance in the regular market.201 The resulting plan assigned higher risk
drivers to companies in proportion to their market share.202
196

Id. at 105.
Id. at 106. Justice Black believed it was frivolous to suggest there was a
constitutional question. Id. at 111 (“Mr. Justice Black would dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the constitutional questions are frivolous.”). At the time of the
Maloney case, California did not have mandatory liability insurance for drivers;
Massachusetts was still the only state with mandatory liability insurance. See
supra text accompanying note 158.
198
Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107. The lower court noted concerns that insurance
companies’ risk classification was inaccurate towards racial minorities, as well as
the elderly and young drivers, and caused “much hardship and many inequities.”
Cal. State Auto Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Downey, 216 P.2d 882 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist.)(1950), aff’d, Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S.
105, 107 (1951).
199
Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
197
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The Supreme Court, noting that the state could have taken over the
whole field, and that insurance was “a business to which the government
has long had a special relation,” upheld the plan as permissible regulation
of a challenging problem.203 Notable was the court’s recognition of the
centrality of automobiles, even in 1951, to many people’s livelihoods, and
the hardship of not being able to drive.204 Also striking was the fact that
“the economic burden on the public purse” caused by uncompensated
injuries was a reason offered for the mandate.205 Finally, it is noteworthy
that high risk plans were developed by private industry in response to the
threat of government takeover of insuring for that risk.206
State auto insurance mandates of all types have been upheld for
decades against constitutional attacks; the “public welfare” nature of
insurance, the “special relation” between government and insurance, and
the “peculiar nature” of insurance all were factors supporting courts’
acceptance.207 Legal challenges based on freedom, like the policy
203

Maloney, 341 U.S. at 109. Justice Douglas wrote that “[c]learing the
highways of irresponsible drivers, devising ways and means for making sure that
compensation is awarded the innocent victims, and yet managing a scheme which
leaves the highways open for the deserving are problems that have taxed the
ingenuity of lawmakers and administrators.” Id. at 110.
204
See Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107, 110.
205
Brief for Appellee at 37 n. 23, Cal. State Auto Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951) (No. 310).
206
Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107. The same is true for uninsured motorist
coverage, which was also developed to avoid government takeover of the risk. See
supra note 157.
207
Maloney, 341 U.S. at 110, In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. at 698. Cases
and advisory opinions deeming auto insurance mandates constitutional include the
following: Drake v. Gordon, 848 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1988). Bushnell v. Sapp, 571
P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1977); Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1975); Del Rio v.
Crake, 955 P.2d 90 (Haw. 1998); Washington v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., Co., 708
P.2d 129 (Haw. 1985); Burriss v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 691 P.2d 10 (Kan.
1984), Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan. 1974); Fann v. McGuffey, 534
S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971); In re
Opinion of Justices, 147 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925); In re Requests of the Governor
and the Senate on the Constitutionality of Act No. 294 of the Public Acts of 1972,
208 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1973); Justices, 129 A. 117 (N.H. 1925); Rybeck v.
Rybeck, 358 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Montgomery v. Daniels,
340 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Singer v. Sheppard, 346 A.2d 897 (Pa.
1975); For a comprehensive although dated list of challenges to auto insurance
mandates by state see IRVIN E. SHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, Vol I 1981). See also Josephine Y. King,
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arguments based on freedom that were made to oppose the laws’ passage,
have been abandoned. Opponents now use the political process to lobby for
changes they seek.208 The system of auto insurance mandates and private
competition has been with us for decades; with constitutional doubts laid to
rest and legislative support for the mandates, industry and individuals have
adjusted to the very American public-private model of dealing with the
consequences of automobile accidents.209
V.

CONCLUSION

Now that the Supreme Court has upheld the ACA’s individual
mandate under the Federal government’s taxing power, it is a critical time
to look at precedents for the individual mandate, which was not done at the
time of the ACA’s passage or the Supreme Court case. A systematic
examination of auto insurance mandates shows that the ACA individual
mandate is not the uniquely coercive anomaly that its opponents claim.
Auto insurance mandates are similar in four important, yet
unexamined ways, to the ACA individual mandate. First, both types of
mandate are responses to difficult situations that defy simple solutions;
there are strong public policy reasons for both types of mandates.
Second, both order people to buy insurance to protect themselves
from risks they might want to bear themselves. Third, both require that
risks be pooled and spread, which is fundamentally what insurance is and
does. Fourth, both mandate that some people buy something from a private
Constitutionality of No Fault Jurisprudence, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 797 (1982);
BERNARD P. BELL, 5-46 NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 46.03
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011). But see Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.2d
9 (Fla. 1973)(holding that the threshold classifications of the compulsory
insurance law were arbitrary); Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1972)
(Illinois’ no- fault law unconstitutionally discriminated against commercial
vehicles by limiting their special damages remedies and that the compulsory
arbitration provision denied citizens their right to a jury trial); Shavers v. Kelley, 267 N.W. 2d 72 (Mich. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979)(Michigan nofault law’s procedures for rate-setting do not guarantee due process; eighteen
months granted for the state to develop a remedy).
208
People and organizations can and do lobby their representatives to change
auto insurance laws if they object to them, as happened in 2011 in Wisconsin.
Jason Stein, Walker Signs Bill Rolling Back Auto Insurance Minimums,
MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL-SENTINEL ONLINE, (Apr. 12, 2011), available
at ww.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/119695019.html.
209
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102-04.
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seller; they both use a model of a regulated market combined with private
competition to deal with the problems at which they are aimed rather than
have a government program handle the problems. Most broadly, they
embody essentially the same policy response to a massive public policy
problem involving illness or injury and how to pay for needed treatment or
redress.
The most common response to the parallel is that auto insurance
mandates are distinguishable and actually irrelevant because they are
regulating something that is a choice-whereas the ACA mandate coercively
intrudes on individuals’ freedom. This “choice rejoinder” resonates with
the sentiments underlying the majority’s Commerce Clause discussion, but
this Article has shown that it falls apart under scrutiny for three reasons.
First, driving is not always a choice, and both caselaw and insurance laws
recognize this. The fact that every state has laws requiring insurance
companies to insure high-risk drivers shows that driving is seen as a
necessity rather than a choice, for example. Second, the Supreme Court’s
decision makes clear that the ACA individual mandate presents a choice
between buying insurance and paying higher taxes, so it is not coercive in
the way opponents claim. Third, car insurance mandates are far more
coercive than the ACA mandate in their reach and enforcement
mechanisms.
The history of auto insurance mandates, both legislative and
constitutional, yields several observations that bear on the ACA. One,
arguments about freedom and American values are recycled from
generation to generation by reform opponents but do not necessarily have
staying power. The current “forced purchase of broccoli”210 arguments
made by mandate opponents and accepted by the majority opinion in the
Commerce Clause section may fade over time as the ACA goes into effect.
Second, the combination of auto insurance market regulation, including
high risk plans that mandate expansion of coverage, with private auto
insurance mandates, has been so workable that it is rarely the focus of
public attention. The ACA’s individual mandate and other reforms
similarly recognize that market intervention is necessary to expand
coverage more widely, and envision a system significantly similar to our
auto insurance system where insurance companies compete in a regulated
market. Third, while constitutional doubts initially were raised about
mandates, these doubts have been definitively resolved in part because of
what the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court called the “peculiar

210

See NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591.
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nature” of insurance and its significance for the “public welfare”211 and
what the United States Supreme Court called the “special relation”
between government and the insurance business.212 Health insurance has a
public welfare function that is far more important than car insurance, so if
decisions upholding car insurance showcase the public welfare function of
insurance, how much more should the public welfare function of insurance
be emphasized in the context of health insurance.
This article has demystified the ACA individual mandate by
showing its significant similarities to the commonplace, widely accepted
auto insurance mandates found all over the United States. Now that the
ACA individual mandate has been shown to be grounded in the U.S. public
policy tradition of auto insurance mandates, perhaps the focus can shift to
making it work as well as possible.

211
212

See In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. at 701.
Maloney, 341 U.S. at 105.

COVERAGE FOR VETERANS WITH POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER: A SURVEY THROUGH THE WARS
ANDREA GOMES
***
“No matter how the business of war is adorned by parades,
uniforms, and literary glorification of the warrior’s courage, and however
it is burdened by administration and logistics, the soldier’s real work is in
killing. The soldier’s privilege to kill is unlike anything most other
individuals have ever experienced, and the soldier who kills is permanently
changed, fixed to the death he has made.”1
From its first remnants in Ancient Greece, up through the initial wave of
“shell shocked” American soldiers in World War I, all the way to its
present day status in the midst of the Middle East conflict, Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a disease that has continued to evolve, both in
its treatments as well as in the societal stigma attached to it. This
comment traces the development of PTSD within the context of our
nation’s health care treatment and coverage for veterans battling the
disorder. The comment documents recent federal legislation which,
combined with the ongoing efforts of the Department of Veterans Affairs
(DVA), should allow for significant improvements in the treatment and
coverage of veterans with PTSD. However, despite the fact that our
government has seemingly acknowledged the importance of dealing with
the PTSD issue, many veterans are still left without adequate coverage for
their mental health care. With troops still returning home from
Afghanistan and others just now beginning to see the first signs of PTSD,
the Department of Veterans Affairs must strive for even greater health care
coverage for its veterans.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the time of the ancient Greeks, soldiers have encountered
significant psychological trauma as a result of experiencing shocking
1

ILONA MEAGHER, MOVING A NATION TO CARE 83 (2007) (citing
THEODORE NADELSON, TRAINED TO KILL: SOLDIERS AT WAR 37 (2005)).
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events during war.2 The Greek historian Herodotus described an Athenian
warrior who, after witnessing the slaughter of a fellow soldier, became
“blind” during the Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. although the soldier was
“wounded in no part of his body.”3 Hundreds of years later, a Swiss
physician, Johannes Hofer, would name the illness “nostalgia,” symptoms
of which included “melancholy, incessant thinking of home, disturbed
sleep or insomnia, weakness, loss of appetite, anxiety, cardiac palpitations,
stupor and fever.”4 During the Napoleonic era, Napoleon’s Chief Surgeon,
Dominique Jean Larrey, focused on both biological catalysts and social
factors that influenced the illness in prescribing regular exercise, music,
and “useful instruction” as the cure for Nostalgia.5 The disorder has been
given names such as “soldier’s heart”, “battle fatigue”, and “shell shock.”6
Today, however, we call this disease Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or
PTSD.7
Studies conducted since World War II have shown that only two
percent of those serving in the military have a “natural-born killer”
predisposition.8 The remaining ninety-eight percent of men must be trained
and taught how to pull a trigger to kill.9 While the military training tactics

2

Madeleine Baran, Timeline: Mental Illness and War Through History, MINN.
PUB. RADIO NEWS (Feb. 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/projects/
2010/02/beyond-deployment/ptsd-timeline/index.shtml.
3
MEAGHER, supra note 1, at 13.
4
Id. at 14-15 (citing Major Stephane Grenier, Operational Stress Injuries
(OSI): A New Way to Look at an Old Problem, VETERANS AFF. CAN.:
OPERATIONAL STRESS INJ. SOC. SUPPORT (OSISS) PROGRAM, June 12, 2005,
http://www.osiss.ca/pdfs/english/ANewWayToLookAtAnOldProblem_March200
2_e.pdf).
5
MEAGHER, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Franklin D. Jones, Psychiatric Lessons
of War, in WAR PSYCHIATRY: THE TEXTBOOK OF MILITARY MEDICINE 6
(Brigadier General Russ Zajtchuk, M.C., U.S. Army ed.,1995)). See also Mylea
Charvat, Presentation: History of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Combat,
VETERANS AFF. WAR RELATED ILLNESS & INJ. STUDY CTR., (Sept. 14-15, 2010)
available
at
http://www.warrelatedillness.va.gov/WARRELATEDILLNESS/education/confere
nces/2010-sept/slides/2010_09_14_CharvatM-History-of-PTSD-in-Combat.ppt.
6
Baran, supra note 2.
7
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS IV-TR 463 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
8
MEAGHER, supra note 1, at 84 (citing CHRIS HEDGES, WHAT EVERY
PERSON SHOULD KNOW ABOUT WAR 75 (2003).
9
MEAGHER, supra note 1, at 84.
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used to teach American soldiers how to kill are extremely effective,10 the
military does not prepare its soldiers for the long-term psychological
trauma they may experience as a result.11 Thus, the ninety-eight percent
without the “natural-born killer” instinct experience trauma regardless of
their training and probably do so at a much higher rate than the two percent
that needed no conditioning.
Cultures have attempted to treat and rehabilitate veterans for
centuries.12 Different societies throughout history have participated in
“cleansing rituals” or “purification rites” for their soldiers in the hopes of
allowing for a more seamless transition back into their community.13 Since
its modern inception, government-sponsored treatment and healthcare
coverage of these soldiers with PTSD has been a political and controversial
issue. The United States’ attempt to care for its soldiers can be traced back
to the American Colonies where the English enacted a law in 1636 that
provided pensions for injured veterans.14 In 1812, the Naval Home in
Philadelphia was built and was the first national effort to provide medical
treatment for disabled soldiers in need.15
More recently in the United States, however, insurance coverage in
the form of military benefits from the government has become the main
source of financial, psychological, and medical support for soldiers and
veterans. This support, however, is severely limited. Thousands of soldiers
have been unable to secure assistance for their mental health and today,
thousands of veterans are still fighting for health care.16 As a result of this
insufficient healthcare coverage, inadequate access to resources, and the
10

See id. (citing Jeff Tietz, The Killing Factory, ROLLING STONE MAG. 54,
Apr. 20, 2006, detailing exposé on the U.S. Army’s “Total Control” program
which had been used to desensitize its soldiers from the trauma and emotions
attached to killing or attacking a human being. “The Army turns out 20,000
infantrymen a year; no other institution in history has trained so many to kill so
effectively in such a short time. The number of soldiers who fail to return fire has
fallen from seventy-five percent to nearly zero.”).
11
MEAGHER, supra note 1, at 85-86.
12
Id. at 122.
13
Id.
14
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS: OFFICE OF PUB. &
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF 3 (2008), http://www.va
.gov/opa/publications/ archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf.
15
See id.
16
See Melissa Suran, Veterans Still Fighting – For Health Care, MEDILL
REPORTS WASH. (Aug. 26, 2009), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/
washington/news.aspx?id=139097.
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stigma that is still associated with mental health illnesses like PTSD,
veterans resort to drugs, are unable to secure employment, become
homeless, and at times, even resort to violence.17 Although the number and
quality of available resources and funding have certainly increased over the
past century,18 there is still a long way to go to secure the support and
coverage veterans need to resume civilian lifestyles.
This comment seeks to address the development of PTSD by
examining its presence in the major wars of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. Society’s views concerning each war and the stigma surrounding
mental illness in World War I, World War II, Vietnam and the current
conflicts in the Middle East affected not only how the returning soldiers
manifested the illness itself, but also the ways in which veterans were
provided for in terms of mental health care insurance coverage and
treatment. By examining and analyzing society’s definition of mental
health in conjunction with America’s sentiments concerning the wars, it
will become apparent that PTSD has manifested itself in different ways in
each war which, in turn, affected government coverage for PTSD coverage
and treatment.
II.

MENTAL HEALTH BACKGROUND
A.

WHAT IS MENTAL DISORDER?

By the year 1840, there were only eight “asylums for the insane”
located within the United States.19 Advocates such as Dorothea Dix
spearheaded movements for those with mental illnesses, which, in 1840,
resulted in the transfer of the mentally ill from jails and prison-like
asylums for the insane to one of the thirty-two new mental hospitals that

17

See generally RISDON N. SLATE & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS & OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM (2008); CTR. FOR MILITARY HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, RAND CORP.,
INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR
CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H.
Jaycox eds., 2008) [hereinafter INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR].
18
See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 14, at
32-36.
19
Important Events in NIMH History, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/archive/1998/organization/nimh/history.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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Dix had advocated for.20 The shift in terminology from “asylums for the
insane” to “mental hospitals” is itself indicative of society’s—albeit
slowly—increasing understanding of mental health. By 1940, the U.S.
Public Health Service finally established what would later be called the
Division of Mental Hygiene, in the hopes of merging research on substance
abuse and mental diseases.21 Although steps have certainly been taken in
the last century to assist those with mental disorders and to de-stigmatize
the world of mental health, the stigma that still exists today negatively
affects not only those with mental illnesses but those involved in mental
health care as well.22
The American Psychiatric Association’s Fourth Revised Edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or the DSMIV-TR, defines mental disorder as a
[C]linically significant behavioral or psychological
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is
associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom)
or disability (i.e., impairment in one of more important
areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk
of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of
freedom.23
Although the DSM’s definition is certainly instructive in many
instances, what actually constitutes a “mental disorder” is still vague at
best. The boundaries differentiating mental disorders from physical illness
are slowly beginning to erode as we gain more understanding of how the
brain and the body are connected to one another. The authors of the DSMIV-TR state that the separation of the two—physical illnesses and mental
disorders—creates a “reductionistic anachronism of mind/body
dualism…there is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’
in ‘physical’ disorders.”24 The authors further admit that although the
definition persists in the most current edition of the DSM, “no definition
20

NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 19; See also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 78 (1999).
21
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 19; See also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 20.
22
See generally SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 17.
23
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at xxxi.
24
Id. at xxx.
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adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental
disorder.’”25 Not surprisingly, different mental health theories have
emerged around the definition of mental disorder which separate mental
illness itself into two schools of thought: a biological model, which posits
that one’s mental illness is an organic issue found within the physical body,
and a behavioral model, which centers its focus on one’s behavior and
reaction to environmental stimuli among other behavioral theories.26
Today, the distinction between one’s physical health and mental
health has been significantly blurred. In 1999, Surgeon General David
Satcher published a report on mental health in which he encouraged the
American public to abandon the distinction between mental and physical
health.27 As science progresses, the once-separate models of psychology—
the biological and the behavioral—have become more intertwined with one
another; the biology or physical make-up of the brain is no longer distinct
from the way in which one’s environment affects one’s mind.28
It is now commonly understood that the way in which people think
and experience their lives and the ways in which they exhibit behavior are
simply a reflection of the non-stop workings of the brain.29 Consequently,
what our society considers to be “abnormalities” in thought or behavior
may simply be a reflection of the abnormalities in the physical make-up of
the brain itself.30 The difficulty in using these scientific advances for the
purposes of studying mental illness is the fact that there is often no definite
answer; there is usually always a “gray area” between mental health and
mental illness.31
25

Id.
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 7, 10 (5th ed. 2009).
27
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 20, at 6.
28
Id. at 31 (“The brain and mind are two sides of the same coin. Mind is not
possible without the remarkable physical complexity that is built into the brain,
but, in addition, the physical complexity of the brain is useless without the
sculpting that environment, experience, and thought itself provides. Thus the brain
is now known to be physically shaped by contributions from our genes and our
experience, working together. This strengthens the view that mental disorders are
both caused and can be treated by biological and experiential processes, working
together. This understanding has emerged from the breathtaking progress in
modern neuroscience that has begun to integrate knowledge from biological and
behavioral sciences.”)
29
Id. at 39.
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B. POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
Among the many disorders found within the DSM-IV-TR is none
other than Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Consistently written about
throughout history—especially in connection with war-related trauma—but
repeatedly redefined, PTSD has affected countless people since its
discovery, regardless of the way in which its symptoms appeared or the
name the disorder was given. Today, we certainly have a better
understanding of the disorder but looking back begs the question: will the
illness continue to change as time goes on?
1. Diagnosis and Treatment
The DSM-IV-TR defines Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as the
[D]evelopment of characteristic symptoms following exposure to
an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience
of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious
injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an
event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical
integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent
death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a
family member or other close associate…32
A person’s response to the traumatic event in question must include intense
fear, helplessness, or horror.33 The most common symptoms associated
with PTSD include “persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic
event…persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and
numbing of general responsiveness…and persistent symptoms of increased
arousal.”34 If the traumatic event was the result of human action, the
symptoms may be more severe and may also last longer.35 Although many
veterans may have experienced traumatic events while on duty, not all
people who are faced with trauma develop PTSD.36 Factors that help
32

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7 at 463.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet: New Regulations on PTSD Claims, ¶
1, VA.GOV (2010), http://www.va.gov/ptsd_qa.pdf.
36
DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS, WHAT IS PTSD? (Jan. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/what-is-ptsd.asp.
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determine who may develop the disorder include how long the trauma
lasted, if the person lost someone close to them because of the trauma, and
how much help and support the person received after the event.37
According to the National Center for Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, treatments for PTSD may vary but Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
(CBT),38 Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR),39 and
medications called Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) are the
most effective in treating PTSD.40 The FDA has approved the use of two
SSRIs, Zoloft and Paxil, as the best pharmacological method of treatment
for PTSD.41 Although SSRIs do work, veterans that take such medications
may experience symptoms such as a decreased libido, drowsiness and
fatigue, and nausea.42 Dr. Matthew Friedman, a psychiatrist for the
National Center for PTSD, encourages veterans who hope to live a life free
of medication to pursue psychotherapy.43 Dr. Friedman clarifies by saying

37

Id.
NAT’L CTR. FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, UNDERSTANDING
PTSD TREATMENT 2, 3 (Feb. 2011), available at www.ptsd.va.gov/public/
understanding_TX/booklet.pdf. Included within Cognitive Behavioral Therapy is
Cognitive Processing Therapy, or CPT, which consists of four main parts: (1)
learning about one’s PTSD symptoms and how treatment can help; (2) becoming
aware of one’s own thoughts and feelings; (3) learning skills to challenge one’s
thoughts and feelings, also known as “Cognitive Restructuring”; and (4)
understanding common changes in beliefs and thoughts that occur after
experiencing trauma. See id. at 3. Also included within CBT is Prolonged
Exposure Therapy, or PE, which also consists of four parts: (1) Education or
learning about one’s symptoms and how treatment can help; (2) Breathing
Retraining to help patient learn how to manage stress; (3) Real World Practice (in
vivo exposure) to help reduce distress in safe situations that the patient had been
avoiding; and (4) Talking through the trauma (imaginal exposure). See id.
39
Id. at 5. (EMDR consists of four main parts: (1) Identification of a target
memory or image concerning the trauma; (2) Desensitization and reprocessing by
focusing on mental images while doing eye movements that therapist has coached
patient on; (3) Installing positive thoughts and images once the negative thoughts
are no longer distressing; and (4) Body Scanning by focusing on tension or
unusual sensations in patient’s body in the hope that the patient will be able to
identify additional problems that need to be dealt with). See id. at 5.
40
Id. at 6.
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Id.
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Id.
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With medication you need to be on it indefinitely, for the
most part, whereas for psychotherapy, you typically need
10-12 sessions and maybe a ‘booster’ now and then…So
for a patient that doesn’t want to be on medication
indefinitely, that can be another motivation for them to go
into psychotherapy.44
Dr. John H. Krystal of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ National
Center for PTSD commented that the benefits medical professionals had
believed patients were experiencing from medications most likely came
from engaging the patient in other forms of treatment, such as talk
therapy.45 Studies have shown that some form of talk therapy either alone
or in combination with an antidepressant medication, may be the best
method of treatment for alleviating symptoms such as nightmares.46
Knowing what kinds of treatments work best in treating PTSD is especially
important when analyzing the insurance coverage American veterans
receive from the United States. The Department of Veterans Affairs’ duty
to provide veterans with mental health care coverage isn’t as simple as
covering prescription medications. Veterans may need both medication and
some form of talk-therapy to successfully overcome their battles with
PTSD and this is often where insurers, including the Department of
Veterans Affairs, fall short.
III.

WORLD WAR I
A.

BACKGROUND

On June 28th, 1914, a Serbian nationalist shot and killed the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo.47
After the assassination, the major world powers split in two: the Allies,
which included Russia, France and Britain, and the Central Powers,
composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.48
44

Id.
Benedict Carey, Drugs Found Ineffective for Veterans’ Stress, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/health/research/03psych
.html.
46
Id.
47
See PUB. BROAD. SERV., Introduction to the Great War, PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/chapters/index.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
48
See id.
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The United States entered the War to support the Allies in 1917
after President Woodrow Wilson encouraged the country to “make the
world safe for democracy.”49 On November 11, 1918, an Armistice was
declared that ended the Great War.50 By the time the War had ended in
1918, nine million people had died,51 116,000 thousand of whom were
American soldiers.52 Another 204,000 American soldiers returned to the
United States wounded.53
The fortunate soldiers that did survive the massacres of World War
I, wounded or not, returned home to a different world and with a different
outlook on life. World War I “marked the first use of chemical weapons,
the first mass bombardment of civilians from the sky, and the century's first
genocide.”54 This new method of warfare, like the use of chemical poison
gas, heavy artillery, and trenches, subjected American soldiers to
unexpected traumatic events, which contributed to what was then called
“Shell Shock” or “Combat Fatigue.”55 Initially, medical professionals
believed that the symptoms associated with shell shock were actually
attributable to a physical “shock” to the nervous system, also termed as
“shelling.”56 Symptoms of shell shock included staring eyes, violent
tremors, blue and cold extremities, and unexplained deafness, blindness or
paralysis.57
As medical professionals began to notice that the symptoms of
shell shock were present in soldiers who had never experienced “shelling”,
classification of the illness as a psychiatric disorder become more
common.58 At the time, treatment for shell shock was primarily concerned
with treating the soldier as close to the traumatic event as possible.59 In
addition to concerns with Immediacy, other treatment considerations
49

Id.
See id.
51
Id.
52
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 14, at 7.
53
Id.
54
PUB. BROAD. SERV., Introduction to the Great War, supra note 47.
55
Baran, supra note 2. See also Charvat, supra note 5 at 11, 14; PUB. BROAD.
SERV., Stalemate, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/chapters/ch1_stalemate.
html (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
56
Baran, supra note 2.
57
Charvat, supra note 5.
58
Baran, supra note 2. See also Erica Goode, When Soldiers Snap, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/weekinreview/08
goode.html.
59
Charvat, supra note 5.
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included Simplicity, or providing simple treatment such as rest, food, and
shelter, and Expectancy, or the expectation that the soldier would return to
his position in the battle as soon as treatment had concluded.60 In Europe,
methods such as electro-shock therapy and Torpillage therapy61 were also
used in the hopes of curing the “hysteria” that had taken over the Allied
soldiers.62 Soldiers who returned home to the United States with shell
shock confused the American people with the new and unheard of
disorder.63
B.

COVERAGE AND TREATMENT FOR VETERANS

Before the United States had even entered the war, Congress
passed the War Risk Insurance Act of 1914 to insure American ships and
their precious cargo.64
The Act was amended in 1917 both to provide soldiers with
insurance against loss of life, injury, or capture by the enemy while aboard
American merchant ships and to offer veterans government-subsidized life
insurance.65 By 1917, the Surgeon General, Rupert Blue,66 recognized the
60

Id.
Laurent Tatu et al., The “Torpillage” Neurologists of World War I: Electric
Therapy to Send Hysterics Back to the Front, 75 NEUROLOGY 279, 280 (2010)
(Torpillage, which literally means torpedoing, would include a doctor, “strongly
exhort[ing] a soldier to return to a normal state of being with the help of the
electric current.”).
62
Id. at 279.
63
See Baran, supra note 2 (“I wish you could be here in this orgie of neuroses
and psychoses and gaits and paralyses….I cannot imagine what has got into the
central nervous symptom of the men…Hysterical dumbness, deafness, blindness,
anaesthesia galore. I suppose it was the shock and the strain, but I wonder if it was
ever thus in previous wars? …The soldier, having passed into this state of lessened
control, becomes prey to his primitive instincts….He may be so affected that
changes occur in his sense perceptions; he may become blind or deaf or lose the
sense of smell or taste. He is cut off from his normal self and the associations that
go to make up that self. Like a carriage which has lost its driver, he is liable to all
manner of accidents. At night insomnia troubles him, and such sleep as he gets is
full of visions; past experiences on the battlefield are recalled vividly; that will that
can brace a man against fear is lacking.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 14, at 7.
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Id.
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Office of the Surgeon Gen., Previous Surgeons General.
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/about/previous/index
SURGEONGENERAL.GOV,
.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
61

336

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.2

seriousness of shell shock and as a result, created a comprehensive
treatment program for those soldiers who exhibited shell shock
symptoms.67 The program endeavored to place a sufficient number of
psychiatrists in as many combat units as possible.68
In an attempt to further understand the disorder, the United States
sent Major Thomas Salmon to France to study the symptoms and possible
treatments for shell shock and to make recommendations to the U.S. Army
based on his research findings.69 Major Salmon proposed a system of
“forward psychiatry” in which hospital beds were to be cleared for mental
cases, which ultimately resulted in the creation of Base Hospital No. 117 in
La Fauche, France.70 In October of 1917, Major Salmon reported that oneseventh of all discharges from the British Army were attributable to shell
shock.71
Two years later, in 1919, Congress passed a law as part of the War
Risk Insurance Act, which placed the Public Health Service in charge of
veterans’ medical care, transferred several military hospitals to the Public
Health Service, and also authorized the establishment of new hospitals in
the hope of overcoming the large burden that had been placed on armed
services hospitals.72 In 1921, with the purpose of consolidating veterans
programs managed by three different agencies, Congress created the
Veterans’ Bureau, headquartered in Washington, D.C.73 Just three years
later in 1924, General Frank T. Hines, the second director of the Bureau,
reorganized the Bureau into six different services: medical and
rehabilitation, claims and insurance, finance, supply, planning and
control.74
Although society and its mental health professionals of the time
period had moved towards understanding and classifying shell shock as a
mental disorder, adequate mental health care coverage and effective
67

Charvat, supra note 5.
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Edgar Jones et al., Shell Shock and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A
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DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 14, at 7.
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(These agencies included the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, Public Health Service
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encompass the Bureau of Pensions of the Interior Department and the National
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treatments for shell shock were almost nonexistent by the end of the War.
In addition, the movement from defining shell shock as a physical illness to
a mental disorder greatly affected not only the methods of treatment used
to treat shell shock but the stigma that the surviving soldiers returned home
to as well.75 If the explanation for shell shock was physical, such as a
breakdown or withering of the nerves in the brain, treatments such as rest,
massage and electroshock therapy were used.76 One commentator
remembered, “with what tenacity men clung to a diagnosis of ‘shell
shock’… something which was generally recognized as incapacitating and
warranted treatment in a hospital.”77 As a result, the stigma associated with
shell shock was not as prevalent because it was viewed as a physical
disorder or “neurological lesion.”78 When the source of the illness became
psychological however, rest, the “talking cure”, and hypnosis became the
recommended treatment.79
Consequently, male soldiers who had been seen as the strong
defenders of our country were now weakened and emasculated by their
psychological diagnosis. In all such psychological treatments for shell
shock, occupational retraining and the “inculcation of masculinity” were
highly recommended for all soldiers.80 One medical supervisor at a military
hospital informed all medical officers that although they were required to
show sympathy to all shell shock patients, “the patient must be induced to
face his illness in a manly way.”81 When symptoms became apparent on
the battlefield, men were often dismissed with little sympathy.82 Upon
returning home and entering military hospitals for shell shock treatment,
soldiers were met with even less sympathy; veterans were greeted in
silence and hung their heads in “inexplicable shame” as they entered the
hospital.83 It is therefore unsurprising that in a country with such little
understanding and sympathy for a condition as serious as shell shock, there
75
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was inadequate mental health coverage to assist veterans in their recovery.
The United States’ inability to define and understand PTSD meant that
government-sponsored coverage and treatment were moved to the bottom
of the Veterans Bureau’s list of priorities.
IV.

WORLD WAR II
A.

AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I

By the end of World War I, much of the United States had felt that
the War was a monumental mistake, never to be repeated again.84 For
years, the United States focused on everything but its armed forces, which
were composed of too few men, outmoded and rusty equipment, and
dwindling spirits.85 By the time the Great Depression hit, however,
America’s people were without jobs and thus, eager to go back to work.86
This excitement and energy that had infected the American population
would mobilize people to remodernize its armed forces. This patriotic
enthusiasm would translate into the way Americans felt about World War
II.
In 1930, Congress created the Veterans Administration (“VA”) by
consolidating the Veterans’ Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions, and the
National Homes for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.87 President Herbert
Hoover signed the executive order establishing the VA on July 21, 1930.88
Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, who had served as the Director of the
Veterans’ Bureau since 1923, was appointed as the first administrator of
the VA and would remain in that position until 1945.89 The new VA was
accountable for medical services and coverage for veterans, allowances and
disability compensation for World War I veterans, life insurance and other
benefits such as pensions and retirement payments.90 In the next ten years,
General Hines and the new VA would expand the number of VA hospitals
from sixty-four to ninety-one and would increase the number of beds from
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http://www.va.gov/about_va/vahistory.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).
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33,669 to 61,849.91 It seemed that both the American people and
government were beginning to realize that resources were required to help
these veterans acclimate to citizen life once again.
B.

BACKGROUND

On Sunday, December 7th, 1941, Japanese aircraft fighters
launched an attack on Pearl Harbor, which killed 2,400 Americans
stationed in Hawaii.92 Another 1,200 Americans that had been burned or
maimed in the attack were sent to the already over-crowded hospitals in
nearby Oahu.93 President Franklin Roosevelt immediately declared war on
Japan and less than one week later on December 11th, Adolf Hitler declared
war on the United States.94
Learning from the effects of shell shock on its veterans during
World War I, the United States Army conducted extensive psychiatric
screenings of its soldiers before deploying them overseas. The military
established such screenings with the intention of identifying the soldiers
that might be vulnerable to developing psychological problems in combat
environment due to “defects” such as personality flaws or inherent
psychological neuroses.95 Unfortunately, because pre-deployment
screening for possible future behavior indicators was new to the American
psychiatric world, screening was imprecise and extremely unreliable.96
Unfortunately, because pre-deployment screening for possible
future behavior indicators was new to the American psychiatric world,
screening was imprecise and extremely unreliable.97
In all, over sixteen million Americans enlisted in World War II. By
the end of the War in 1945, over 400,000 Americans had been killed, and
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almost another 700,000 men had been wounded.98 The total number of
reported fatalities for all who participated in World War II varies from
thirty-five million to sixty million.99 The destruction of World War II, less
than thirty years after the devastation of World War I, sparked the
beginning of different shell shock symptoms in soldiers who survived long
enough to experience trauma.100 Just as the United States had experienced
new chemical and trench warfare in World War I, advances in technology
and the creation of innovative atrocities in World War II took a very
devastating psychological toll on American troops and lead to the
development of a “new shell shock.”101 The newly invented atomic bomb
that the United States dropped over Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August of
1945 killed approximately 375,000 people instantly and continued killing
thousands more in the following decades from radiation poisoning.102
American soldiers, although following orders, were forced to realize that
the bomb President Truman had promised would never be used on women
and children had killed—and would continue to kill—innocent civilians for
years to come.103 In addition to the horror of the atomic bomb, the
atrocities that American soldiers viewed when liberating German
concentration camps traumatized much of the United States’ military force
for many years.104 Many soldiers did not believe that such devastation was
actually happening, and many would not have believed it if they had not
seen it.105 In comparison to the warfare in the First World War, World War
II was
98
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Feb. 18, 2013).
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[A] greater horror for the 800,000 men in extended
combat… Bigger field weapons meant soldiers fought in
small units dispersed over more territory, without the
company camaraderie that sustained WW1 doughboys.
Bomber crews could kill more people from afar, but at
significantly greater risk from enemy fighters and antiaircraft fire. At sea, enemy planes and submarines could
turn the mightiest warship into a sinking inferno in
minutes.106
The “new shell shock” of World War II manifested itself in
symptoms such as nightmares, anxiety, and startled reactions.107 Other
symptoms included headaches, dizziness, fatigue, memory loss, and poor
concentration.108 The new disorder, which no longer included trembling or
paralysis as it did during World War I, was renamed “combat fatigue,”109
“war neurosis,”110 or, most notably, “postconcussional syndrome.”111 The
treatments for these newly defined disorders were heavily influenced by
Freudian psychoanalytic theories,112 which had taken hold in the United
States in between the two World Wars.113 Psychiatrists and other
106
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treating combat fatigue rested upon the concept of unit cohesion among soldiers
and its connection to resilience in soldiers who had experienced combat fatigue
symptoms. Consequently, replacement troops were more susceptible to combat
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their fellow soldiers).
113
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_of_Psychoanalysis.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (“Psychoanalysis became
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medical professionals in the field experimented with other treatments as
well, such as sodium pentathol, in an attempt to get the soldiers to relive
their repressed battlefield experiences and thus reach catharsis.114 Others
like Flight Surgeon Jack McKittrick found that distributing alcohol before
a flight mission best calmed the men when they most needed it.115
One in four casualties during World War II was attributable to
combat fatigue, and for soldiers involved in long-term, intense fighting, the
ratio was one in two.116 Combat fatigue was more common in certain
combat zones and in the Pacific where, for example, forty percent of
combat evacuations were “mental” in nature, and over 26,000 psychiatric
cases were reported in Okinawa alone.117 To keep soldiers from going mad
and losing their composure in anticipation of kamikaze attacks,118 soldiers
were not informed that an attack was mounting until they absolutely
needed to know.119 During World War II, 1,393,000 soldiers were treated
for battle fatigue and of all ground combat troops; thirty seven percent
were discharged for psychiatric reasons.120
The classification of postconcussional syndrome or combat fatigue
as either physical or mental was, once again, a difficult one to make. As
one author put it, “[d]isagreement about etiology followed tracks laid down
during World War I.”121 The symptoms of postconcussional syndrome
were often quite difficult to differentiate from symptoms of a severe brain
injury.122 While medical professionals did their best to differentiate
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between an organic head injury and postconcussional syndrome,123 studies
on the differences between the two did not support a differentiation.124
Instead, the medical world came to the conclusion that "the practice of
dividing the postcontusional cases into two groups, labeling the one
organic and the other functional or neurotic [was]…unprofitable and
misleading."125 As a result, the stigma soldiers experienced upon being
diagnosed with shell shock in World War I126 had barely changed with the
newly developed symptoms of postconcussional syndrome in World War
II. Some commentators believed, however, that “except for a few blood-n'guts hardliners like Generals George Patton and Curtis LeMay, the brass
no longer thought combat fatigue was evidence of cowardice or a pre-war
neurosis.”127 Although mental, combat fatigue was still a wound and many
believed that more than anything else, affected soldiers were simply
overly-fatigued.128
C.

COVERAGE AND TREATMENT FOR VETERANS

Due in part to the United States’ growing concerns with helping
veterans in their transition back to civilian life and in the hopes of
decreasing the possibility of a post-war depression, Congress responded by
passing the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or the “GI Bill of
Rights.”129 The GI Bill had three different types of benefits for veterans.130
123

Jones et al., supra note 69, at 1643. One author believed that in examining
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The first benefit provided veterans with up to four years of education or
training, the second provided veterans with federally guaranteed farm,
business or home loans without a requisite down payment, and the third
provided for unemployment compensation.131 When the World War II GI
Bill expired in 1956, approximately 7.8 million veterans had received some
form of training and the VA had guaranteed approximately 5.9 million
home loans totaling approximately fifty billion dollars.132 In the same year,
Congress also passed the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, which gave
veterans hiring preference where federal funding was involved.133
Although Congress, the VA and the United States as a whole were
certainly becoming more involved in and concerned with veterans’
benefits, there was a very apparent gap in coverage for health care and
more specifically, mental health care. The lack of evidence for any mental
health care coverage is in and of itself indicative of how society in this
time period viewed mental illness. It is safe to say that society chose not to
view mental illness at all, in fact. It would not be until years later that
American veterans would begin to see the government-sponsored mental
health coverage and treatment that they deserved. Until then, however,
public conceptions of mental illness and mental health treatment would
directly affect the VA’s coverage for such services—or lack thereof.
The 1999 Surgeon General’s Report on mental illness included an
overview of the public attitudes and understanding of mental illness in the
1950s, the era immediately succeeding the end of World War II.134 The
Report came to the conclusion that in the 1950s, the public had a very
2011). See also DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note
14, at 13.
130
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 14, at 13.
See also Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (1944), supra note 129.
131
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provision stated that veterans could apply for loans up to $2,000 with a half of that
being guaranteed by the federal government. Lastly, the unemployment
compensation provision mandated that veterans who had served at least ninety
days were allowed $20 per week for a maximum of fifty-two weeks). See also
Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (1944), supra note 129.
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unscientific understanding of mental illness, which, in turn, resulted in a
highly stigmatized view of mental illnesses as a whole.135 The intense
stigma that had infected society during the time period was linked with the
fear that a mentally ill person would be susceptible to unpredictable and
violent behavior.136 The public was typically unable to distinguish those
with mental illnesses from people who were generally unhappy and tended
to see only extreme forms of behavior or symptoms, such as those
exhibited in psychotic disorders, as mental illnesses.137
The lack of both private and government-funded coverage for
mental health services was not surprising considering society’s
rudimentary understanding of mental illness which was accompanied by
intense stigma. In the aftermath of the two World Wars in less than a fiftyyear period, the United States government had other, more “physical”
concerns such as those enumerated in the GI Bill to focus its resources and
energy on. Although, once again, the United States as a whole had made
great progress in caring for veterans who had sacrificed life and limb for
their country, those who needed insurance coverage for mental health
treatment fell in between the gaps left by the VA’s insurance coverage. In
the years to come, however, the United States would be confronted with a
mental epidemic of sorts that simply could not be ignored. Symptoms of
mental illnesses such as shell shock, battle fatigue, and postconcussional
syndrome would continue to persist in those who had served. With the
United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, the American people
would be forced to face mental illnesses on a scale that had never been
seen before.
V.

VIETNAM WAR
A.

AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II

In the years following the demobilization of World War II, the
number of veterans in the United States jumped to more than fifteen
million.138 To compensate for this enormous growth, the number of VA
hospitals also increased from ninety-seven to 151 in the years between
1942 and 1950.139 Each year, 2.5 million veterans received outpatient and
135
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dental care at VA facilities and another 2.5 million veterans and their
dependents received $125 million in compensation and pensions each
month.140 To meet the growing number of veterans’ claims, the VA was
reorganized in 1953 into three separate departments including the
Department of Medicine and Surgery, the Department of Veterans
Benefits, and the Department of Insurance.141 In the following years, the
VA would continue expanding its research and increasing its funding on
chronic care problems such as age.142 Other programs such as the ExServicemen’s Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 would establish a
system of unemployment insurance for both deployed and peacetime
veterans.143 In the years leading up to the Vietnam War, benefits and
programs were increased in number and importance but the VA had still
not focused its funding or energies—at least not explicitly—on veterans’
mental health.
B.

BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of World War II and the world of “combat
fatigue”, “postconcussional syndrome”, and “war neurosis”,144 American
psychiatrists renamed the disorder “stress response syndrome” or “gross
stress reaction” and included the condition in the first edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or the DSM.145 The
DSM stated, “Under conditions of great or unusual stress, a normal
personality may utilize established patterns of reaction to deal with
overwhelming fear…When promptly and adequately treated, the condition
may clear rapidly.”146 The DSM restricted diagnosis to those soldiers who
were in combat and who had experienced a “civilian catastrophe” such as a
fire or explosion.147
After North Vietnam had defeated the French Colonial
administration of Vietnam in 1954, the new government and its allies
within South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, tried to unify the two parts of the
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country into one coherent communist regime much like China.148 The
South Vietnamese government, on the other hand, fought for a more
Western-like form of government, like its allies the United States.149
Although there was an American presence in South Vietnam throughout
the 1950s, U.S. presence began increasing on a large scale in 1961.150 By
1965, the United States had introduced active combat units and by 1969,
more than 500,000 American military work forces were present in South
Vietnam.151 Incidentally, the American Psychiatric Association chose to
remove “gross stress reaction” from the DSM in 1968152 and to instead
combine all trauma-related disorders into a category titled “situational
disorders” in the DSM-II.153 As a result, mental health professionals could
no longer diagnose a veteran or soldier in active duty with a combat-related
illness.154 For those veterans returning home, the lack of a concrete
diagnosis made it difficult both for mental health professionals to assess
health and disability benefits and for the soldiers to receive any mental
health coverage.155 Once again, it seemed as if the United States
government had placed other veterans’ issues well above mental health
coverage and treatment. The removal of gross-stress reduction from the
DSM-III certainly contributed to the invisibility of American soldiers’
plight with PTSD and as a result, coverage and treatment remained beyond
veterans’ grasps.
For the next four years, the United States would continue fighting
and assisting South Vietnam while other countries, like the Soviet Union
and China would provide North Vietnam with weapons, supplies, and
military advisors.156 With “gross stress reaction” having been removed
from the DSM, officials classified many soldiers exhibiting symptoms as
having “character disorders” and focused their energies on rectifying these
“behavioral problems” instead of seeking the diagnosis of a mental
illness.157 Around the same time, a group of “anti-war psychiatrists” led by
148
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Chaim Shatan and Robert Jay Lifton created a new diagnostic theory to
describe the psychological trauma that veterans had sustained in the
Vietnam War. The group called the disorder “Post-Vietnam Syndrome,”
symptoms of which included “growing apathy, cynicism, alienation,
depression, mistrust, and expectation of betrayal as well as an inability to
concentrate, insomnia, nightmares, restlessness, uprootedness, and
impatience with almost any job or course of study.”158 Shatan and Lifton
claimed it was not uncommon for symptoms of Post-Vietnam Syndrome to
emerge months or years after veterans returned home.159
In 1973, the United States withdrew from Vietnam because it
could not bear the physical and monetary costs and by 1975, South
Vietnam had completely fallen to the North Vietnamese government.160 As
a result of the Vietnam War, as many as two million civilians and 1.35
million soldiers and Viet Cong fighters had died.161 In addition, the United
States had lost over 58,000 men and woman in their struggle to support the
fight against communism.162
C.

COVERAGE AND TREATMENT FOR VETERANS

At first, Congress limited benefits for the Vietnam War to those
who had served between August 5, 1964 and May 7, 1975.163 Soon after,
Congress increased the time period to service beginning on February 28,
1961.164 During this time period, more than six million Vietnam veterans
had been discharged.165 One of the major differences found in Vietnam-era
veterans as compared to those in previous wars was the enormous number
of veterans who returned home disabled.166 Due to even more advances in
medical and airlift technology, many veterans who would have died in
158
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previous wars survived, albeit mentally or physically disabled.167 The
return of veterans to civil life within days of leaving combat was also new
and by 1972, 308,000 veterans with disabilities connected to military
service had returned home.168
The quick transition from combat to civilian life in combination
with the strong anti-war sentiments infecting the United States at the time
caused greater adjustment difficulties than found in previous wars.169
Additionally, the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973170
corresponded with an economic recession on the home front.171 As a result,
a large number of veterans were unemployed and many reported feeling
isolated and alienated from friends, family, and society in general.172 In
response to the mounting stressors on Vietnam veterans, Congress passed
the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act, also called the Vietnam GI
Bill.173 “Under this Act, veterans who had been on active duty for more
than 180 consecutive days were entitled to one month of educational
assistance for each month of service.”174 The Servicemen’s Group Life
Insurance program was also instituted in the Vietnam era, which provided
soldiers with a maximum of ten thousand dollars of coverage.175 “Similar
coverage was extended to veterans under the Veterans Group Life
Insurance program.”176 Finally, Congress created the Veterans Mortgage
Life Insurance program, to provide a program of mortgage life insurance
for severely disabled veterans who needed grants for special housing
167
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accommodations due to their war-related disabilities up to a maximum of
thirty thousand dollars.177 For the first time, the VA also began instituting
outreach programs to bring VA benefits to the attention of Vietnam
soldiers.178 VA representatives were sent to Vietnam to assist soldiers
before they were discharged and by 1967, the VA had also installed tollfree telephones to regional offices in each state.179 In addition, counselors
were stationed at separation centers and follow-up letters were sent to those
soldiers who did not respond to the VA’s initial outreach attempts.180
Although health programs such as the Radiation-Exposed Veterans
Compensation Act of 1988 were created to handle specific health issues
such as Agent Orange exposure,181 by the end of the war, the VA had still
not instituted any formal coverage or assistance programs specifically
geared towards mental health programs for veterans with PTSD. As a
result, veterans were left without adequate treatment, assistance or
coverage for a chronic, highly-stigmatized, and debilitating disorder.
VI.

THE CURRENT CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A.

AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM

The time period following the Vietnam War was marked by an
increased focus on veterans’ benefits and a major season of change in the
armed forces.182 The Government, the VA, and the general American
public became increasingly educated on veterans’ issues including mental
health and as a result, new legislation and programs were enacted.
Programs such as the Post-Vietnam Era Veterans’ Educational Assistance
Act of 1977, the Veterans’ and Survivors’ Pension Improvement Act of
1978, and the VA’s special tribute to deceased Medal of Honor recipients
in 1976 all increased the American public’s awareness of issues veterans
were facing on a daily basis.183 Until the passage of the Veterans Health
Care Amendments Act of 1979, which established a network of Veterans’
Centers across the country, and Congress’ 1980 authorization for Geriatric
177
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Research, Education and Clinical Centers, which researched and
coordinated veterans’ geriatric medicine, very little of the VA’s advocacy
had been focused on health care coverage, access or assistance.184 Finally,
in 1986, Congress established income-based eligibility assessment
protocols for determining whether or not veterans were eligible for free
medical care.185 By passing Public Law Number 99-272 in 1986, Congress
established three categories of veterans to determine their eligibility for
health care.186 Veterans in Category A, the veterans with the most need,
were provided with free hospital care and were eligible for outpatient and
nursing home care.187 Veterans assigned to either Category B or C based
on income and net worth were provided with care on a resource-available
basis.188 Although the VA health care reform of 1986 didn’t specifically
address mental health, the VA began dedicating resources to serving the
homeless and the chronically mentally ill by the late 1980s.189 In 1984,
recognizing the mounting problems with PTSD in veterans, Congress
created the Special Committee on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which
was composed of PTSD specialists from across the DVA’s Mental Health
and Readjustment Counseling Services.190 The Committee was created to
determine the DVA’s ability to provide assessment and treatment for
PTSD and to encourage the DVA’s educational, research and benefits
activities concerning PTSD.191
In 1988, President Ronald Reagan elevated the VA to Cabinet
status and, on March 15, 1989, the VA was renamed the Department of
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Veterans Affairs.192 The DVA was reorganized into three main parts,
which included the Veterans Health Administration, the Veterans Benefits
Administration, and the National Cemetery System.193 During the Persian
Gulf War, Congress passed the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act, which, among other benefits,
offered psychological counseling at Vet Centers for veterans having
trouble transitioning back to civilian life.194 Finally, veterans with mental
illnesses were being specifically addressed in Congress’ attempt to offer
more coverage and services for both veterans and soldiers still in combat.
In 1995, the VA’s Hospitals were consolidated into twenty-two Veterans
Integrated Service Networks. The effects of this reorganization included
“population-based planning, decentralization, universal availability or
primary care, a shift to outpatient care from inpatient care, and an emphasis
on measuring health-care performance on the outcome of patient
treatment.”195
Advances in the psychiatric world were also taking place in the
post-Vietnam era. In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association
introduced “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder” into the third edition of the
DSM by placing the disorder in a sub-category of anxiety disorders.196
Although the formal inclusion of the illness in the DSM-III was a
monumental step in the right direction for veterans’ rights to mental health
care, one of the most important changes the DSM-III’s definition ushered
in was “the stipulation that the etiological agent was outside the individual
(i.e., a traumatic event) rather than an inherent individual weakness (i.e., a
traumatic neurosis).”197 As a result, the tug of war that had previously
existed between defining PTSD as biological or behavioral was coming to
an end due in part to advances in research and to society’s greater
understanding of mental health. One of the most fundamental concepts
included in this new disorder was a necessary understanding of what
constituted “trauma” for the purposes of PTSD under the DSM-III.198
192
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Although the diagnostic criteria for PTSD in the DSM have been revised
several times since its initial formulation in 1980, the mere fact that a
formal diagnosis has been entered into the DSM was a great victory for
veterans and their well-deserved mental health care rights.199
B.

BACKGROUND

The day after the September 11th attacks on the United States in
2001, President George W. Bush declared a war on terror. After the
Taliban refused to hand over al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, American
and British forces began airstrikes on Afghanistan. October of 2001
marked the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom200 and by August of
2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had also deployed troops to
Afghanistan for a peacekeeping mission.201 Later, the deployed soldiers
would expand both in numbers and in geographical location to over eleven
experience. The framers of the original PTSD diagnosis had in mind events such
as war, torture, rape, the Nazi Holocaust, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, natural disasters (such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and volcano
eruptions), and human-made disasters (such as factory explosions, airplane
crashes, and automobile accidents). They considered traumatic events to be clearly
different from the very painful stressors that constitute the normal vicissitudes of
life such as divorce, failure, rejection, serious illness, financial reverses, and the
like. (By this logic, adverse psychological responses to such ‘ordinary stressors’
would, in DSM-III terms, be characterized as Adjustment Disorders rather than
PTSD.) This dichotomization between traumatic and other stressors was based on
the assumption that, although most individuals have the ability to cope with
ordinary stress, their adaptive capacities are likely to be overwhelmed when
confronted by a traumatic stressor.”).
199
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thousand.202 That same year, the United States would have ten thousand
troops stationed in Afghanistan.203
In 2003, President George W. Bush gave Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein and his sons forty- eight hours to leave the country or face the
threat of war.204 When Saddam and his sons did not leave, the United
States lead an invasion on Baghdad as President Bush assured the
American people that the invasion’s purpose was “to disarm Iraq, to free its
people, and to defend the world from grave danger.”205 The American
invasion toppled Saddam Hussein’s government and marked the beginning
of years of conflict in Iraq.206 March of 2003 also marked the beginning of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.207
Since 2001, approximately 1.64 million American troops have
been deployed as part of OEF in Afghanistan and OIF in Iraq.208 Today,
the United States government, under President Barak Obama, has begun
withdrawing troops from the Middle East. The Obama administration
planned on having all troops out of Iraq by January of 2012.209 On
December 18, 2011, the last convoy of American troops in Iraq left the
Middle East and began their voyage home.210 The Obama Administration
had also planned to pull 33,000 of the over 100,000 troops in Afghanistan
by the end 2011.211 Although many of the troops in Afghanistan have
202
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returned home, many still remain. Because of the large number of troops
still remaining in Afghanistan, the Senate recently voted to accelerate troop
withdrawal in November of 2012.212 The Senate hopes that the President
will, “continue to draw down United States troop levels at a steady pace
through the end of 2014; and end all regular combat operations by United
States troops by no later than December 31, 2014, and take all possible
steps to end such operations at the earliest date consistent with a safe and
orderly draw down of United States troops in Afghanistan.”213 Naturally,
with the influx of troops returning home in the coming years, issues of
coverage for PTSD treatment will certainly arise.
Due in part to the fact that the American public has had more
access to international news through the media than it did in the past and
also because soldiers are facing, once again, new methods of warfare, the
current conflicts in the Middle East have marked an enormous increase not
only in the number of soldiers affected with PTSD but also with the
amount of national attention and healthcare services the disorder has
received. Deployments to the Middle East have taken place at the quickest
speed in the history of all volunteer forces with deployments lasting longer,
common redeployments, and infrequent breaks in between deployments.214
As America saw in both World War II and Vietnam,215 recent advances in
medical science, body armor and other military technology means that
more soldiers are surviving experiences that would have killed them in
earlier wars.216 As the co-director of the “Invisible Wounds of War” Study
team commented, however, “casualties of a different kind have emerged in
large numbers—invisible wounds, such as post traumatic stress
disorder.”217 In the same study, a telephone survey of approximately two
thousand previously deployed veterans were questioned and of those
interviewed, fourteen percent reported symptoms consistent with major
depression while another fourteen percent reported symptoms consistent
with PTSD.218 Applying these findings to the 1.64 million troops who had
been deployed for either OEF or OIF as of October 2007, the study
212
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estimated that approximately 300,000 veterans were suffering from PTSD
or major depression as of April 2008.219
The National Center for PTSD also found that ten to eighteen
percent of OEF and OIF troops were likely to have PTSD upon returning
home.220 In assessing the stressors faced in each combat zone in 2003, the
Center found that soldiers and marines reported more combat stressors at
higher levels than soldiers in Afghanistan.221 The Center listed certain
factors which made it more likely that OEF or OIF service members would
develop PTSD, which included longer deployment time, more severe
combat exposure such as deployment to “forward” areas close to the
enemy or seeing others wounded or killed, more severe physical injury,
traumatic brain injury, not being married, and low morale and poor social
support within the unit.222
C.

COVERAGE AND TREATMENT FOR VETERANS

The Department of Veterans Affairs now has an ever-expanding
web of resources on coverage and services for veterans with mental health
problems like PTSD. A quick glance at the Department’s website provides
page upon page of information, resources, and additional informative
documents such as informational pamphlets, a Guide to VA Mental Health
Services for Veterans & Families, recent studies on veterans with mental
disorders, and links to additional resources beyond those on the website
itself.223 The National Center for PTSD is also an excellent resource for
veterans.224 Programs like AboutFace, which details real veterans’ battles
with PTSD, have made it apparent that the disorder is personal, extremely
real, and curable with the right treatment.225
219

Id. at xxi.
See Mental Health Effects of Serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. DEP’T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/overview-mentalhealth-effects.asp.
221
Id.
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Id. (Other factors included lower rank, lower level of schooling, family
problems, member of the National Guard or Reserves, prior trauma exposure,
female gender, and Hispanic ethnic group).
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See generally U.S.Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, www.va.gov.
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See generally National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/index.asp.
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See generally About Face, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/apps/AboutFace/.
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The National Center for PTSD found that recent veterans are
seeking health care from the DVA more than ever before.226 DVA data
indicates that between the years of 2002 to 2009, one million troops had
left active duty in either Afghanistan or Iraq and thus became eligible for
DVA care.227 Of those one million troops, forty-six percent used DVA
health care services and of those who used the services, forty-eight percent
were diagnosed with a mental illness.228 The Center did express concern,
however, that many veterans with mental health problems had not yet
accessed any available services.229 Some possible reasons for failing to do
so include concern over being seen as weak or treated differently, concern
that others would lose confidence in them, concerns about privacy and side
effects of treatments, and problems with access, such as cost or location of
treatment.230
Today, veterans who have served or are currently serving in Iraq or
Afghanistan may enroll in the DVA Health Care System and receive
healthcare for two years after separation without any co-payment
requirements for health issues that are related to military service.231 After
the two-year period expires, veterans may continue to utilize the DVA
system but are required to pay applicable co-payments.232 Although several
laws have been proposed to extend the two-year period of time,233 the
DVA, in a 2005 hearing on the proposed laws, expressed its opposition to
the laws claiming that two years was more than enough time to apply for
enrollment in the health care system and to receive co-payment free health
care.234 When Congress expressed concern that such restriction may
prevent veterans from enrolling in the DVA’s health care program since
symptoms in illnesses such as PTSD may not manifest until years after the
trauma, the DVA responded by claiming that, “if PTSD appears in a nonenrolled combat veteran following the end of his or her two-year period of
eligibility, and is subsequently determined to be service-connected, that
veteran would then become eligible for enrollment in Priority Group 1, 2,
or 3, and thus they would be able to receive needed care.”235
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According to the DVA, it has come a long way in providing
services for veterans with PTSD.236 In addition to the DVA’s efforts, the
Assured Funding for Veterans Health Care Act of 2005, would require the
Secretary of the Treasury to make mandatory appropriations for DVA
health care.237 Enacting the 2005 Act would result in a net increase in
direct spending of approximately $179 billion over the 2007-2010 period,
and an additional $518 billion over the 2007-2015 period.238 More recently
in 2010, President Barak Obama signed the Caregivers and Veterans
Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 into law.239 Section 202 of the act
specifically provides for training and certification of mental health care
providers within the DVA for veterans suffering from sexual trauma or
PTSD.240
The above series of acts, bills and laws proves that the American
government has finally moved veterans’ mental health closer to the top of
its priority list. Unfortunately, many veterans are still left without adequate
coverage for their mental health care. As a result, these veterans are
receiving either inadequate treatment or no treatment at all for the PTSD
that plagues them. Veterans’ support systems that are in place are
consistently experiencing funding cuts as well. For example, most recently,
the DVA announced that it will no longer fund service dogs for veterans
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Id. at 23 (pointing out that it has developed an Iraqi War guide for
clinicians; implemented a national clinical reminder to prompt clinicians to assess
OEF and OIF veterans for PTSD, depression, and substance abuse; implemented a
national system of 144 specialized PTSD programs in all states; required all DVA
outpatient clinics to either have a psychiatrist or psychologist on staff full-time or
ensure that veterans can consult a mental health provider in their community; and
established uniform budgets for mental health care at some of the DVA’s health
centers. In June 2004, the VA instituted the “Afghan and Iraq Post-Deployment
Screen” as a mandatory electronic clinical reminder to conduct brief, postdeployment screening of OEF/OIF veterans. The screening consists of brief,
validated screening measures to assess alcohol use, PTSD, and depression.).
237
Id. at 26-27.
238
Id. at 27.
239
See Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010, PUB.
L. NO. 111–163, 124 Stat. 1130 (2010). See also General James Jones, Improving
Health Care for Veterans, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 6, 2010, 4:54 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/05/improving-health-care-veterans (for
a summary of the Act).
240
See Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010, PUB.
L. NO. 111–163, 124 Stat. 1130, sec. 202 (2010).
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with mental disorders like PTSD.241 Endless news articles detail the plight
these veterans face and their inability to secure the health care they
deserve.242 In 2009, two non-profit organizations, the Veterans for
Common Sense and the Veterans for Truth, sought injunctive and
declaratory relief concerning the delays in the DVA’s mental health system
and in the adjudication or service-connected death and disability
compensation claims.243 In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found for Veterans in holding that the DVA’s delays
were a violation of veterans’ due process rights to receive the benefits
they’re promised by the statute for harms and injuries sustained while in
service.244 Several months after the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the DVA had
still failed to take any measures to ameliorate the situations veterans with
post-traumatic stress disorder are placed in.245 Although the DVA claims it
is taking more steps to improve its mental health care system, these
measures are often still not enough.246
In addition to mounting pressures placed upon the DVA to
overhaul its mental health system, courts and communities across the
United States have pulled together more than ever before to support their
troops. A new Veterans’ Court in Queens, New York hears cases
concerning veterans who have committed low-level misdemeanors while
experiencing mental health or substance abuse problems.247 The Veterans’
Court will seek treatment rather than imprisonment for veteran-defendants
and will also aim to assign a veteran mentor to each defendant in the hopes
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See Kevin Dolak, VA Cuts Funding for Service Dogs for PTSD Veterans,
ABC (Sept. 8, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/va-cuts-funding-service-dogsptsd-veterans/story?id=17179680#.UOc0XKWpV95.
242
See Erica Goode, Suicide’s Rising Toll: After Combat, Victims of an Inner
War,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/02suicide.html; Suran, supra note 16.
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See Veterans for Common Sense & Veterans for Truth v. Shinseki, No. 0816728, (9th Cir. May 10, 2011).
244
Id.
245
See More Excuses and Delays from the VA, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/opinion/more-excuses-and-delays-from-theva.html?_r=1&ref=posttraumaticstressdisorder.
246
See While Veterans Wait, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/10/25/opinion/while-veterans-ait.html?ref=posttraumaticstressdisorder.
247
See John Eligon, Queens Court for Veterans Aims to Help, Not Punish,
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/
N.Y.
nyregion/14vets.html.
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of establishing a meaningful connection.248 Local community projects such
as the Wounded Warrior Project have visions of fostering “the most
successful, well-adjusted generation of wounded service members in our
nation's history.” The Wounded Warrior Project does so by creating a
support network for its local troops in their transition to civilian life, which
may assist the veterans in seeking services such as mental health care
coverage and treatment.249 Such support means that veterans are returning
home to more stable support systems than in previous wars. Unfortunately,
what services currently exist are simply not able to provide enough support
for the large number of veterans who need assistance.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The manifestation of post-traumatic stress disorder during each
war’s era was directly affected not only by the way in which society
viewed mental illness at the time, but the way in which each war was
fought. Advances in weaponry and medical technology meant that soldiers
were seeing more horrific events take place and living to tell the tale. Upon
returning home, the way in which soldiers were greeted by their fellow
Americans not only affected the ways in which soldiers experienced posttraumatic stress disorder but also affected the ways in which the American
government provided—or failed to provide—government-sponsored
mental health coverage. When mental health was an afterthought in
society’s mind, it became so for the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Advances in research in the world of mental health subsequently lead to a
greater understanding of the origins and composition of mental disorders.
The desire the world once had to bifurcate physical disorders from illnesses
that plagued one’s mind had blurred and the people of the United States
slowly began to understand that one couldn’t necessarily separate the two.
Finally, as soldiers returned home to a more supportive society, the
American government began to follow suit in increasing the duration and
number of benefits that veterans would receive after completing their
service.
The evolution of PTSD in veterans throughout the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries coincided with the immense growth of the
Department of Veterans Affairs. From offering simple pensions centuries
before World War I to offering health care, loan, education and
248

Id.
See THE WOUNDED WARRIOR PROJECT, http://www.woundedwarrior
project.org/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).
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employment programs today, the Department of Veterans Affairs has
certainly come a long way from its inception. While the name and the
symptoms associated with PTSD changed with each war’s time period, one
thing has remained: veterans are not receiving enough coverage, adequate
treatment or adequate compensation for the traumatic mental injuries they
have sustained while serving their country. Until the United States’
Department of Veterans Affairs begins providing the coverage veterans
deserve, affected veterans will not seek out the mental health care they
need to successfully treat post-traumatic stress disorder.

A BILLION DOLLAR PROBLEM: THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY’S WIDESPREAD FAILURE TO ESCHEAT
UNCLAIMED DEATH BENEFITS TO THE STATES
DEVIN HARTLEY*
***
This note examines whether insurers are violating state unclaimed
property statutes as well as unfair claims settlement practices statutes by
failing to take affirmative steps to locate and pay beneficiaries of life
insurance policies or, in the alternative, by failing to escheat the proceeds
to the state. This note shows that the current claims settlement practices of
the nation’s largest insurers do indeed violate these statutes. Specifically,
the insurance industry has used the Social Security Administration’s Death
Master File (DMF) to identify deceased annuitants and terminate annuity
payments but has failed to use the same technology to identify deceased
insureds and pay beneficiaries. Additionally, this note describes the
industry’s reaction to the regulatory scrutiny of its claims settlement
practices and predicts a paradigm shift with respect to those practices;
that is, a shift from an industry that only pays beneficiaries upon the filing
of a claim to an industry that proactively seeks to identify deceased
insureds and pay out the insurance benefits associated with those deaths.
***
“I’m concerned that the [life] insurance industry is not holding up
its end of the sacred bargain it struck with its clients when it issued life
insurance policies in the first place.”1
Since its inception, the life insurance industry has been relied upon
by consumers as an ameliorating corollary to a tragedy; a type of financial

* I would like to thank Professor Jill Anderson for her valuable feedback on
this note- it is much appreciated.
1
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's Practices and Procedures Relating
to the Use of the Death Master File Data and Related Information: Hearing
Before the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, 11 (Fl. 2011)
[hereinafter California MetLife Hearing] (statement of Dave Jones, California
Insurance Commissioner).
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safety net to be cast in the unfortunate event of a loved one’s death. For
most people, a life insurance policy represents a hard-earned effort to
provide their loved ones with some measure of financial support, or at the
very least, a means by which to cover funeral expenses.2 In many cases, the
foundation for these policies has been laid through decades of premium
payments, paid by the insured with the understanding that the insured’s
heirs would one day reap the rewards.3 Currently, however, there are
widespread practices among the insurance industry which suggest that this
understanding on the part of the consumer may be mistaken.
Specifically, it has been estimated that over 1 billion dollars in
death benefits currently sit on the books of insurers,4 unclaimed by the very
beneficiaries that the insurer sought to protect, notwithstanding the fact
that the industry has available to it the technology that would allow it to
identify and reach out to those beneficiaries.5 The situation is made more
egregious by the fact that insurance companies regularly employ such
technology to terminate annuity payments while failing to use this same
technology to identify beneficiaries and pay death benefits.6
Unfortunately, many of these same beneficiaries are further victimized
when insurers rely on ambiguous contractual language to continue paying
themselves premiums out of a policy’s accumulated cash value long after

2

See Paul Sullivan, Tracking Down and Collecting Unclaimed Life Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/
your-money/life-and-disability-insurance/26wealth.html.
3
See id. (“. . . most people expect the policies on which they have paid
premiums for decades to help their heirs get by- or at the least cover funeral
expenses”).
4
Ed Leefeldt, $1 Billion in Life Insurance Unclaimed?, MSN MONEY (May
19, 2011, 6:36 PM), available at http://money.msn.com/saving-moneytips/post.aspx?post=f24dc3b4-e3a9-495d-8bcc-8be7fe5090ea.
5
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of John
Chiang, California State Controller).
6
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: Hearing Before the Florida Office of
Insurance Regulation, 71-72 (Fl. 2011) [hereinafter Florida MetLife Hearing]
(statement of Belinda Miller, Acting General Counsel, Florida Office of Insurance
Regulation) (“Now you heard the issue is that . . . when the company is stopping
payment, you use that file frequently and regularly; and then when it is a matter of
paying someone a death benefit, it's later and not as consistent.”).
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the insured has stopped making premium payments on that policy.7 Once
the policy’s cash value is depleted, the insurer then lapses the policy
without ever paying out death benefits.8
This note will examine whether some of the largest life insurers in
the U.S. are violating state insurance statutes and state unclaimed property
statutes by failing to take affirmative steps to pay out on policies of life
insurance or, alternatively, escheat the proceeds to the appropriate state.
Part I of this note discusses the problem of unclaimed death benefits by
providing statistics detailing just how significant this issue has become
while also touching on the process of demutualization, the smoking gun
that helped uncover the true extent of the problem. Part II discusses the
legal basis for the concept of escheat and traces the development of escheat
law from its early English common law roots through landmark twentieth
century Supreme Court cases and up to the current version of escheat as it
appears in modern unclaimed property laws. Part III examines insurance
industry practices9 such as the asymmetrical use of the Death Master File
and the misapplication of contractual anti-forfeiture provisions, practices
7

In Re: Nationwide Insurance Company: Hearing Before the Florida Office
of Insurance Regulation, 36 (Fl. 2011) [hereinafter Florida Nationwide Hearing]
(statement of Belinda Miller, Acting General Counsel, Florida Office of Insurance
Regulation) (“But a lot of these policies aren't going to get to limiting age because
they lapsed, because they [the insurers] paid the premium out of the accumulated
cash in the policy and then it never gets to limiting age.”).
8
Id.
9
It is important to note the extent to which the issues and practices discussed
in this note truly are endemic to the insurance industry as a whole. This is not a
situation where a few isolated insurers are acting as outliers, but rather, one where
the majority of the nation’s largest insurers are, to some degree, exhibiting these
practices . For evidence of the pervasiveness of these practices within the
insurance industry, one need look no further than the breadth and scope of the
regulatory agreements that have already been entered into between regulators and
insurers regarding the insurers’ unclaimed property practices. MetLife, John
Hancock, Prudential, AIG and Nationwide have all entered into regulatory
agreements- and it is likely that others will soon follow; see Jack McDermott &
Amy Bogner, Florida Announces a $11 Million Multi-Agency Agreement with the
AIG Companies to Protect Life and Annuity Beneficiaries, FLA. OFFICE OF INS.
REG. (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.floir.com/PressReleases/viewmediarelease.aspx
?id=1976. See also The Probe Into Life Insurance Company Beneficiary Payouts,
GO INSURANCE RATES (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.goinsurancerates.com/lifeinsurance/probe-into-life-insurance-company-beneficiary-payouts.
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which contribute to the industry’s failure to pay out death benefits, or
alternatively, escheat them to the state. 10 Part IV examines industry wide
violations of state unclaimed property laws stemming from the failure of
insurers to adhere to statutory dormancy requirements. Part V discusses the
extent to which industry practices such as the asymmetrical use of the
DMF constitute violations of state unfair claims practices law in the wake
of Connecticut Mutual v. Moore.11 Part VI of the note examines recent
developments concerning the insurance industry’s unclaimed property
practices and its concomitant failure to pay out or escheat unclaimed death
benefits. And finally, the note concludes by predicting that, due to
regulatory pressure, the insurance industry as a whole is trending towards a
reformed model of business that utilizes a more proactive approach with
respect to locating beneficiaries, paying out death benefits, and escheating
unclaimed benefits to the state.
UNCLAIMED DEATH BENEFITS UNDER LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES: THE INDUSTRY WIDE DILEMMA

I.
A.

THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

According to life insurers, approximately 1% of death benefits owed
to beneficiaries are never claimed.12 Even with only 1% of policies going
unclaimed, however, the total value of unclaimed death benefits figures to

10

See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement by California
Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones that “[s]ome insurers appear to use Death
Master to cut off payments on annuities when an annuity owner dies, but do not
use that information to identify life insurance policyholders who die and pay their
beneficiaries.”).
11
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
12
See e.g., How to Find Lost Life Insurance Policies, ARTICLESBASE.COM
(May 25, 2007), http://www.articlesbase.com/insurance-articles/how-to-collecton-lost-life-insurance-policies-357858.html (“Dave Potter, a spokesperson for
Hartford Life said ‘approximately less than 1% of all policies are never claimed by
the beneficiary.’”); see also California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 77-78
(statement of Todd B. Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance
Products, MetLife) (“If you looked over a period of time, about 99 percent of the
claimed dollars paid came from the normal sources and about one percent of those
claims never were submitted through the normal processes.”).
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be in the billions.13 In terms of raw figures for unclaimed property around the
country, it is estimated that roughly $351 million in unclaimed life
insurance was transferred to the states in 2009.14 But perhaps even more
telling is the $1.3 billion in total unclaimed policy liability which is
estimated to be on the books of the largest insurance companies.15 New
York has received $400,287,736 in unclaimed life insurance property since
2000 and, out of that sum, has paid out $64,772,228 to beneficiaries.16
Since 1943, the state of New York has received $10.5 billion in unclaimed
property, only 20% of which is claimed in any given year.17 Once the
states are in possession of this unclaimed property, they are able to use
these proceeds in a way that actually benefits the state’s general
population. For instance, California uses this extra source of revenue to
alleviate budget shortfalls and supplement its general fund.18 Yet, budget
concerns and tax reduction aside, the state’s main concern is returning the
property to its rightful owner.19 This goal is in stark contrast with the

13

Leslie Scism & Vauhini Vara, Life Insurers Skimp on Payouts: States,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
28,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703367004576289423732099868.html; Arthur D. Postal,
McCarty: Unclaimed Property Probe Could Bring in “North of $1 Billion”,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (May 19, 2011), http://edit.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/
News/2011/5/Pages/McCarty-Unclaimed-Property-Probe-Could-Bring-in-Northof-1-Billion.aspx (according to Florida Insurance Commissioner Kevin McCarty,
an investigation into life insurers’ death benefits payment practices could help
beneficiaries and state unclaimed property funds recover “north of $1 billion”).
14
Postal, supra note 13.
15
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 2 (this is likely a conservative estimate as this data
was drawn from a study performed by Joseph M. Belth, professor emeritus of
insurance at Indiana University and editor of the Insurance Forum, which only
considered the 20 largest insurance providers and their dealings with the 20 largest
states); see Marc J. Musyl, Micah Schwalb & Sarah Niemiec Seedig, Unclaimed
Property Audits: No Laughing Matter, NAT’L L. F. (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://nationallawforum.com/2011/08/08/unclaimed-property-audits-no-laughingmatter/; see also Leefeldt, supra note 4.
16
Paul Sullivan, Tracking Down and Collecting Unclaimed Life Insurance, N.
Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/your-money/lifeand-disability-insurance/26wealth.html (These figures were reported by Vanessa
Lockel, a spokeswoman for the Office of the State Comptroller).
17
Id.
18
Scism & Vara, supra note 13.
19
Id. at 2-3.
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conduct of those insurers who hold onto unclaimed death benefits thereby
allowing them to profit from the underlying investment income.20 Certainly,
insurers have incentives to escheat unclaimed death benefits in compliance
with unclaimed property laws- namely to avoid having to pay the statutory
interest on a late remittance21- but competing considerations, such as the
profit insurers can realize by holding onto these benefits for years after the
proceeds become due, are no doubt compelling.22
There are many reasons why this money goes unclaimed but the
most prevalent seems to be the simple fact that the beneficiaries do not
know the money exists.23 Many cash-strapped states, intrigued by the
magnitude of these figures, are now in the process of investigating the
practices of life insurers with respect to unclaimed property. Specifically,
they are looking into whether life insurers are doing enough to locate
beneficiaries after a policyholder dies, and if they are complying with state
laws which require insurers to turnover unclaimed money to the states.24
Among other things, the states are attempting to ascertain what information
life insurers have about their policyholders, whether the insurers are using
this information properly and how vigilant the companies have been in
attempting to track down beneficiaries. More specifically, they are looking
to determine whether the insurers are using the DMF in a selective manner

20

Id.
Florida Nationwide Hearing, supra note 7, at 42 (statement of Eric
Henderson , Senior Vice President of Individual Investments, Nationwide) (“[I]f
you just go for pure financial interest, it’s in our interest to do that [escheat] so we
don’t have that statutory interest.”).
22
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Adam
Cole, General Counsel, California Department of Insurance) (“It should be noted
that improper calculation of the dormancy period allows insurers unlawfully to
retain millions of dollars in proceeds for years, if not decades, after they are due to
be escheated.”).
23
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1 (Additional circumstances in which a policy
may go unclaimed occur when the beneficiary dies before the policyholder, or
when the beneficiary knows of the policy but is unable to locate it).
24
Matthew Sturdevant, Connecticut Joins Investigation into Unclaimed Life
Insurance
Funds,
COURANT.COM
(Apr.
28,
2011,
3:52
PM),
http://blogs.courant.com/connecticut_insurance/2011/04/ (a total of 36 states,
including Connecticut, New York, and all New England states, are now
investigating life insurers’ actions in tracking down beneficiaries).
21
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to avoid paying death benefits to policy beneficiaries.25 Connecticut has
been a recent addition to the growing list of states now in the midst of an
investigation to uncover escheatable unclaimed property.26 The states
participating in the investigation view unclaimed property as a much
needed source of revenue in the midst of budget shortfalls and trying
economic times.27 Additionally, from the insurer’s point of view, failure to
comply with these state unclaimed property laws could result in millions of
dollars in interest and penalties being paid by the insurers.28
The unclaimed property figures, of course, raise the question: what
happens to the billions of dollars of death benefits that go unclaimed?
Unfortunately, this money is being used by insurers in ways that plainly
disregard the state statutes governing unclaimed property.29 When an
insured stops paying the premiums on a policy, rather than turning to
readily available information30 to check whether the policyholder is

25

Id.
Id. (Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Thomas B. Leonardi has
announced that he is launching a “formal inquiry into the business practices of life
insurance companies regarding timely payments of death benefits- money paid to a
beneficiary when a policyholder dies.”).
27
Marc J. Musyl, et al., Unclaimed Property Audits: No Laughing Matter,
THE NATIONAL LAW FORUM (Aug. 8, 2011), http://nationallawforum.com/2011/
08/08/unclaimed-property-audits-no-laughing-matter/ (In fact, during the last two
years, some state legislatures have revised their unclaimed property statutes to
reduce dormancy periods, which effectively speeds up the process by which states
can receive and, ultimately, use this unclaimed property).
28
Id.
29
Although unclaimed property laws vary slightly on a state-by-state basis,
most states use a modified version of one of the four Uniform Acts (Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act of 1954; Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act of 1966; Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1981; and
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1995), which results in a baseline of
uniformity among state unclaimed property laws; MICHAEL HOUGHTON, ESQ., ET
AL., Unclaimed Property, in CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES PORTFOLIO 74-2nd, A1 (2006).
30
See Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6 at 17-18 (statement of Belinda
Miller, Acting General Counsel, Florida Office of Insurance Regulation) (“There
are a variety of ways insurance companies become aware of [the] death of their
insureds.... They [also] can use information contained in or derived from publicly
available databases such as the Social Security Administration Death Master
File.”).
26
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deceased, the insurer relies on so-called ‘anti-lapse’ or ‘nonforfeiture’ laws
to pay itself premiums out of the built-up cash value of the policy.31 The
insurer continues to pay itself premiums until the cash value has been
depleted, at which point it terminates the policy and avoids paying out any
benefits.32 Not only do the insurers fail to be proactive in terms of seeking
out beneficiaries, they go so far as to use information on the United States
Social Security Administration Death Master File [hereinafter DMF] to
terminate annuity payouts yet ignore this exact same information on the
life insurance side of their business.33 The insurers regularly check the
DMF for deceased annuitants because, when an annuitant dies, the insurers
discontinue annuity payouts, but when it comes to life insurance policies,
the insurers fail to utilize the DMF.34 In other words, the insurance
industry has embraced the practice of relying on the DMF when it is
beneficial for them to do so, yet disregarding DMF information when its
use would be to their detriment.
B.

DEMUTUALIZATION: THE SMOKING GUN

During the early 2000’s many of the large insurers changed their
form of ownership from a mutual company to a stock company.35 A
mutual insurance company is owned solely by the policyholders, whereas a
stock insurance company is owned by members of the public. In order to
accomplish this shift in ownership, they went through a process called
“demutualization.” In that process the companies were required to
compensate the policyholders for their interest in the mutual company with
stock, or in some cases, cash. When the companies tried to locate those
policyholders in order to compensate them it was determined that a large
amount of those policy holders were missing, or “lost”. Prudential, for
example, identified approximately 1 million policyholders as lost during

31

For a fuller discussion of the insurance industry’s questionable practices
concerning anti-forfeiture provisions, see infra Part III, Section B.
32
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 6-7 (statement of Dave
Jones, California Insurance Commissioner).
33
Id. at 7 (statement of Dave Jones, California Insurance Commissioner).
34
Id. (statement of Dave Jones, California Insurance Commissioner).
35
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 26 (statement of Dave
Jones, California Insurance Commissioner).
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their demutualization process36 and Metropolitan Life, or MetLife,
identified lost policyholders in excess of 1 million.37 The companies
recognized that the payment owed to these lost policyholders constituted
unclaimed property and escheated those proceeds to the states pursuant to
each state’s unclaimed property laws.38 Nevertheless, most companies39
failed to investigate whether some of the policyholders who were lost,
were lost because they were dead.40 Because eligibility for a
demutualization payment was conditioned upon the ownership of an
underlying life insurance policy, each time a lost policyholder turned out to
be deceased, death benefits were owed under the affiliated life insurance
policy. To this end, regulators have been questioning insurers as to why
they did not investigate whether these lost policyholders were dead,
especially as some of the policies were over forty years old.41 MetLife, for
example, admitted that many of these policyholders were likely dead but
could not explain why they failed to investigate which specific policies had
benefits due.42
II.

UNCLAIMED PROPERTY STATUTES AND CASE LAW: THE
PREVAILING INTERPRETATIONS
A.

THE CONCEPT OF ESCHEAT

The law of escheat has its roots in early English common law. The
underlying philosophy of escheat was described by Blackstone: “[t]he

36

Lost Life Insurance – Missing Policyholder Claims, DEMUTUALIZATION
CLAIMS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 28, 2013), www.demutualization-claims.com.
37
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 180 (statement of Todd B.
Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance Products, MetLife).
38
See Lost Life Insurance – Missing Policyholder Claims, supra note 36.
39
Prudential being a notable exception, as they did, in fact, investigate whether
these lost policyholders were dead.
40
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 183 (statement of Todd
Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance Products, MetLife)
(“Yeah. It’s probably reasonable to assume some were dead.”).
41
Id. at 184 (statement of Dave Jones, California Insurance Commissioner);
see Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 127 (statement of Frank Cassandra,
Senior Vice President, Insurance Products Financial, MetLife).
42
Id. at 184-85 (statement of Todd B. Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S.
Business Insurance Products, MetLife).
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grand and fundamental maxim of all feudal tenure is this: that all lands
were originally granted out by the sovereign, and are therefore holden,
either mediately or immediately, of the crown.”43 Early common law
escheat was the concept by which land held by tenants was returned to the
owner, or lord, in the event that a tenant died without an heir.44 Escheat
law, however, has evolved over time, and the modern concept refers to a
process where the state takes title to property, real or personal, that is
unclaimed or, in the language of many current statutes, presumed
abandoned by the rightful owner.45 Unclaimed property laws retained their
original common law form until the 19th century when states began
enacting the first escheat statutes. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Alabama, Illinois, Georgia, New Jersey, Mississippi,
Missouri, Maryland and North Carolina were the first states to codify some
version of the common law escheat doctrine.46
In early English common law, escheat referred only to real
property, but the concept of bona vacantia, literally “vacant goods”,
applied to personal property.47 This concept allowed for the crown to take
possession of personal property in the absence of any other rightful owner
on the basis of its “royal prerogative.”48 Remnants of bona vacantia can be
found in modern statutory law where the state is allowed to acquire title to
property that is presumed abandoned because “possession by the crown
was more equitable than that of a stranger.”49 Another rationale used to
support the concept of bona vacantia was that the crown’s ownership
would preclude conflicting claims made by private parties for the same
property .50
The English common law doctrines of escheat and bona vacantia
provide the foundation for current state unclaimed property laws.51
American states have adopted as their unclaimed property laws a

43

HOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 29, at A-3.
ANTHONY L. ANDREOLI & J. BROOKE SPOTSWOOD, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY:
LAWS, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT 5 (2002).
45
Id. at 5.
46
HOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 29, at A-5.
47
ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 5.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Michael I. Saltzman, Providing Protection In State Unclaimed Property
Audits, in TAX ANALYSTS SPECIAL REPORT 1599, 1601 (2000).
44
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combination of these two principles. In their current form, however, state
escheat laws differ from the early English version in two significant
aspects: first, the modern statutes presume all unclaimed property to be
abandoned after it has remained unclaimed for a certain period of time;
second, once the unclaimed property is escheated, the states act as the
custodian of the property but not the owner.52 The states hold the right to
title against anyone except the missing owner, so, unlike its English
predecessors, the state cannot claim absolute title to the property.53 There
are numerous justifications for the state serving as custodian of unclaimed
property. For one, there is the fact that the state is a safer custodian of
unclaimed property because businesses (such as insurance companies)
could go bankrupt, or dissolve.54 Also, there is the states’ ability to better
protect the interest of the owner, and the idea that a holder of unclaimed
property should not benefit from property belonging to third parties.55
Finally, state custody relieves the holder from any attendant liability while
also preventing the possible misuse of funds by the holder.56
Current unclaimed property law, however, differs from the early
common law concept of bona vacantia in that, at least in terms of
intangible unclaimed property in the form of insurance policies, bank
deposit accounts or dividend payments, it is not the possessor but rather the
state who ultimately gains the right to these monies.57 This divergence
from early common law could be explained by the fact that the law of
escheat originally applied only to real estate,58 and additionally, in its
earliest form, abandoned property was viewed mainly in terms of
intentionally abandoned property.59

52

Id.
Id.
54
ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 7 (discussing the underlying
purpose of the 1954 Uniform Act and noting that although the Act was amended
by future Uniform Unclaimed Property Acts, the rationale of this 1954 Act still
applies).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Intangible unclaimed property includes items such as insurance policy
proceeds, bank deposit accounts and dividend payments.
58
HOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 29 at A-3.
59
Id. at A-4.
53
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THE UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACTS

Most states have adopted a version of one of the following uniform
acts as their own unclaimed property law: the Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act of 1954, the Revised Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act of 1966, the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of
1981 and the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1995.60 For the most
part, unclaimed life insurance policy proceeds are escheatable three to five
years after the policy becomes due and payable.61 Both the 1981 Act and
the 1995 Act are based on the original Uniform Unclaimed Property Act,
which was proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSL].62 The NCCUSL is a nonprofit organization consisting of commissioners appointed by each state.63
In 1954, the NCCUSL proposed the first uniform unclaimed property act,
which became known as the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act.64 Thereafter, in 1966, the NCCUSL made small modifications to the
1954 Act and then again, in 1981, the NCCUSL made additional
revisions.65 The 1981 version is the version enacted by a majority of the
states.66 The 1995 Act, although it embodies the most recent revisions to
the unclaimed property laws, has to this point been adopted by only a
handful of states.67

60

UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT (1995); Saltzman, supra note 51, at

1602.

61

See, e.g. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1515(a) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 365a (1958).
62
ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 29.
63
Frequently Asked Questions, UNIFORM LAWS (March 28, 2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/narrative.aspx?title=Frequently%20Asked%20Questi
ons.
64
Why States Should Adopt UUPA, UNIFORM LAWS (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20
Adopt%20UUPA.
65
Unclaimed Property Act Summary, UNIFORM LAWS (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Unclaimed%20Property%20
Act.
66
Why States Should Adopt the UUPA, supra note 64.
67
Id.
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CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. V. MOORE

In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance v. Moore, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that administrative hurdles such as the requirement of a death
certificate and the filing of a formal claim, although appropriate in the
context of a contractual insurer-insured relationship, cannot be applied to
the states.68 The Court rejected the insurers’ argument that a New York
abandoned property statute was unconstitutional because Article I,
section 10 of the Constitution prevents the state from transforming a
contractual obligation that was previously only conditional into one that is
liquidated.69 The insurer’s argument was predicated on the fact that their
obligation to pay out policy proceeds to a beneficiary was triggered only
upon proof of death or the filing of a formal claim. The New York statute
in question, however, would require that insurers, once the dormancy
period has run, escheat the proceeds of unclaimed policies to the states,
irrespective of whether or not the insurers had received proof of death or a
formal claim.70 In rejecting the insurer’s Contract Clause argument, the
Court recognized the long-standing right of the state to collect abandoned
property while also emphasizing the inherent unreasonableness of
requiring the state, acting as a conservator rather than a contracting party,
to comply with contractual obligations which may properly be imposed on
the contracting parties.71 The Court reasoned that “the state may more
properly be custodian and beneficiary of abandoned property than any
person,” before pointing out that if these unclaimed benefits are not
escheated to the state, the insurance companies would end up retaining
money which they normally would have been required to pay out.72
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore reflects a preference
towards the states, rather than the insurer, as the holder of unclaimed death
benefits not only because the states are in a better position to track down

68

Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 547 (1948).
Id. at 545 (“[A]ppellants raised in their complaint and have consistently
maintained that the statute impairs the obligation of contract within the meaning of
Art. I, s 10, of the Constitution… Their argument under the Contract Clause is that
the statute transforms into a liquidated obligation an obligation that was previously
only conditional.”).
70
N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 703; See also Moore, 333 U.S. at 542 n.1.
71
Moore, 333 U.S at 547.
72
Id. at 546.
69
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the beneficiary but also because, until the beneficiary is located, the
unclaimed proceeds are used to supplement the state’s general fund.73
D.

TEXAS V. NEW JERSEY

It is well settled in all jurisdictions that the state in which tangible
property sits has the exclusive right and power to escheat.74 However, with
respect to intangible property such as life insurance benefits, the issue of
which state holds the escheat right has historically been much less clear.
Because the states themselves were powerless to decide a dispute between
multiple states and there was no applicable federal statute, the burden of
creating a rule fell on the Supreme Court. In 1965, the question of which
state has the right to receive unclaimed intangible property when multiple
states can assert ties to such property was settled in the case of Texas v.
New Jersey.75 In Texas v. New Jersey, four different states claimed title to
various small debts owed by the Sun Oil Company to small creditors who
had not come forward to claim them and could not be located.76 Each state
argued for the adoption of a different rule, but ultimately, the Court settled
on the rule suggested by Florida that, because a debt is the property of the
creditor as opposed to the debtor, “the right and power to escheat the debt
should be accorded to the State of the creditor’s last known address as
shown by the debtor’s books and records.”77 The Court reasoned that such
a rule would eliminate the need to grapple with the often complicated legal
concepts of residence and domicile while simplifying the administration

73

Id.
Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965).
75
Id. at 680-81.
76
Id. at 675, 677 (Texas filed suit against New Jersey, Pennsylvania and the
Sun Oil Company for injunctive and declaratory relief but Florida was permitted
to intervene because they “claimed the right to escheat the portion of Sun’s
escheatable obligations owing to persons whose last known address was in
Florida.”).
77
Id. at 678-81 (Texas argued that exclusive jurisdiction to escheat should be
given to the State with the most significant ‘contacts’ with the debt; New Jersey
urged the court to grant the right to escheat to the State that served as the domicile
to the debtor; and finally, Pennsylvania asked the Court to hold that the right and
power to escheat should be accorded to the location of the principal place of
business of the corporate debtor.).
74
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and application of escheat laws.78 Also significant was that Florida’s rule
afforded proper weight to the fact that a debt is the property of the creditor,
not the debtor.79
Texas v. New Jersey is particularly relevant to any discussion of
the escheatment of unclaimed death benefits because, until the decision
was handed down in 1965, there was no way to determine which state
could properly lay claim to which unclaimed death benefits.80 However,
applying the Texas v. New Jersey holding to the context of unclaimed
death benefits, it is well settled that the state in which the beneficiary was
last known to reside is the state with the exclusive right to escheat the
unclaimed death benefits owed to that beneficiary.81
INSURANCE INDUSTRY PRACTICES

III.
A.

THE DEATH MASTER FILE

Unfortunately for the beneficiaries of insurance policies, insurance
companies have failed to implement practices which would enable them to
identify deceased insureds and pay out the insurance benefits associated
with those deaths. In 1936, the Social Security Administration created the
DMF for the purpose of providing the government, as well as multiple
industries, with a tool to prevent fraud, verify death and ensure compliance
with the USA Patriot Act. The DMF contains over sixty million records of
death, each file containing information on the decedent’s name, social
security number, date of birth, date of death, state or country of residence,
ZIP code of last residence and ZIP code of lump sum payment.82 The
DMF, despite being such a comprehensive database, is actually quite
accurate in its information. In fact, Bill Gray, Deputy Commissioner of

78

Id. at 681.
Id. at 680.
80
See ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 54-55.
81
Id.
82
It should be noted that the DMF may not contain this complete list of
information for each decedent as, occasionally, the Social Security Administration
itself does not possess all of this information. Mark E. Hill & Ira Rosenwaike, The
Social Security Administration’s Death Master File: The Completeness of Death
Reporting at Older Ages, 64 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 45, 45-46 (2001-02).
79
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Systems at the Social Security Administration, testified in a Congressional
hearing that “the death data that we maintain is 99.5% accurate overall.”83
For the insurance industry, the DMF is a highly useful tool because
it allows insurers to verify the deaths of policyholders and prevent identity
fraud. There is evidence, however, that many insurance companies are
using the DMF inconsistently. Regulators in multiple states have expressed
concern that some of the nation’s largest insurance companies have
embraced the practice of rigorously combing the information contained in
the DMF when it benefits them to do so, yet altogether ignoring this same
information when it would work to their detriment.84 Insurers frequently
run their annuitants against the DMF to ensure that annuity payments are
promptly cut-off in the event of the annuitant’s death, yet their references85
against the DMF are much less frequent on the life insurance side where a
match would require death benefits to be paid to a beneficiary.86 On the
annuity side, life insurers benefit from the DMF by using it to learn of the
death of an annuitant, thereby allowing the insurer to terminate monthly
payouts owed to the annuitant. As a result of their access to the DMF, the
insurers have information at their disposal which allows them to learn not
only of annuitants who have passed away, but also life insurance
policyholders who have passed away. Yet, they ignore this information on

83

California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Adam Cole,
Gen. Couns. for the California Department of Insurance).
84
Id. at 22-23.
85
In this context, a ‘run against the DMF’ essentially amounts to a crosscheck of all computer-recorded policies for any one particular branch of the
business (annuities, life insurance, etc.) against the DMF, looking for matches.
86
All annuity policies are in one of two phases: the pay-in or deferred stage,
which is the time period during which the annuitant pays premiums on the policy,
building up the policy’s savings without receiving any payments, and then the payout stage, where the annuitant no longer pays premiums and begins to receive
monthly payments from the insurer which usually continue for the duration of the
annuitant’s life. It is important to note that annuities in the pay-out phase are
matched against the DMF with even greater frequency than annuities in the
deferred phase because deferred annuities are not yet costing the insurer monthly
premium payments so there is less urgency on insurers part to uncover DMF
matches with respect to deferred annuities. California MetLife Hearing, supra note
1, at 46 (statement by Robert E. Sollmann, Jr., Executive Vice President,
Retirement Products, MetLife) (“In general, these sweeps are conducted monthly
for payout annuities and quarterly for deferred annuities.”).
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the life insurance side, despite having already used this same information
to terminate annuity payments.
In a May, 2011 hearing before the California Insurance
Commissioner and the California State Controller, representatives from
MetLife testified under oath to their practices and procedures relating to
the DMF. It appears that this proceeding confirmed many of the regulator’s
concerns regarding the industry’s asymmetrical use of the DMF. MetLife,
which is currently the nation’s largest insurance company in terms of asset
size, revealed that, although they had access to the DMF in the late 1980’s
and began systematically running their group annuities policies against the
DMF at that time,87 it was not until 2007 that they first ran their life
insurance policies against the DMF in any sort of comprehensive manner.88
Additionally, it was not until 2010 that MetLife instituted policies and
procedures to allow a DMF match on the annuities side to be
communicated over to the life insurance side in an effort to determine
whether this annuitant also had a life insurance policy.89 Even then,
MetLife admitted that the implementation of these new policies and
procedures was at least partly due to investigations launched by state
regulators into the industry’s widespread practices in the area of unclaimed
property.90 When asked by state insurance commissioners at the
investigative hearing to describe these newly instituted changes, none of
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Id. at 35 (statement by Todd B. Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S.
Business Insurance Products, MetLife) (“MetLife first began to use Death Master
in the late 80’s. That usage was primarily in our group annuity business.”).
88
Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 49 (statement of Mr. Todd B.
Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance Products, MetLife) (“In
2007, we ran the death index against a majority of our individual life business…”);
Id. at 152 (statement of Adam Hamm, Insurance Commissioner, North Dakota
Insurance Department) (Hamm directed a question to a MetLife representative
asking why MetLife’s use of the DMF for annuities can be traced back to the
1980’s but was not used for the first time on life insurance policies until 2007.).
89
California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of Robert E.
Sollmann, Jr., Executive Vice President, Retirement Products, MetLife).
90
Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 87 (statement of Todd B. Katz,
Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance Products, MetLife) (“we were
in discussions with regulators about this very topic, and I can assure you we are
most interested in… what’s on their minds… So I don’t want to sit here and tell
you that the discussion with our regulators wasn’t part of that, too, because it
was.”).
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the MetLife representatives were able to articulate what these policies and
procedures, in fact, were.91 Instead, MetLife requested to enter into the
record a two page document that provided a “description of the processes”
by which this information was shared between various business lines
within the company.92 Even now, insurers who have begun to run the DMF
systematically across product lines still run their annuity policies against
the DMF with much greater frequency than they do their life insurance
policies. In fact, both MetLife and Nationwide have testified that, although
they run all annuities in the pay-out phase against the DMF on a monthly
basis, they run their life insurance policies against the DMF only once a
year.93 In other words, for every time these two insurers check the DMF
for possible matches on the life insurance side, they perform twelve such
checks on the annuities side. To provide further perspective, insurers first
gained access to the DMF in the 1980’s. They began using the DMF on a
monthly basis for annuities in the late 80’s, and they continue to use the
DMF on a monthly basis for annuities.94 Yet, some insurers95 waited until
the late 2000’s to first run their individual life insurance policies against
the DMF, and it was not until 2010, in the wake of regulatory crackdowns,
that they instituted any sort of systematic use of the DMF on the life
insurance side.96 Regulators have also pointed to the aggressive marketing
91

California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of Todd B. Katz,
Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance Products, MetLife).
92
Id. at 51 (statement of Robert E. Sollmann, Jr., Executive Vice President,
Retirement Products, MetLife).
93
Id. at 129 (statement of Dave Jones, California Insurance Commissioner)
(asking MetLife witnesses to explain the difference in frequency between DMF
usage on the annuities side compared to the life insurance side); Florida
Nationwide Hearing, supra note 7, at 20 (statement of Eric Henderson,
Nationwide representative).
94
Id.
95
Prudential was the exception here as they ran their policies against the DMF
for the first time shortly after their demutualization process concluded in 2002.
Reg. Settlement Agreement, N.H. INS. DEPT. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.nh.gov/
insurance/consumers/documents/prsa.pdf.
96
California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of Robert
Sollmann, Jr., Executive Vice President, Retirement Products, MetLife) (when
asked to provide the date at which MetLife first started using the DMF on a
regular basis to identify matches on the life insurance side, Sollmann said:
“Systematically on a more formal basis, we began that process within the last
year.”).
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and selling campaigns of insurers and expressed displeasure at certain
insurers to the extent that their selective DMF use suggests a greater
emphasis on selling products than on following through on the terms of
these products once they are sold, by locating and paying beneficiaries the
death benefits they are owed.97
When asked to account for their inconsistent use of the DMF
across product lines, insurers have offered a variety of responses. First,
they argue that the DMF is used on the annuity side to prevent expensive
and time consuming98 “duration errors”, errors where an annuitant who is
no longer alive receives a payment in violation of the annuity contract.99
Ironically, insurers are quick to point to the terms of the contract when, in a
given situation, those terms call for the termination of payouts, but much
more reticent to discuss contractual obligations in different circumstances
where they may be required to pay out death benefits.100 Easily lost in the
argument that the DMF must be used more frequently for annuities to
prevent duration errors is the fact that an insurer’s contractual right to stop
annuity payments upon the death of an annuitant is no stronger than their
obligation to pay out death benefits under a life insurance policy. If the
DMF must be used frequently on the annuity side to avoid violating the

97

Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 8 (statement by Kevin McCarty,
Insurance Commissioner for the State of Florida) (“We know that life insurance
companies work very hard to sign up people to purchase their products and accept
billions of dollars a year in premium payments. We also know, based on
information widely available in the public domain, that many beneficiaries go
unpaid for a variety of reasons.”).
98
It is important to note that these duration errors impose little to no burden
on consumers, rather, it is only expensive and time consuming for the insurers to
have to recoup these amounts.
99
Under an annuity contract, the annuitant must be alive in order to receive
the benefits. So, a duration error occurs when an annuity payment is sent out after
the death of the annuitant. California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 37-38
(statement of Todd B. Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance
Products, MetLife). In such a situation, the insurer would be within its rights to
recover the amount incorrectly paid out. Id. at 129-30 (statement of Frank
Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Insurance Products Financial, MetLife).
100
Id. at 129 (statement of Frank Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Insurance
Products Financial, MetLife) (“We believe that the frequency needs to consider
the underlying contractual provisions and the promises that are embedded in those
policies.”).
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terms of the contract, then it should be used just as frequently on the life
insurance side where the terms of the contract are no less clear and of equal
weight. By saying that the DMF must be used more frequently for one than
the other, the insurance industry is assigning greater value to contractual
provisions which create a beneficial right for the company, and lesser to
those provisions which create a liability for the company.
Perhaps even more inexplicable, however, is the insurers’
argument that the DMF should be utilized less frequently on the life
insurance side so that the insurance company does not interfere with the
grieving process of the victim’s family.101 MetLife testified that one of the
reasons for their sporadic use of the DMF for life policies was their belief
that beneficiaries prefer to “take a little bit of time to get their loved one’s
affairs in order before they actually make a claim for life insurance
benefits.”102 MetLife suggested that if they used the DMF as often on the
life insurance side as they did on the annuities side, they would be
“matching almost in real time” thereby inappropriately rushing grieving
families into making a claim. However, the insurers have no problem
“injecting themselves into that process”103 when it comes to sending a
letter to a deceased annuitant’s family informing them that they will no
longer be receiving annuity payments. In fact, MetLife and Nationwide,
among others, have said it is their policy to send such a letter immediately
following the death of an annuitant to inform the victim’s family that, as a
result of the annuitant’s death, they will no longer be receiving annuity
payments.104 It did not take long for the regulators to pick up on these

101

Id. at 130-31 (statement of Frank Cassandra, Senior Vice President,
Insurance Products Financial, MetLife).
102
Id.; Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 77-78 (statement of Frank
Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Insurance Products Financial, MetLife) (“the
practical reason is we don’t want to insert ourselves into the process…[w]e believe
that beneficiaries should be given an appropriate amount of time to get their loved
ones’ affairs in order.”).
103
California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 131 (statement of Frank
Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Insurance Products Financial, MetLife).
104
Id. at 37 (statement of Todd Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business
Insurance Products, MetLife) (“[I]t certainly was used as a means to prevent
duration errors by sending a letter of notification to an individual where we had an
indication of death, advising that individual of such indication and that the
payments were suspended.”). Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 34
(statement of Todd Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance
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inconsistencies. After hearing MetLife representatives testify to this effect,
John Chiang, California State Controller, expressed his incredulity on the
record when he stated: “But I don’t personally find it invasive if, in the
event that somebody passed away, my family received notice that we may
be the beneficiary of the proceeds.”105 Additionally, the insurance industry
has conducted no research on this matter and can provide no data to
substantiate their claim that consumers would generally be opposed to
hearing from insurers at this stage regarding potential death benefits.106
Moreover, the very fact that insurance companies routinely send letters to
annuitants’ families immediately following the annuitants death renders
this supposed concern towards grieving families disingenuous at best.
B.

ANTI-FORFEITURE PROVISIONS

Another issue of growing concern to state regulators is the
insurance industry’s questionable practices relating to the anti-forfeiture
provisions in life insurance contracts. Most life insurance policies contain a
provision, designed to be a consumer protection tool, which allows for
premiums to be paid automatically out of the built up cash value of a
policy in the event that a premium payment is missed.107 This becomes
especially useful should an insured, for whatever reason, miss a monthly
premium payment. Without the anti-forfeiture provision in the contract,
one missed payment could result in the policy being terminated but, with it,
the missed premium would automatically be paid out of the policy’s
accrued cash value and the policy would remain in force.108
However, the insurance industry has been using these nonforfeiture provisions to pay themselves monthly premiums after an insured
has died. The insurers continue to collect monthly premiums until the
Products, MetLife) (“For a group annuity, we consider a match an indication of
death. We suspend the annuity payment. We write to the family indicating that we
have done that.”).
105
Id. at 161.
106
California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 163 (statement of Frank
Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Insurance Products Financial, MetLife).
107
Id. at 94 (statement of Todd Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business
Insurance Products, MetLife) (Anti-forfeiture provisions may vary slightly by
contract but, for the most part, the specific kind used by insurers to continue
paying themselves premiums out of the policy’s built up cash value are commonly
referred to as automatic premium loans, or APL’s.).
108
Id.
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policy’s cash value has been depleted, at which point, the policy is allowed
to lapse with no value.109 The argument is also made by the insurers, again
somewhat ironically, that the problem of incorrectly lapsed policies can be
rectified by running a DMF match against all policies, both in force and
lapsed, which would uncover any policy where the date of death preceded
the date at which the policy lapsed.110 Insurance companies have assured
regulators that anytime a DMF match indicates an incorrectly lapsed policy
they will restore the value of the policy to whatever it was at the time of
the insured’s death. However, even if insurers are able to identify these
lapsed policies, restore the value and locate the beneficiaries, tasks which
in themselves seem unlikely, this fails to offset what could be decades of
waiting in the case of some beneficiaries.111 MetLife testified that they ran
lapsed policies from as far back as the mid-1960’s in their 2007 DMF
match, which means that even if those policies were restored to their
proper value and the beneficiary was located, the death benefits would
have been received more than forty years after the death of the insured.112
Given this timeframe, it is not inconceivable that the beneficiary would
have passed away long before receiving death benefits that were owed to
him decades earlier. Regulators have uncovered this industry wide practice
and expressed their disapproval: “Anti-forfeiture provisions are a consumer
protection device. They should not be used to usurp the value of a policy
after [an insured’s] death or result in people not getting the proceeds of the
policy when the person [the insured] has actually died.”113

109

Both MetLife and Nationwide admitted this does occur with their
policyholders although neither would provide a figure as to how frequently. See id.
at 95 (statement of Todd Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance
Products, MetLife) (“could there ever be a situation where an individual doesn’t
make a premium and there’s cash value in that policy and the policy ultimately
lapsed? That certainly could happen.”).
110
Id. at 95.
111
2007 was the first year in which life insurance policies were run against the
DMF, so this would have been the earliest possible year which the insurers could
have detected incorrectly lapsed policies. So, for all policies lapsed in the 90’s or
earlier, the waiting period for beneficiaries to receive their death benefits could be
measured in decades.
112
Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 127 (statement of Frank
Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Insurance Products Financial, MetLife).
113
Id. at 21 (statement of Belinda Miller, Acting General Counsel, Florida
Office of Insurance Regulation).
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INDUSTRY WIDE VIOLATIONS OF STATE UNCLAIMED
PROPERTY LAW

IV.

Unfortunately, asymmetrical use of the DMF is not the only
industry-wide practice which has come under regulatory fire of late. State
Controllers and Treasurers throughout the country are looking into whether
insurers are violating unclaimed property laws by holding onto abandoned
funds long after they should have been escheated to the state.114 Although
many of these investigations are still in progress, an analysis of industry
practices against the backdrop of unclaimed property statutes reveals that
insurers may be violating these state laws.115
Perhaps the most glaring violation of unclaimed property law
centers on the industry’s interpretation and, ultimately, exploitation of the
statutory dormancy period. As California Insurance Commissioner Dave
Jones stated: “[I]mproper calculation of the dormancy period allows
insurers unlawfully to retain millions of dollars in proceeds for years, if not
decades, after they are due to be escheated.”116 Each state’s unclaimed
property laws reference a dormancy period, which is the length of time that
property must remain unclaimed before it is considered abandoned and
becomes escheatable to the State. Most dormancy periods are either three
or five years. Florida, for example, has a five year dormancy period,
whereas Connecticut, New Jersey and Indiana all have dormancy periods
of three years.117 For insurance companies, this means that any unclaimed
death benefits must be escheated to the state once the dormancy period has
run. With this in mind, the crucial question then becomes: what triggers the
dormancy period? The insurers claim that the dormancy period does not
begin to run until the beneficiary has provided them with a death certificate
and a full claim has been filed.118 This interpretation, however, runs
114

See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Adam
Cole, General Counsel, California Department of Insurance).
115
See infra Part VI for a fuller discussion of these state led investigations of
the insurance industry and recent regulatory developments relating to unclaimed
property.
116
California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 25.
117
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-58a (2011); FLA. STAT. § 717.107 (2005); IND.
CODE § 32-34-1-20 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30B-28.1 (West 2004).
118
See Florida MetLife Hearing, supra note 6, at 154-55 (statement of Todd
Katz, Executive Vice President, U.S. Business Insurance Products, MetLife) (“[I]n
virtually all of our forms… proof of death is a requirement for a liability.”).
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counter to the Supreme Court ruling in Connecticut Mutual v. Moore
where it was determined that contractual obligations, such as the filing of a
claim, may properly be required of a beneficiary but are not appropriate
when applied to the states.119 The holding in Moore was essentially
codified when Congress passed the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Acts. In fact, the 1981 Act contained a provision which stated:
“Property is payable or distributable for the purpose of this Act
notwithstanding the owner’s failure to make demand or to present any
instrument or document required to receive payment.”120 In their comment,
the Commissioners described as the underlying purpose of this subsection
“to make clear that property is reportable notwithstanding that the owner,
who has lost or otherwise forgotten his entitlement to property, fails to
present evidence of his ownership to the holder or to make a demand for
payment.”121
The state unclaimed property laws, having derived almost
exclusively from the Uniform Acts, closely mirror the language contained
in those Acts. Most of the state statutes, for example, label the point at
which a life insurance policy becomes “due and payable” as the start of the
dormancy period.122 Again, there is disagreement between the insurance
industry and regulators as to what constitutes “due and payable.” The
regulators maintain that a life insurance policy becomes so on the actual
date of death of the insured.123 The insurers assert that “due and payable” is
the point at which a formal claim is made and a death certificate is

119

See Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 547 (1948)
(“When the state undertakes the protection of abandoned claims, it would be
beyond a reasonable requirement to compel the state to comply with conditions
that may be quite proper as between the contracting parties.”).
120
UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 2(b), 8C U.L.A. 185 (1981). Also, it is
important to note that the beneficiary of a life insurance policy becomes the
“owner” of the policy proceeds upon the death of the insured.
121
ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 231.
122
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-58a (2011) (“As used in this section, “unclaimed
funds” means all moneys held and owing by any insurance company unclaimed
and unpaid for more than three years after the moneys became due and payable as
established from the records of a life insurance company . . . .”).
123
Florida Nationwide Hearing, supra note 7, at 42 (statement of Belinda
Miller, Acting General Counsel, Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation) (“[U]nder the
Unclaimed Property Law you don’t necessarily need to have a death certificate
certified from the beneficiary.”).
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presented to the insurer.124 If, for example, an insured died in 1992 but the
insurer fails to run their policyholders against the DMF until 2010,
depending on which interpretation of “due and payable” is used, there
would be different outcomes as to when the property becomes escheatable.
The insurers would likely construe “due and payable” to mean the date at
which they learned of the death (2010), thereby allowing them to hold onto
the funds for an additional three or five years.125 The regulators would say
that the policy proceeds became “due and payable” on the date of death of
the insured (1992), which would mean the dormancy period would have
long ago expired and the proceeds would be immediately escheatable to the
state.
Given the large amounts of money at stake, the lack of case law
directly addressing the “due and payable” issue is somewhat surprising.
Nevertheless, the holding in Moore, the language of the Uniform Acts and
the clear intent behind those Acts all lend support to the conclusion that a
policy becomes “due and payable” on the date of death of the insured. This
interpretation is bolstered by the fact that insurers now have access to the
actual date of death of all policyholders through the DMF.126 Also, as
California State Controller John Chiang pointed out, the insurers definition
of “due and payable” cannot be correct simply because, in many instances,
it would result in the dormancy period never being triggered, thereby
allowing insurers to retain unclaimed death benefits indefinitely.127
Also instructive in determining what constitutes “due and payable”
for the purpose of triggering the dormancy period is a closer look at the
underlying purpose of dormancy statutes in general. The dormancy period
is the time during which the owner (the beneficiary of the policy) can come
forward and claim his benefits. The problem with the industry argument
that “due and payable” means the point at which the insurer receives a
124

See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 169 (statement of Frank
Cassandra, Senior Vice President, Ins. Prods. Fin., MetLife) (“[W]ithout someone
submitting a claim without the facts around the debt… that in and of itself may not
be sufficient for the company to know it has a liability.”).
125
This time period would depend on the state, as the dormancy period varies
by state but is usually either three or five years.
126
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Todd B.
Katz, Exec. Vice President, US Bus. Ins. Prod., MetLife).
127
Id. at 169 (statement of John Chiang, Cal. State Controller) (“Your view of
when the obligation is triggered, the extreme… is that in certain instances, you
would never have a triggering responsibility.”).
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death certificate and a full claim is that it assumes the dormancy period is
for the benefit of the holder, which it is not. The purpose of the dormancy
period is to provide a time period, after the passing of which, it is
presumed that the owner of the property—here, the beneficiary—has
abandoned his property.128 In light of this purpose, “due and payable” must
mean the date of death of the insured because the beneficiary becomes the
owner of the property upon the insured’s death.
INDUSTRY WIDE VIOLATIONS
CLAIMS PRACTICES LAW

V.

OF

STATE

UNFAIR

On August 15, 2011 the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners [hereinafter NAIC] formed a special task force to
investigate a number of life insurance companies focusing on their
settlement practices related to unclaimed death benefits and their handling
of unclaimed property.129 Presumably, the task force will be analyzing
whether the failure to proactively identify deaths among policyholders and
subsequently look for beneficiaries constitutes a violation of various state
unfair insurance claims settlement practices. Whether the insurance
industry is operating in violation of these unfair claims practices laws will
depend heavily on regulators’ determinations regarding the industry’s use
of the DMF.130 As previously discussed, regulators have expressed
concerns about the industry’s selective use of the DMF. Certainly, these
ongoing investigations will look very closely into the DMF practices of the
insurance industry. Florida Insurance Commissioner Kevin McCarty
framed the issue of DMF usage within the context of unfair claims
settlement practices when he stated: “We want to have a clear

128

See ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 231 (discussing the
Commissioners’ Comment to Section 2 of the 1981 Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act regarding the statistical evidence used to determine what
length dormancy period provided the owner with the optimum chance to come
forward and claim his funds).
129
The following states are among those involved in the NAIC investigation:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West Virginia.
130
See supra Part III.A for a fuller discussion of the insurance industry’s
practices relating to the DMF.
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understanding of what is an appropriate claims-settlement practice. It is
hard for me to get my arms around the concept that a company would use a
database to terminate an annuity, but fail to use that same database to
investigate whether a claim exists on a life policy.”131
It seems clear that the insurance regulators, acting under the
authority of the newly formed NAIC task force, have the power to
investigate and take action against those insurance companies who are
acting in violation of state law. Most states, under their insurance laws,
have adopted similar, if not identical, unfair insurance claims settlement
practice acts.132 For example, in California, an insurance company violates
the Unfair Claims Practices Act if it “fail[s] to adopt and implement
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims
arising under insurance policies.”133 It is possible that any asymmetrical
use of the DMF uncovered by the NAIC task force would fall within the
scope of activities prohibited by unfair claims practice statutes.134
California Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones hinted as much in the
investigative hearing he led in May of 2011: “Let’s be perfectly clear. The
insurance companies know about these policies, even if the beneficiaries
don’t.”135 To the extent companies have information in their books and
records that allows them to identify deceased individuals but only use that

131

Scism & Vara, supra note 13.
See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(3) (2010) (“[f]ailing to adopt and
implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of
claims arising under insurance policies” constitutes unfair claims settlement
practice); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(a) (West 2006) (“[f]ailing to adopt
and implement standards for the proper investigation of claims” constitutes unfair
claims settlement practice); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/154.6(c) (2010) (“[f]ailing to
adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigations and
settlement of claims arising under its policies” constitutes unfair claims settlement
practice).
133
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(3) (2010).
134
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of John
Chiang, Cal. State Controller) (“I was concerned that the life insurance industry
was ignoring information that it had access to which would identify deceased
clients and enable[d] the company to pay those benefits to either the insured’s
beneficiaries or to the State of California so that we could return those benefits to
the beneficiaries.”).
135
Id. at 10.
132
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information when it benefits them, an unfair claims settlement practice is
implicated.
The issue of the insurance industry’s use of the DMF is an area
that is ripe for regulatory intervention. However, the question of whether
the insurance companies’ failure to properly interpret and follow state
unclaimed property statutes amounts to a violation of unfair claims laws is
not easily answered. It can be argued that the jurisdiction of the insurance
regulators extends only to the prompt investigation and processing of
claims arising under insurance policies and that, in the event no beneficiary
has been located after a search, the companies have satisfied their
obligation under those acts. Such a determination, while undoubtedly
propounded by the insurance companies, does not adequately address the
symbiotic relationship between the Unfair Insurance Claims Settlement
Acts and the Unclaimed Property Acts.136 The purpose of the Unclaimed
Property Acts is not to enrich the treasuries of the states, as many insurers
would argue, but rather to entrust money to the states in their role as
parens patriae for citizens of those states.137 The goal of these unclaimed
property statutes is to get the unclaimed funds in the hands of the most able
conservator; the conservator most likely to return the unclaimed funds to
the rightful owner.138 Connecticut Mutual v. Moore has decisively ruled
that the state, and not the insurance company, is the conservator best suited
for this important task: “The State may more properly be custodian and
beneficiary of abandoned property than any person.”139 In effect, the
Supreme Court held that, with respect to abandoned life insurance
proceeds, the State must step into the shoes of the beneficiary until such

136

ANDREOLI & SPOTSWOOD, supra note 44, at 241 (The Commissioners’
Comment for subsection (c) of Section 7 of the 1981 Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act explains “that proceeds of a life insurance policy are
presumed abandoned if the insurer is aware that the insured has died even though
actual proof of death has not been furnished to the insurer.” This is similar in
effect to provisions of unclaimed property acts that require insurers “to adopt and
implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of
claims arising under life insurance policies” as both call for a reasonable amount
of due diligence on the part of insurers once they have knowledge of a claim or of
an insured’s death.).
137
Moore, 33 U.S. at 546.
138
Id. at 546.
139
Id. at 546-47 (“The State is acting as a conservator, not as a party to a
contract.”).
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time as the beneficiary comes forward to claim his or her policy proceeds.
Viewed through the prism of Connecticut Mutual v. Moore, the insurance
industry’s failure to escheat unclaimed death benefits to the states, despite
having information indicating that such benefits are due, may constitute a
violation of unfair claims practices law.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

VI.

Beginning around 2008, various state treasurers and controllers
joined in a multi-state audit of the John Hancock Life Insurance Company
and Prudential Insurance Company, specifically for the purpose of
identifying abandoned death benefits under policies of life insurance and
annuities. On June 1, 2011, Hancock entered into what was termed a
Global Resolution Agreement [hereinafter Hancock Agreement] with a list
of states that now totals at least thirty-five.140 On January 11, 2012,
Prudential entered into a similar Global Resolution Agreement [hereinafter
Prudential Agreement].141 The Hancock and Prudential Agreements,
140

California State Controller John Chiang has made both Global Resolution
Agreements (The Hancock Agreement and the Prudential Agreement) public on
the California State Controller’s Office Website under the press release section.
Controller Reaches Settlement with Insurer John Hancock and Settlement (Global
Resolution Agreement), CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Apr. 22,
2011), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_9934.html [hereinafter Hancock
Agreement]. As of this date, the following states have signed on to the Hancock
Agreement: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington
and Wisconsin.
141
Controller Reaches Settlement with Prudential Insurance and Multi-State
Agreement (Global Resolution Agreement), CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER’S
OFFICE (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_11429.html
[hereinafter Prudential Agreement]. As of this date, the following states have
signed onto the Prudential Agreement: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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entered into by state controllers and treasurers together with the insurers,
are significant for multiple reasons. First, they provide that, for the purpose
of the Agreements, the date of death of the insured begins the dormancy
period.142 This is a concession that accepts the regulator interpretation of
the unclaimed property statutes that dormancy begins upon the death of the
insured and not formal notice and proof of death as the insurance
companies contended. Second, the Hancock and Prudential Agreements
provide that the states will be free to audit the books and records of
Hancock and Prudential going back to 1992 in an effort to determine if
those books and records contain evidence of unpaid death benefits.143 And
finally, the Hancock and Prudential Agreements provide that, to the extent
that abandoned death benefit proceeds are identified and escheated to the
states, those proceeds will be escheated with 3% interest compounded
annually from 1995 or date of death of the insured, whichever is later.144
This interest component could arguably be considered a penalty for noncompliance with the state unclaimed property statutes notwithstanding the
fact that the language of the Hancock and Prudential Agreements describes
it simply as interest included on top of unclaimed death benefits when they
are turned over to the states.145
On February 2, 2012, the NAIC Task Force, led by California,
Florida, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, entered into a Regulatory Settlement Agreement which calls for
Prudential to pay an assessment of $17 million to state insurance
departments.146 Under the terms of this Agreement, Prudential must

142

See Hancock Agreement, supra note 140, at 9 (“The death benefit under
life insurance policies shall be determined in accordance with the policy terms as
of the date of death of the insured”); see also Prudential Agreement, supra note
141, at 11 (“Proceeds under life insurance policies shall be determined in
accordance with the policy terms as of the date of death”).
143
See Hancock Agreement, supra note 140, at 4; see also Prudential
Agreement, supra note 141, at 6.
144
See Hancock Agreement, supra note 140, at 9; see also Prudential
Agreement, supra note 141, at 11.
145
Most state unclaimed property statutes provide for interest and penalties
for late reported property. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 717.134 (West 2010).
146
The California Department of Insurance has made this regulatory
agreement available under the press release section of their website by clicking on
the link for ‘agreement.’ See “Death Master” Investigation Results in National
Settlement With Major Life Insurer, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
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regularly run its book of in-force life insurance policies and annuities
against the DMF to make a determination as to whether the policy holders
or annuity holders have died.147 Additionally, Prudential is then required to
make efforts to locate beneficiaries of policy holders in order to pay them
policy proceeds.148 If those policy holders cannot be located, this
Regulatory Settlement Agreement requires Prudential to turn over those
proceeds to states as required by state unclaimed property laws.149 The
Regulatory Settlement Agreement, entered into by Prudential along with
state insurance departments, effectively closes the loop that was begun
with the multi-state Global Resolution Agreement (Prudential Agreement)
between Prudential and the state treasurers and controllers. The Prudential
Agreement, recognizing that the controllers and treasurers have jurisdiction
for unclaimed property, sets out requirements for identifying and reporting
such property to the states.150 This is effectively a retrospective agreement,
looking backwards through 1992 to identify death benefits that should have
been paid and are overdue for escheatment to the states. The Regulatory
Settlement Agreement, on the other hand, deals with the insurer’s conduct
prospectively. Dictating the steps Prudential must take going forward, the
Regulatory Settlement Agreement specifies what best practices the insurer
must implement in order to avoid repeating past violations.
Also significant is MetLife’s announcement in October of 2011
that they will take a charge of $125 million on their quarterly earnings
report to account for life insurance claims that need to be paid.151 MetLife
is quick to point out that this set-aside is a result of the company’s recent
comprehensive policy sweep and is not a penalty assessed by regulators.152
Even so, it is clear that regulators are now paying close attention to the
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2012/
release010-12.cfm [hereinafter Regulatory Settlement Agreement].
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Hancock Agreement, supra note 140, at 7-10; see also Prudential
Agreement, supra note 141, at 9-12.
151
Arthur D. Postal, MetLife to Take $125M Unclaimed Property Charge,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/10/07/metlife
-to-take-125m-unclaimed-property-charge.html.
152
Id. at 1 (statement of John Calagna, vice president, public affairs, MetLife)
(“We did not take a charge for a regulatory investigation. We took a charge for a
policy record sweep we began in 2010 before any regulator was investigating the
topic.”).
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unclaimed property practices of life insurers.153 In fact, the State of New
York, despite neither being a member of the ten-state NAIC task force nor
having signed onto the Global Resolution Agreements, is taking strong
action of their own. The New York Attorney General’s office has issued
subpoenas to nine large insurers related to unpaid claims that need to be
turned over to the state.154 Additionally, the New York State Insurance
Department has requested information from all 172 life insurers that
conduct business in the state.155
At the time of this Note’s publication, the industry trend towards
resolution with state treasurers and controllers, as well as with state
insurance regulators, has continued. Subsequent to the Hancock and
Prudential Agreements, a number of other major insurers entered into
similar Global Resolution Agreements with state controllers and treasurers.
Additionally, subsequent to the Regulatory Settlement Agreement entered
into by Prudential with the NAIC Task Force, other major insurers entered
into similar Regulatory Settlement Agreements with the NAIC Task Force.
On April 19, 2012, MetLife entered into both a Global Resolution
Agreement with state treasurers and controllers and a Regulatory
Settlement Agreement with the NAIC task force.156 On October 10, 2012,
AIG entered into a Global Resolution Agreement and then, on October 19,
2012, also entered into a Regulatory Settlement Agreement.157 Nationwide

153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
For the MetLife Global Resolution Agreement, see Controller Chiang
Announces Settlement with MetLife (Global Resolution Agreement), CALIFORNIA
STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.sco.ca.gov/
eo_pressrel_9934.html; For the MetLife Regulatory Settlement Agreement, see
Florida Announces a $40 Million Multi-Agency Agreement with MetLife Insurance
Companies, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.myfloridacfo.com/sitePages/newsroom/allReleases.aspx?year=2012.
157
For the AIG Global Resolution Agreement, see Controller Chiang,
Insurance Commissioner Jones Announce Settlement with AIG Insurance (Global
Resolution Agreement), CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Oct. 22,
2012), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel.html#Apr2012; For the AIG Regulatory
Settlement Agreement, see Controller Chiang, Insurance Commissioner Jones
Announce Settlement with AIG Insurance, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE, (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-pressreleases/2012/.
154
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entered into a Global Resolution Agreement on October 9, 2012 and a
Regulatory Settlement Agreement on October 11, 2012.158 Finally,
Lincoln Financial entered into a Global Resolution Agreement on
December 19, 2012.159
Even more recently, on April 1, 2013, a Kentucky trial court ruled,
in the case of United Insurance Corporation of America v. Kentucky, that a
state statute requiring life insurers to search the DMF is a valid exercise of
the legislature’s powers to regulate the insurance industry.160 The plaintiff
insurers filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the
constitutionality of the state statute on the basis of its alleged impairment
of the insurers’ Contract Clause rights under both the U.S. and Kentucky
Constitutions. The court rejected the argument that the statute161 impaired
any vested contractual rights of the insurers while affirming the legitimate
purpose of the state in regulating this aspect of insurers’ business.162 The
court, using strong language, supported the notion that the industry should
undertake proactive steps to locate beneficiaries:
Here, the legislature has sought to remedy the problem of
insurance companies holding on to funds that should be
paid to beneficiaries upon the death of the insured. The
traditional industry practice allows insurance companies to
stick their heads in the sand and ignore publicly available

158

For the Nationwide Global Resolution Agreement, see Chiang Announces
Settlement with Nationwide (Global Resolution Agreement), CALIFORNIA STATE
CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel.html
#Apr2012; For the Nationwide Regulatory Settlement Agreement, see Insurance
Commissioner Dave Jones Announces Settlement in Death Master Investigation,
CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT
OF
INSURANCE,
(Oct.
11,
2012),
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2012/.
159
For the Lincoln Financial Global Resolution Agreement, see CALIFORNIA
STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.sco.ca.gov/serp.html?
q=Lincoln+Financial+Global+Resolution+Agreement&cx=001779225245372747
843%3Ajzcl_x9eh9w&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF-8.
160
Marlys A. Bergstrom et al., Constitutional Challenge to Kentucky’s Death
Master File Statute Rejected, SUTHERLAND, 1 (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.
sutherland.com/files/upload/ConstitutionalChallengetoKentuckysDeathMasterFile
StatuteRejected.pdf.
161
The statute at issue was KY. REV. STAT. § 304.15-420.
162
See Bergstrom et al., supra note 160.
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data regarding the deaths of their insureds, to the detriment
of the beneficiaries (and the public).163
VII.

CONCLUSION

Now that Hancock, Prudential, MetLife, AIG, Nationwide and
Lincoln Financial have agreed to turn over unclaimed death benefits with
interest to the states based on a date of death calculation for dormancy,
there has been a seismic shift in the way some of the nation’s leading
insurers will conduct their business.164 These companies are not only some
of the largest insurers in the country but also, as brand name insurers, they
are synonymous with life insurance in the United States. With this in mind,
we may see the insurance industry as a whole trending towards this new
paradigm. Of course, the far reaching effect of the above mentioned
agreements will only be revealed with time, but it is certainly plausible that
other insurers follow the example set by these six and agree to escheat
unclaimed death benefits to the states using the parameters set forth in
these agreements.
The insurance industry should, and likely will, adopt a course of
conduct similar to that of Hancock, Prudential, MetLife, AIG, Nationwide
and Lincoln Financial. In fact, this Note predicts that, ultimately, the
insurance industry will be required (by regulatory enforcement and
legislative enactment) to shift from a notice based life insurance payment
process to a more proactive approach requiring insurers to determine
whether their insureds are deceased irrespective of whether notice has been
provided from a beneficiary or family member. There are a number of
reasons for insurers to follow this new model. First, the insurance
regulators, and to a lesser extent the state controllers and treasurers, have
the ability to affect the way insurers do business in this country through
regulatory intervention. Second, it is no secret that the regulators look
unkindly upon the industry’s asymmetrical use of the DMF.165 The
regulators will not be shy in taking steps to prevent this type of conduct, as
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See id. at 2.
See Hancock Agreement, supra note 140, at 11; see also Prudential
Agreement, supra note 141, at 9.
165
See supra Part III Section A for a fuller discussion of the insurance
industry’s selective use of the DMF; see supra Part V for a fuller discussion of the
regulators thoughts on the industry’s selective use of the DMF.
164
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well as any other industry conduct which they deem violative of state laws.
Finally, state treasurers and controllers, while having no explicit regulatory
authority, do have the ability to bring suit to force compliance with their
unclaimed property laws.166 Together, these two entities can exert
enormous pressure on the industry to reform their questionable practices
and comply with the laws of the various states. Now more than ever, the
insurance industry finds itself under the intense glare of the regulatory
microscope. Yet, in the midst of regulatory investigations and nationwide
audits, there is no better time for the insurance industry to honor the
“sacred bargain”167 it has struck with so many millions of customers. There
is no better time for the insurance industry to do the right thing.

166
167

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1515 (WEST 2007); FLA. STAT. § 717.1331 (2010).
See California MetLife Hearing, supra note 1, at 11.

DOUBLE TROUBLE – AN EX-SPOUSE’S LIFE INSURANCE
BENEFICIARY STATUS & STATE AUTOMATIC
REVOCATION UPON DIVORCE STATUTES: WHO GETS
WHAT?
KRISTEN P. RAYMOND*
***
This note analyzes the status of an ex-spouse’s designation as a
life insurance beneficiary where the insured has failed to designate a new
beneficiary following divorce. The note first discusses life insurance
contracts in general, emphasizing that, much like other types of insurance
contracts, life insurance contracts are governed by principles of contract
law. In fact, it is this basis in contract law which has led most states to
uphold the insurance contract and award policy proceeds to the ex-spouse
in the event of a dispute over the beneficiary. The note then touches on the
minority rule- divorce automatically terminates an ex-spouse’s beneficiary
status- before analyzing the constitutionality of automatic revocation
statutes within the framework of the Contract Clause. Next, the note
discusses the property settlement exception and its application to both the
majority and minority rules before concluding with the suggestion that
courts employ a two-pronged philosophy in their adjudication of these
beneficiary disputes whereby the focus is on executing the insured’s intent
and the uniform application of the existing jurisdictional rule.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the marriage rate in the United States has declined in
past ten years,1 the divorce rate has consistently hovered around fifty
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2014;
B.A. Bowdoin College, 2008.
1
Census: U.S. Marriage Rate at a Record Low, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2011,
5:18 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/wellness/marriage/story/
2011-12-14/Census-US-marriage-rate-at-a-record-low/51924344/1.
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percent.2 Fifty percent of first marriages end in divorce, sixty seven percent
of second marriages end in divorce and a staggering seventy four percent
of third marriages in the United States fail.3 While many Americans are
aware of rising wedding costs,4 they don’t realize that divorce can cost just
as much. The US divorce industry generates about $28 billion a year, with
the average cost of divorce estimated at about $20,000.5 Although many
couples take into account the high divorce rates before their wedding by
signing a prenuptial agreement,6 few Americans realize that simply saying
“I do” may give their soon-to-be ex-spouse a legal right to their life
insurance policy’s proceeds, regardless of a prenuptial agreement.
Another burgeoning industry in the United States is the life
insurance industry. According to Prudential, life insurance is “one of the
largest sources of capital in the nation, with $4.5 trillion invested in the
U.S. economy.”7 In total, life insurance premiums alone accounted for
3.8% of U.S. GDP in 2009.8 Not only does the life insurance industry have
a significant impact on the U.S. macro economy, but about “70% of U.S.
2

DIVORCE RATE, http://www.divorcerate.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
Id. (“50% percent of first marriages, 67% of second and 74% of third
marriages end in divorce, according to Jennifer Baker of the Forest Institute of
Professional Psychology in Springfield, Missouri.”).
4
The average cost of a wedding in the United States is $25,631. COST OF
WEDDING, http://www.costofwedding.
com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
5
Kevin McDonald, The Cost of a Divorce, BANKRATE (June 8, 2001),
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/advice/19990903a.asp
(“According
to
maritalstatus.com, a Web site geared toward divorce and remarriage, divorce is a
$28 billion-a-year industry with an average cost of about $20,000.”).
6
Claudia Buck, More and More Couples Use Prenuptial Agreements,
ABC2NEWS, (Apr.18, 2011), http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/money/personal
_finance/more-and-more-couples-use-prenuptial-agreementswptv1303137646047#ixzz1eFgihyN2 (“In a survey of American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers released last September, 73 percent said they have seen an
increase in ‘prenups’ during the past five years.”).
7
The Importance of Life Insurance Industry in the U.S., PRUDENTIAL LIFE
INS., http://research.prudential.com/
media/managed/documents/research_perspective/Importance_of_Life_Insuran
ce_Industry.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (citing AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., Life
Insurers Protecting Families, Building America, available at http://www.acli.com
/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Documents/Protecting_Families.pdf).
8
Id. (citing LIMRA, ANALYSIS OF BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
SNL FINANCIAL LLC DATA (2010)).
3
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households depend on life insurance industry products to protect their
financial and retirement security.”9 Americans rely on the $59 billion in
yearly death benefits paid out by life insurance companies to provide for
their families in the event of their death. 10
As unpleasant as dealing with the possibility of divorce may be
when drafting a prenuptial agreement, addressing what becomes of life
insurance proceeds in the event a deceased spouse forgets to change the
beneficiary status of his life insurance policy after a divorce is a tougher
issue to tackle. Because a life insurance policy constitutes a separate
contract between the insured policyholder and the insurance company, life
insurance is a nonprobate asset that does not get settled through the probate
system when the insured dies. The high divorce rates in the United States,
in conjunction with the growing use of life insurance policies for financial
protection for family and inheritance money,11 create a growing number of
issues when insureds do not change the beneficiary status of an ex-spouse
after a divorce. Conflict arises between the insured’s intent to change his
ex-spouse’s beneficiary status and the insurance company’s duty to uphold
the letter of the life insurance contract by paying the contract proceeds to
the insured’s designated beneficiary.
Many divorcing Americans struggle when dividing assets,
spending vast amounts of time and money on attorneys to strike an equal
balance. This note explores the effect of divorce on a beneficiary spouse’s
right to life insurance proceeds, focusing on the impact of state enacted
9

While 70% of Americans rely on insurance policies and products to protect
their financial and retirement security, a little under half of U.S. households own
individual life insurance policies. Id. (citing Eric Soundergeld, LIMRA, THE FACTS
OF LIFE AND ANNUITIES (Sept. 2010)).
10
Id. (citing AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., Life Insurers Protecting Families,
Building America, available at http://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/
Documents/Protecting_Families.pdf) (“Over $59 billion in death benefits and $67
billion in annuity benefits paid in 2009.”).
11
The main reasons to purchase life insurance are to: replace income for
dependents, pay final expenses, create an inheritance for heirs, pay federal and
state “death” taxes, make significant charitable contributions, and create a source
of savings. Life Insurance Basics, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
http://www2.iii.org/insurance-handbook/insurance-basics/life-insurancebasics.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013); Results of Poll of Reasons People Purchase
Life Insurance Announced, YAHOO! NEWS, http://news.yahoo.com/results-pollreasons-people-purchase-life-insurance-announced-210221574.html (Nov. 16,
2011).
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automatic revocation statutes. Typically, divorce alone does not affect the
designated soon to be ex-spouse’s right to proceeds. Absent a change in
beneficiary designation, many courts will award a policy’s proceeds to the
former spouse over the claim of a current spouse, or other purported
beneficiary.12 However, some states have enacted legislation to
automatically revoke a spouse as beneficiary to a life insurance policy that
is owned by the other spouse upon divorce.13 Whether courts have
protected an ex-spouse’s status as a life insurance beneficiary, issues arise
when the divorce agreement did not discuss the policy, and additional
issues arise in states that have enacted legislation to automatically revoke a
now ex-spouse’s status as a beneficiary, but the policyholder purchased his
policy before the legislation was enacted.
Some states have statutory provisions that attempt to provide that a
divorce revokes the former spouse’s beneficiary status except as otherwise
specified by court order.14 Some courts have found these statutes
unconstitutional because the beneficiary’s status stems from the insurance
contract, and the legislature cannot abrogate this part of the insurance
contract upon divorce.15 Even when the relevant state has such a statute, it
may not apply if the plan has contrary provisions, such as a provision that a
divorce or anything other than the plan’s beneficiary designation form has
no effect upon the beneficiary designation.
This note examines the policies behind whether or not to adopt an
automatic revocation statute for life insurance beneficiary designations
upon divorce, and recent developments by state supreme courts or
legislatures discussing the adoption of automatic revocation statutes or the
property settlement agreement exception. Additionally, this note touches
upon recent court rulings on the constitutionality of such laws, specifically
in the context of the Contract Clause.16 I argue that all jurisdictions, in
keeping with the goal of upholding the insured’s intent in forming the
insurance contract, should adopt the property settlement agreement
exception as a means to opt-out of the existing jurisdictional rule.
12

See infra Part III; see, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ortiz, 535 F.3d 990
(9th Cir. 2008).
13
See infra Part IV; see, e.g., Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Heitz, 468 F. Supp.
2d 1062 (D. Minn. 2007).
14
See infra Part VI.
15
See infra Part V.
16
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
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Additionally, courts and legislatures should aim to uniformly apply the
existing jurisdictional rule in conjunction with the property settlement
agreement opt-out in order to reduce both the number of legal challenges
and the amount of time for intended beneficiaries to receive this
nonprobate transfer of wealth.
This note does not address federal preemption issues that have
arisen with pension plans and life insurance in the context of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [hereinafter ERISA].17 Rather, this
note focuses solely on privately purchased life insurance policies.
Part II of this note discusses the nature of the life insurance
contract. Part III explains the policy reasons behind the traditional majority
rule while Part IV addresses the modern trend of automatic revocation
statutes, currently considered the minority rule in this area of law. Parts V
and VI describe the recent Contracts Clause issue in jurisdictions that have
passed automatic revocation statues and the arguments for and against the
constitutionality of these pieces of legislation. Part VII explains the recent
property settlement agreement exception that proposes a way to opt-out of
existing jurisdictional rules. In part VIII, I submit what courts or
legislatures can do to provide clarity in this area of law in light of the
purpose of life insurance and goal of executing the insured’s intent.
II.

THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT

In a life insurance policy, the insured “enters[s] into a contract
with an insurance company that promises to provide [the insured’s]
beneficiaries with a certain amount of money upon [the insured’s] death. In
return, [the insured] make[s] periodic payments, called premiums. The
premium amount is based on factors such as [the insured’s] age, gender,
medical history, and the dollar amount of life insurance . . . purchase[d]. In
the event of [the insured’s] passing, life insurance provides money directly

17

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 regulates employee
pension benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006) (originally enacted as Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829). The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
whether ERISA’s qualified domestic relations order is the only valid way a
divorcing spouse can waive her right to receive her ex-spouse’s pension benefits
under ERISA. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. And Inv. Plan, 555 U.S.
285 (2009).

404

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.2

to [his] beneficiaries.”18 Unlike other assets that transfer at the time of
death, typically through the lengthy probate process, life insurance is
“usually transferred directly to the named beneficiaries.”19
Life insurance policies, along with the majority of insurance
contracts, are governed by the principles of contract law.20 In order to
acquire a life insurance policy, one must have an “insurable interest”21 in
the life of the insured.22 Because each person holds an insurable interest in
his own life, the insured who takes out a life insurance policy on his own
life is generally free to designate the beneficiary of his choosing.23 In the
past, insurance companies had limited an individual’s ability to take out a
life insurance policy on his spouse’s life. Insurance companies required
individuals to establish an insurable interest by demonstrating an economic
dependence on the spouse in order to successfully issue a life insurance
policy.24 The modern rule25, established from a combination of case law
and state statutes, holds that “husbands and wives can insure each other’s
18

Life Insurance: An Introduction, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/
individual/life-advice/personal-insurance/life-insurance-policies/index.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2013) (alteration in original).
19
Sandra Block, Divorce Doesn’t Mean Your Ex is No Longer Your
Beneficiary, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2004, 9:40 PM), http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/block/2004-09-06-block_x.htm (“By the
time most estates cleared probate, the beneficiaries may already have received the
money . . . .”).
20
See also 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:14 (4th ed. 1993).
21
Insurable
Interest,
INSURANCE
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
http://www2.iii.org/index.cfm?instanceID=268 (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (“[A]
person exhibits an insurable interest in a potential loss if that person will suffer a
genuine economic loss if the event insured against occurs. Without the presence of
insurable interest, an insurance contract is not formed for a lawful purpose and,
thus, is not a valid contract.”).
22
BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE §2.04[1] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011) [hereinafter LIFE AND
HEALTH INSURANCE].
23
Id. (noting that the majority of states currently hold that a beneficiary does
not need to have an insurable interest on the insured’s life); see also Block, supra
note 19 (noting that many Americans have various accounts and policies with
beneficiaries, ranging from individual or employer-provided retirement accounts
to variable annuities and insurance policies).
24
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22 at §2.04[1][a].
25
See infra Part IV.
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lives, regardless of their actual economic relationship.”26 A looser rule as
to who has the requisite insurable interest to acquire life insurance applies
in most other states. These states loosely define insurance interest as “in
the case of persons closely related by blood or by law, a substantial interest
engendered by love and affection.”27
Once the insured designates a beneficiary of his life insurance
policy, the rights of the beneficiary “can only be terminated by an
affirmative act to modify or terminate the insurance contract in some way
or by creating a separate agreement which overrides the beneficiary
designation in the life insurance contract.”28 When the insured dies, the
terms of the insurance contract dictate that the insurance company will pay
the policy’s proceeds to the insured’s designated beneficiary.29
An ex-spouse named as a beneficiary to the insured’s life
insurance contract would not meet the traditional test for having an
insurable interest. However, the “insurable interest requirement, if
applicable at all, applies as of the time the life insurance coverage is
initiated.”30 Therefore, a divorce that occurred long after the insured
designated his then-spouse as beneficiary to his life insurance policy has
no effect on the insurable interest.31 The beneficiary’s claim to insurance
proceeds does not stem from her spousal status but rather stems from the
terms of the insurance policy issued when she had an insurable interest on
her ex-spouse.32
26

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §2.05[1][b] (alteration in
original) (“Missouri and Arkansas have explicit statutes specific statutes reciting
the insurable interest a wife has in her husband, while Ohio . . . recogniz[es] the
insurable interest one spouse has in the other spouse’s life.”); see ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-79-108; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.11 (West 1986); MO. REV. STAT. §
376.530 (1985), repealed by L.2007, S.B. No. 613 Revision, § A.
27
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22 at §2.05[1][b] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28
Domenico Zaino, Jr., The Practical Effect of Extending Revocation By
Divorce Statutes to Life Insurance, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 213, 217 (1996) (citing 44
AM. JUR. 2D, Insurance, §§ 1714, 1750-51 (1982 & Supp. 1995)).
29
See HARRY P. KAMEN & WILLIAM J. TOPPETA, THE LIFE INSURANCE LAW
OF NEW YORK 215 (1989).
30
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22 at §2.05[1][e][i] (emphasis
added).
31
See also Id.
32
See 29-180 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 180.11[A][1] (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE].
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Given that courts must enforce the terms of a private life insurance
policy, including beneficiary designation,33 issues of the insured’s intent to
disburse funds to the designated beneficiary typically arise when the
insured either forgets to affirmatively change his ex-spouse as the
beneficiary of his life insurance policy after a divorce or neglects to clearly
address, or address at all, an existing life insurance policy in a property
settlement agreement or divorce decree.
Although the simplest opportunity to prevent this issue from
occurring exists during divorce proceedings, by informing the insured of
the nature of state case law regarding an ex-spouse’s beneficiary status, the
issue is commonly overlooked.34 Since life insurance benefits are paid after
the insured policyholder has died and can no longer state who he desires as
his intended beneficiary, thus causing this issue, it remains more important
for clear case law to exist regarding this matter when proactive legal
counseling cannot help.

33

See Ping v. Denton, 562 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ky. 1978) (“A policy of
insurance is nothing more nor less than a contract wherein an insurance company,
for valuable consideration, agrees to pay a sum of money on a specified
contingency to a designated person called a beneficiary.”); Shaffer v. Winhealth
Partners, 261 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2011) (“An insurance policy constitutes a
contract between insurer and insureds.”); APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note
32, at §180.11(A)(1).
34
But see Lauren J. Wolven and Ashley Crettol, Life Insurance Litigation
Post-Divorce: Easy to Avoid, Commonly Neglected, HORWOOD MARCUS & BERK
(Aug. 2, 2010), http://hmblaw.com/publications/life-insurancelitigation-post-divorce-easy-to-avoid,-commonly-neglected.aspx
(“[O]ne
essential step in addressing the issue is to include specific language in a prenuptial
agreement or in the divorce decree indicating that any beneficiary designations
(excluding ERISA) will be deemed revoked with respect to that spouse. Such
provisions should also include a requirement that the spouses cooperate with any
subsequent paperwork necessary to perfect the waiver. Ideally, the provision
should also reference the specific policy numbers, so as to avoid any claims that
the waiver is broadly worded.”). This approach works in most, but not all states, as
the majority of states have adopted the property settlement agreement exception
providing that specific language clearly delineating the insured’s intended
beneficiary in either the prenuptial agreement or divorce decree adequately
delineates the insured’s intended policy beneficiary.
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MAJORITY RULE: DIVORCE DOES NOT AFFECT AN EXSPOUSE’S BENEFICIARY STATUS

States applying the majority rule, which upholds the terms of the
insurance contract, do not change the ex-spouse’s beneficiary status even
after divorce, if the ex-spouse is still listed as the beneficiary.35 These
states hold that divorce per se does not affect a designated ex-spouse’s
right to receive life insurance proceeds. Here, proceeds from life insurance
policies “are deemed payable to the named beneficiary as a matter of law
irrespective of a subsequent divorce between the insured and the
beneficiary.”36
These courts hold that unless the terms of the insurance policy
specifically dictate that the spouse’s beneficiary status is conditioned on
the continuation of the marriage, divorce does not per se affect or defeat
any of the vested rights of the ex-spouse as designated beneficiary.37 Some
states that apply the majority rule allow for the property settlement
agreement exception, but only allow the exception to the extent that the

35

Jurisdictions that follow this rule include: Arkansas, District of Columbia,
Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See,
e.g., MFA Life Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 630 F.2d 322, 323 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying
Arkansas law); Estate of Bowden v. Aldridge, 595 A.2d 396, 397-98 (D.C. 1991);
Rountree v. Frazee, 209 So. 2d 424, 426 (Ala. 1968); Allen v. Allen, 589 N.E.2d
1133, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Hancock v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 527 N.E.2d
720, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa
1984); Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 94 P.3d 729, 733 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004);
Stiles v. Stiles, 487 N.E.2d 874, 875 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Eschler v. Eschler,
849 P.2d 196, 201 (Mont. 1993); Dubois v. Smith, 599 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H.
1991); Harris v. Harris, 493 P.2d 407, 409 (N.M. 1972); Daughtry v. McLamb,
512 S.E.2d 91, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Estate of Revis v. Revis, 484 S.E.2d 112,
116 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Bersch v. Van Kleeck, 334 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Wis.
1983).
36
Zaino, supra note 28 at 217; see also HARRY P. KAMEN & WILLIAM J.
TOPPETA, THE LIFE INSURANCE LAW OF NEW YORK 215 (1989) ( “By contract,
policy proceeds are payable to the named beneficiaries, and several beneficiaries
may be designated for specified shares.”).
37
See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co., 94 P.3d at 733; see also Hollaway v. Selvidge,
548 P.2d 835, 838 (Kan. 1976); Stiles, 487 N.E.2d at 875 n. 3; Bersch, 334
N.W.2d at 116.
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court order clearly addresses the beneficiary status designation.38 If this
exception does not apply in states that adopted the majority rule that allow
for the property settlement agreement exception, the designated beneficiary
remains the beneficiary even though he is now an ex-spouse.
In an often-cited Kentucky case supporting the majority rule, Ping
v. Denton, the court summarized the rationale behind the application of the
majority rule in light of the state’s revocation of a statute providing for
automatic termination of an ex-spouse’s designation as a life insurance
beneficiary upon divorce.39 In Ping v. Denton, the administratrix of the
insured’s estate brought an action against the insured’s former wife to
recover the life insurance proceeds that the insurance company had
previously paid to the ex-spouse, who had remained the beneficiary of the
policy after the couple legally dissolved their marriage.40 As Kentucky had
repealed its automatic revocation statute, the divorce did not necessarily
terminate the ex-wife’s interest as a beneficiary of the policy.41 Instead, the
insured:
[A]lone determined to make [his ex-spouse] the
beneficiary at a time [before] they were married This he
had a right to do. [The insured] alone determined to retain
[his ex-spouse] as the beneficiary during the period of their
marriage. This he had a right to do. [The insured] alone
determined not to take from [his ex-spouse] the interest of
a beneficiary. This he had a right to do. [The insured]
alone owned and controlled the policy and the right to
change the beneficiary if he chose to do so. Not having
changed the beneficiary at the time of his death, [his exspouse] was entitled to receive the proceeds from the
policy of insurance.42
Here, the court was wary of re-interpreting the deceased’s intent in
not changing his life insurance beneficiary after his divorce, placing

38

See, e.g., Cincinnati Life Ins., 94 P.3d at 733. For a discussion of the
property settlement exception, see infra Part VII.
39
Ping, 562 S.W.2d at 316.
40
Id. at 314.
41
Id. at 317.
42
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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priority on executing the insured’s formal intent evidenced by the text of
his life insurance policy.43
Courts and legislatures that have adopted the majority rule in
honoring the insurance contract have given three main reasons for doing
so. Courts and legislatures adopting the majority rule are fearful about the
potential for the court guessing about the insured’s intent when interpreting
the insurance contract.44 Because the problem with deciphering whether or
not the insured intended to leave an ex-spouse as a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy always arises after the insured died, courts cannot simply
ask the insured to make his intent clear. The courts must consider whether
the insured’s failure to make a formal beneficiary change when the
beneficiary has relinquished or been divested of the right to continue in
such status still then indicates that the insured intends his ex-spouse to
receive the proceeds anyways. In order to minimize the amount of
guesswork done by courts in sorting out this issue, jurisdictions adopting
the majority rule note that an insured’s failure to formally change his exspouse’s status as life insurance beneficiary after their divorce is evidence
in and of itself of the insured’s intent for his ex-spouse to remain the
policy’s beneficiary, despite the absence of any legal requirement in
connection with their divorce.45 Simply put, the insured could have
changed the policy’s beneficiary had he wished to do so, so the courts
should not actively interfere with an insurance contract, especially when
the insured is no longer able to make his intent clear. Courts and
legislatures that have adopted the majority rule also note that the insured
who wished to have his ex-spouse retain her beneficiary status should not
needlessly have to go through the exercise of re-designating his ex-spouse
as the beneficiary with an automatic revocation statute.46 These courts hold
that simply retaining an ex-spouse as the legal beneficiary of the policy
establishes clear evidence of the insured’s intent.
A second reason courts adopt the majority rule is to preclude the
insurer from being held liable for dispensing the policy’s proceeds, which,
as a non-probate asset, are quickly disbursed after the policyholder’s death,
43

See id.
See LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][A].
45
See id. Some divorce decrees include provisions requiring an ex-spouse to
maintain life insurance as a part of child support or alimony. Divorce, AXA
EQUITABLE,
http://www.axa-equitable.com/plan/divorce/overview.html
(last
visited Jan. 8, 2012).
46
See APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 32, at §180.11(A)(1).
44

410

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.2

to the wrong beneficiary.47 When issues of the insured’s intent in change of
beneficiary arise, the insurance company can be sued from either the
primary or contingent beneficiary for incorrectly dispensing the funds.48
Most recently, majority rule jurisdiction Kansas amended its
statute that provided that a divorce decree must provide for changes in
beneficiary designation.49 In Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, a life
insurer filed an interpleader action to resolve competing claims by the
insured’s ex-spouse, the primary beneficiary and mother, the contingent
beneficiary.50 In considering the statutory amendment Kan. Stat. Ann. §601610(b), which is presently codified at §23-2802, the court addressed
whether the statute imposed a requirement that a “beneficiary change be
filed with the insurer in order to make an express provision in a divorce
decree effective, or whether this provision is intended for the protection of
the insurer that might be unaware of the decree.”51 The court held that the
divorce decree did not affect the designation of a non-spouse as the new
beneficiary of the policy because the decree didn’t contain an express
change of beneficiary provision, which the court ruled was necessary under
the statute for a decree to effect the designation.52
The third policy reason for upholding the insurance contract
derives from life insurance categorization as a non-probate asset, so courts
should not play an active role in its disbursement, and considering that life
insurance is a contract between two private parties, courts are bound to

47

In times where the insurance company swiftly anticipates a lawsuit from a
non-designated beneficiary, the insurance company must interplead all parties
involved to preclude its own liability for the wrongful disbursement of insurance
proceeds. See, e.g., Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 94 P.3d 729 (Ky. Ct. App.
2004).
48
See id. at 731.
49
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2802(d) (2011) (previously codified as 60-1610(b)
(“nothing in this section shall relieve the parties of the obligation to effectuate any
change in beneficiary designation by the filing of such change with the insurer or
issuer in accordance with the terms of the policy.”); see also LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][A].
50
Cincinnati Life Ins., 94 P.3d at 729.
51
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][A]; see also
Cincinnati Life Ins., 94 P.3d at 729.
52
Cincinnati Life Ins., 94 P.3d at 733.
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follow the policy terms and apply contract law principles when disputes
arise.53
The majority rule is not without its flaws. It does not take into
account the intricacies of ex-spousal personal relations in deciding what
the insured’s intent was. Instead, the courts seem more concerned to
minimize potential insurer liability by executing the formal beneficiary
designation from the life insurance policy to allow for the quick
disbursement of the policy’s proceeds without such an event causing the
insurer to be open to litigation.
IV.

MINORITY RULE – DIVORCE AUTOMATICALLY
REVOKES EX-SPOUSE’S BENEFICIARY STATUS

Other states have adopted, either through legislation or judicial
mandate, the minority rule, whereby a final divorce automatically revokes
the status of the designated spouse as a beneficiary and terminates their
right to the life insurance proceeds of their former spouse.54 States that
have adopted the minority rule include Michigan, Colorado, Minnesota,
Missouri, Ohio, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Texas.55 Many, but not all, of
these states have based their revocation statute on the 1990 revisions of the
Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter “UPC”] that reflect “the rapidly
increasing use of will substitutes, the evolution of domestic relationships,

53

See KAMEN & TOPPETA, supra note 29. The ex-spouse’s claim is not
derived from status of the relationship, but rather from the terms of the policy.
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 32, at §180.11(A)(1).
54
See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Heitz, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066 (D.
Minn. 2007); NEW APPLEMAN INS. LAW PRACTICE GUIDE §34.31 (Jeffrey E.
Thomas et al. eds. 2013).
55
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2804 (1956); MINN. STAT. § 524.2804 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 461.051.2 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5815.33 (2012) (previously codified as § 1339.63); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 178
(1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(a) (2006) (previously codified as §
3.632(b)); WASH. REV. CODE 11-07-010 (2012).
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and the decline of formalism in private law.”56 Specifically, the statutes are
based on section 2-804 of the 1990 UPC.57
The Michigan legislature adopted a revocation statute58 in 1939
that terminated the designated spouse’s “right to proceeds or interest in the
policy upon divorce, unless the decree provides otherwise or unless the
insured spouse takes some action to see that the ex-spouse is again
designated.”59 Michigan courts have utilized the statute to “foreclose a
designated wife’s interest where she claimed to have interest in two life
insurance policies on her ex-husband’s life by reason of a contractual
arrangement with him.”60 Because “the divorce decree did not mention the
policies . . . the court held that the statute terminated her rights in them.”61
In Colorado, the legislature superseded existing case law
supporting the majority rule that divorce did not abrogate an ex-spouse’s
beneficiary status by enacting essentially a divorce revocation statute.62
The Colorado legislature adopted language almost identical to the UPC 2804 in its divorce revocation statute. The legislation allows for an
exception to the automatic revocation of an ex-spouse’s beneficiary status
if the insured inserts an express provision allowing for the ex-spouse to
retain her beneficiary status in a property settlement agreement.63 Unlike
states adopting the majority rule, the Colorado legislature believed the
insured more likely did not intend to have an ex-spouse remain a
beneficiary and that his failure to make a formal change to the policy’s
beneficiary merely constituted an oversight.64
Minnesota’s divorce revocation statute provides that that
dissolution of marriage revokes any designation as beneficiary of a spouse
56

Suzanne Soliman, A Fair Presumption: Why Florida Needs a Divorce
Revocation Statute for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, 36 STETSON L.
REV. 397, 402 (2007); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2804 (1956); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-804 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-804 (1998); WASH.
REV. CODE § 11.07.010 (2012); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 854.15(3)(a) (2002).
57
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-804 (amended 2010).
58
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.101 (2007).
59
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][C].
60
Id. (citing Northeastern Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Cisneros, 392 F.2d 198 (6th
Cir. 1968) (applying Michigan law)).
61
Id.
62
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-804(2)(a) (2012) (overruling Christensen v.
Sabad, 773 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1989)).
63
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-804(2)(a).
64
See Soliman, supra note 57, at 403-04.
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in a life insurance policy, except as otherwise provided by a “governing
instrument, . . . a court order, a contract relating to the division of the
martial property . . ., or a plan document governing a qualified or
nonqualified retirement plan.”65 The statute permits the insured to change
his beneficiary upon the dissolution of marriage, as long as the change
remains in line with any conditions imposed by the divorce proceedings
and provisions (such as a property settlement agreement) per Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 61A.12(4). In Minnesota, like in many other states that have
enacted such divorce revocation statutes, people have brought suits arguing
the statute violated the Contract Clause.66 In 2007, a federal district court
held that the Minnesota statute, if applied to revoke a beneficiary
designation that preexisted its effective date, was not an impairment of
contract so as to violate the United States Constitution.67 Alternatively, in
2008 another federal district court in Minnesota held that the retroactive
application of Minnesota’s automatic revocation statute as applied violated
the Contract Clause.68
Under Missouri law, the dissolution of marriage after a life
insurance policy owner’s designation of the spouse or of a relative of the
spouse as the beneficiary revokes the beneficiary’s designation.69 In 2001,
however, Missouri enacted legislation providing that the divorce
revocation statute does not apply “to transfers pursuant to life or accidental
death products sold by insurance companies unless the statute is

65

MINN. STAT. § 524.2-804 (2012).
See infra Parts V-VI.
67
Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. Heitz, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1067 (D. Minn.
2007) (holding no Contract Clause issue existed because an ex-spouse’s
beneficiary designation prior to divorce did not create a vested contractual right in
the ex-spouse sufficient to allege a Contract Clause challenge).
68
MONY Life Insurance Co. v. Ericson, 533 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923-24 (D.
Minn. 2008) (noting the Contract Clause issue exhibits the heightened level of
uncertainty in this area of law. In addition to the jurisdictional split in between
majority and minority rule, a split of authority exists in minority jurisdictions that
have retroactively applied divorce revocation statutes).
69
MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.051.1 (1989); see, e.g., Gillespie v. Estate of
McPherson, 159 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that divorce
revoked the designation of an insured’s second wife as beneficiary of life
insurance policy and no existing exceptions to the revocation statute applied, so
second wife was not entitled to policy’s proceeds).
66
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incorporated into the policy or beneficiary designation.”70 However unlike
in Minnesota where the federal district court rejected a Contract Clause
challenge to a retroactively applied provision affecting an insurance
contract, this legislation amending the original divorce revocation statute
could not be applied retroactively.71 The court explained that Mo. Rev.
Stat. §461.051’s automatic revocation on dissolution provision, governing
the effect that a dissolution of marriage had on nonprobate transfers to
former spouses, did not apply to the decedent’s and former wife’s divorce,
because at the time of the dissolution, Mo. Rev. Stat. §461.073, which
controlled the scope and application of the nonprobate transfers law, stated
that §461.051 “did not apply to property, money, or benefits paid or
transferred at death pursuant to a life or accidental death insurance policy,
annuity, contract, plan, or other product sold or administered by a life
insurance company.”72 Therefore, the court held that the decedent’s
designation of his former wife as the beneficiary of his life insurance
policy was valid at the time of his death.73
The Ohio legislature invoked its divorce revocation statute in
1990. The legislative text revokes an ex-spouse’s beneficiary status upon
divorce. However, unlike other legislative enactments based on UPC
section 2-804, the Ohio statute is located in Ohio’s Revenue Code and
specifically mentions life insurance designations. Ohio’s divorce
revocation statute is located in its commercial code and contains language
specific to nonprobate assets such as life insurance.74 This Ohio Revenue
Code provision provides that divorce automatically revokes the exspouse’s beneficiary status for policies owned by the insured spouse,75
unless a divorce decree or judgment granting the divorce specifically

70

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][C] (citing
MO. REV. STAT. § 461.073.6 (1995) (as amended by 2001 H.B. 644 and 2001 S.B.
227)). Exceptions included irrevocable beneficiary designations, designations
made after the dissolution, designations that expressly stated that it shall not be
affected by a future dissolution. MO. REV. STAT. § 461.051.2.
71
United Investors Life v. Wilson, 191 S.W.3d 76, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
72
Id. at 78 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 461.051).
73
Id. at 79.
74
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.63 (West 1990).
75
For the purpose of the insurance contract, "[ex-]spouse shall be deemed to
have predeceased the spouse who made the designation or on whose behalf the
designation was made. Id. (alteration in original).
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provides otherwise.76 Also included in Ohio’s divorce revocation statute is
a provision addressing the insurer liability issue which provides:
[a]n agent, bank, broker, custodian, issuer, life insurance
company, plan administrator, savings and loan association,
transfer agent, trustee, or other person is not liable in
damages or otherwise in a civil or criminal action or
proceeding for distributing or disposing of property in
reliance on and in accordance with a designation of
beneficiary.77
A 1987 Oklahoma statute revokes an ex-spouse’s beneficiary
status unless the insured goes through the process of formally re-naming
the ex-spouse as the intended beneficiary following their divorce.78
Oklahoma’s statute has been deemed unconstitutional if applied to
contracts retroactively because it violated the Contract Clause.79 To remedy
constitutional issues with its divorce revocation statute while still adopting
the minority rule, the Oklahoma legislature since amended its statute to
render it applicable only to insurance contracts entered on or after the
statute’s effective date.80
Texas’s 1987 divorce revocation statute is not modeled on UPC
section 2-804. Instead, the Texas law renders the ex-spouse’s beneficiary
designation ineffective upon divorce unless either:
(1) The decree designates the insured former spouse as the
beneficiary; (2) the insured re-designates the former
spouse as the beneficiary after rendition of the decree; or
(3) the former spouse is designated to receive the proceeds
in trust for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a child or a
dependent of either spouse.81

76

Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
78
See OKLA. STAT. tit 15, § 178, (A),(B)(3) (1987).
79
Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1991).
80
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][C],[D]
(citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 178).
81
TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.301(a) (2006) (formerly codified as TEX. FAM. CODE §
3.632(b)); LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][i][C].
77
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Unlike UPC section 2-804 which releases insurer’s from liability
for wrongful disbursements, the Texas statute holds insurers liable only if:
“(1) before disbursing proceeds, it receives written notice from an
interested person that the beneficiary is wrong, and (2) it does not
interplead and deposit the proceeds into the court registry.”82
A few major policy reasons exist as to why jurisdictions adopt the
minority rule. One argument is that in executing the insurance contract, the
policy should be in line with the insured’s interest - the divorce itself is
evidence of the insured’s intent not to have an ex-spouse receive the
policy’s proceeds. The failure to change beneficiary after a divorce
constituted a mere oversight because the execution of a final divorce
decree exhibited the insured’s true intent to revoke the ex-spouse’s
beneficiary status. Another policy behind the adoption of these statutes is
the inequities that can result from an insured not having time to make a
formal beneficiary change after a divorce.83 Additionally, courts adopting
the minority position understand that an insured’s failure to make a
beneficiary change does not necessarily mean he intended to give the
proceeds to his ex-spouse, but rather could have resulted from an
inadvertent misunderstanding about the nature of the divorce process in
that the divorce itself did not effect a change in beneficiary status.84
The minority rule is the more modern rule, in contrast with the
traditional majority rule. The minority rule attempts to tackle the issue of
deciphering who the deceased’s intended policy beneficiary was by
assuming the finalized divorce established a clear intent to revoke an exspouse’s beneficiary status. While this approach likely reflects the current
sentiments of divorcing spouses in the twenty-first century, the minority
rule, much like the majority rule applies in every situation, is too blunt of a
tool to use in such intricate family situations.
V.

AUTOMATIC REVOCATION STATUTES & THE CONTRACT
CLAUSE

A tension exists between a state’s retroactive application of an
automatic revocation statute that revokes an ex-spouse’s beneficiary status
to a life insurance contract. Under the federal constitution’s Contract
Clause, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
82

TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.301 (2006); Soliman, supra note 57 at 407.
See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ortiz, 535 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
84
See LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §5.21[1][k][I][iii][A].
83
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Contracts . . . .”85 The Contract Clause forbids “any interference with
contracts” by state law.86 Under the Contract Clause, “laws which subsist
at the time and place of the making of a contract . . . enter into and form a
part of it.”87 These laws typically cannot be changed by ex post facto
legislation.88 Many states that have adopted automatic revocation statutes
have retroactively enforced the statutes. The retroactive application of
automatic revocation statutes provoked arguments that the state’s
involvement substantially impaired a prior, private contractual (here, the
life insurance contract) obligation between the named beneficiary and the
insurance company.
In its analysis as to whether a state enacted statute is in conflict
with the Contract Clause, courts must first establish whether the statute
“has operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.”89
The inquiry “has three components: whether there is a contractual
relationship, whether . . . the law impairs that contractual relationship, and
whether the impairment is substantial.”90 If the court has found that the
first two components of substantial impairment existed, it then decides
whether a significant and legitimate public purpose exists behind the
statute.91 Lastly, if the court found that a legitimate and significant public
purpose existed behind the statute, it must determine whether the statecaused contractual impairment was nevertheless justified as reasonable and
necessary in serving an important public interest.92

85

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Honeywell, Inc. v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 110 F.3d 547, 551
(8th Cir.1997).
87
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 188 (1992) (citing Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1934)).
88
See also MONY Life Ins. Co. v. Ericson, 533 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (D.
Minn. 2008).
89
Gen. Motors Corp., 503 U.S. at 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)).
90
Id.
91
See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
92
Id.
86
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VI.

CHALLENGING STATE AUTOMATIC REVOCATION
STATUTES THROUGH THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

Many states have found the retroactive application of an automatic
revocation statute unconstitutional under the Contract Clause.93
While Oklahoma initially retroactively enacted a statute that
automatically revoked an ex-spouse’s beneficiary status upon divorce
unless the insured renames the ex-spouse as beneficiary after divorce, the
Oklahoma legislature amended the statute to avoid a Contract Clause issue.
In Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, the Eighth Circuit found that the
retrospective application of Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 178(B)(6) violated the
Contract Clause.94 Again, an insured did not change his ex-spouse’s
primary beneficiary status after their divorce before he died.95 In
examining whether the Contract Clause prohibited the state from
retroactively passing the statute Okla.Stat. tit. 15, § 178(B)(6), the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that the insured was entitled to expect that his wishes
regarding the insurance proceeds (per the then-existing law) would be
effectuated.96 By retroactively applying the automatic revocation statute,
the State impaired the insured’s contract by reaching back in time and
disrupting this expectation.97 Finding the impairment significant, the
statute impeded the primary purpose of forming the contract – mainly to
provide for the people of the insured’s choosing in the event of his death.98
In next analyzing whether the State’s impairment of the contract was with
legitimate purpose and done in a reasonable manner, the court found that
while the statute intends to effectuate a change in beneficiary because a
fundamental family change had occurred and a tendency to overlook the
formality of changing beneficiary status frequently occurred, retroactively
applying the statute those who entered into contracts before the legislation
passed may frustrate the insured’s intent to provide for his designated
93

See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1991);
Scott v. Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Missouri, 09-4241-CV-C-NKL, 2010 WL 3749210,
*12 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2010); MONY Life Ins. Co., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (D.
Minn. 2008); Maddux v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128 n.1
(S.D. Cal. 1999); In re Estate of Holycross, 858 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Ohio 2007);
Paronese v. Midland Nat. Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 816 (Pa. 1998).
94
See also Whirlpool Corp., 929 F.2d 1318.
95
See also id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1322.
98
Id.

2013

AUTOMATIC REVOCATION UPON DIVORCE

419

beneficiary.99 The court held that the statute, when retroactively applied,
violated the Contract Clause.100
In 1998, a Pennsylvania court reviewed the same issue regarding a
retroactively applicable Pennsylvania automatic revocation statute101 in
Paronese v. Midland National Insurance Company.102 Here, the ex-spouse
primary beneficiary of a life insurance policy brought an action against an
insurer and the contingent beneficiaries to recover benefits following
divorce from insured.103 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like in
Whirlpool, found that the retroactive application of such a statute violated
the Contract Clause. In its Contract Clause analysis, the Court found that
the retroactive application the statute undermined “the very essence of
[insured’s] contract”104 and that the state neither had an emergency need to
protect this small group nor was the retroactive application of the law
protecting a basic societal interest.105
In Scott v. PSRS,106 a district court took an even broader view in
holding that the automatic revocation statute violated the Contract Clause
pertaining to an independent contract for retirement benefits, not a formal
life insurance policy. An ex-spouse brought an action alleging a violation
of the Contract Clause seeking money damages based on the refusal to pay
certain death benefits after her ex-husband died but did not change the
plaintiff’s beneficiary designation status after their divorce.107 The court
99

Id. at 1323 (“While it may be true that some individuals, given a choice,
would prefer to guaranty the financial security of their new family instead of their
former family, this is certainly not a universal truth.”).
100
See also Whirlpool Corp. 929 F.2d at 1323-4, n.6 (alteration in original)
(citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19-20 n.17 (1977)
(“However, [the Eighth Circuit] note[d] that, for purposes of the contracts clause,
there [wa]s a profound difference between changing the law directly governing
contracts yet to be made and changing the law directly governing contracts that
have already been made. In the former case, the parties can be expected to
incorporate the changes into their planning and negotiating, whereas in the latter
case the parties expect their bargain to be protected in accordance with the law
existing at the time of their agreement.”).
101
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111.2 (1994).
102
Paronese v. Midland Nat. Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814 (Pa. 1998).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 818 (alteration in original).
105
See id. at 818-19.
106
Scott v. PSRS, No. 09 4241 CV C NKL, 2010 WL 3749210 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 21, 2010).
107
Id. at *3.
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noted that under Section 169.076 of the Missouri Revised Statutes,108 the
insured’s existing beneficiary designation had been “automatically and
retroactively revoked by operation of Missouri law due to divorce” and the
plaintiff ex-spouse was “no longer entitled to the benefits.”109
In analyzing the merits of the Contract Clause claim, the Court
held that, relying on Whirlpool as precedent, “a party designating a
beneficiary was entitled to expect that his . . . wishes – as expressed in a
contract which pre-dated the divorce revocation statute- would be honored”
and that “disrupting that expectation, the statute substantially impaired the
contract.”110 Even though the court noted the death benefits in this case
were in fact “a contract concerning post-death retirement proceeds” and
not a formal life insurance policy, the similarities in intending to provide
for the insured’s family after his death were substantial enough for this
case to be encompassed under the Eight Circuit’s existing rule that the
revocation statute could not be applied to a pre-existing contract.111
Most recently, a court held Minnesota’s automatic revocation
statute, § 524.2-804,112 unconstitutional.113 In MONY, the insured’s exspouse sought a declaration from the court that he was entitled to his exspouse’s insurance proceeds.114 The court, relying on Whirlpool, found that
under the Contract Clause, substantial impairment existed in the
contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer and the
purpose behind Minnesota’s statute, that ex-spouses often intend to change
their beneficiaries, cannot be used to justify the fundamental change to the
existing life insurance contract.115 Most interestingly, although MONY held
the retroactive application of the statute unconstitutional, just a year prior

108

MO. REV. STAT. 169.076.2 (2005) (“The member’s marriage, divorce,
withdrawal of accumulated contributions, or the birth of the member’s child . . .
shall result in an automatic revocation of the member’s previous designation in its
entirety upon the retirement system receiving actual notice of such event before or
after the member’s death and prior to any payment being made under the
provisions of this chapter.”).
109
Scott, 2010 WL 3749210, at *3.
110
Id. at *12 (citing Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir.
1991)).
111
Id.; see Whirlpool, 929 F.2d at 1323.
112
MINN. STAT. § 524.2-804 (2002).
113
MONY Life Ins. Co. v. Ericson, 533 F. Supp. 2d 921 (D. Minn. 2008).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 924-25.
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another Minnesota District Court held the retroactive application of the
statute constitutional.116
Other courts analyzing the retroactive application of automatic
revocation statutes have found that no Contract Clause issue existed
because an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation prior to divorce did not
create a vested contractual right in the ex-spouse sufficient to allege a
Contract Clause challenge.117 This division in the constitutionality of the
statutes adds to the confusion in this area of law.
VII.

PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EXCEPTION

When beneficiary status issues arise in both majority and minority
jurisdictions, the court typically will examine the terms of the property
settlement agreement or divorce decree to decipher whether the terms of
the agreement or decree provide sufficient clarity of the insured’s intent to
divest his ex-spouse of her beneficiary status. Some jurisdictions allow the
terms of a property settlement agreement, if sufficiently explicit, to act as a
change in beneficiary status without formally changing the beneficiary
through the terms of the insurance policy. These states examine the precise
wording of the property settlement agreement, when the insured purchased
the insurance policy and what the surviving ex-spouse specifically waived
in order to determine whether the property settlement exception to either
the majority or minority rule applied.118
Some majority jurisdictions do not recognize this exception,
holding that a release in a property settlement agreement is not sufficient to
override the insurance contract language.119 In contrast, some minority
116

See generally Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Heitz, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1062,
1063, 1067 (D. Minn. 2007) (holding that a nonexistent Contract Clause issue
because an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation prior to divorce did not create a
vested contractual right in the ex-spouse sufficient to allege a Contract Clause
challenge).
117
See, e.g., Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n Coll. Ret. Equities
Fund, 343 F.3d 1311, 1322 (10th Cir. 2003); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200
F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 2002); Estate of DeWitt v. DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849
(Colo. 2002); Mearns v. Scharbach, 12 P.3d 1048, 1056 (Wa. Ct. App. 2000).
118
See Jani Maurer, Use and Disposition of Life Insurance in Dissolution of
Marriage, 16 BARRY L. REV. 57, 109 (2011).
119
The most notable example of a majority jurisdiction that does not apply
this exception, even for unambiguous property settlement agreements, is Florida.
Soliman, supra note 57, at 407.
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jurisdictions allow the insured to execute his intent for an ex-spouse to
remain the beneficiary of his life insurance policy despite the automatic
revocation statute if his intent is clearly expressed in a property settlement
agreement.120 For example, although the New Jersey legislature enacted a
divorce revocation statute, the courts have adopted an exception to the
statute that allows for divorcing spouses who have entered into a property
settlement agreement which purports to “wipe the slate clean” between
them, divorce creates a presumption that designation of either of the
spouses as the beneficiary of the other’s life insurance policy has been
revoked.121 A New Jersey court first held that the state had joined “the
overwhelming number of states that have enacted statutes recognizing
revocation by divorce. Those statutes adopt the presumption that ‘in the
vast majority of cases the testator’s failure to revoke his will subsequent to
a divorce is due to neglect . . .’” in 1978.122 In 1991, the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted the presumption that when the agreement
supposedly covers all property rights, the insured’s intent per the
agreement is to revoke or keep the existing designation of a spouse as
beneficiary.123
Different state standards exist as to whether the decree or
settlement meets the specificity required for the property settlement
exception to apply. Some states decide whether the settlement may be
reasonably construed as a relinquishment of an ex-spouse’s beneficiary
status.124 Other states examine whether wording of the agreement on the
whole appears to indicate the intention of relinquishment.125 Another
standard adopted by states is whether the agreement expressly states the
intent to deprive the ex-spouse of her beneficiary status.126
120

See e.g., Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1991).
Id. at 1165-66 (citation omitted).
122
Id. at 1164 (citation omitted).
123
Id. at 1164-66.
124
See, e.g., Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 516 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1973);
Hollaway v. Selvidge, 548 P.2d 835 (Kan. 1976); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Weatherford, 621 P.2d 83 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
125
See Costello v. Costello, 379 F. Supp. 630 (D. Wyo. 1974) (applying
Wyoming law); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cassidy, 676 P.2d 1050 (Cal. 1984) (en
banc); Redd v. Brooke, 604 P.2d 360, 361 (Nev. 1980); Pitts v. Ashcraft, 586
S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Culbertson v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 631 P.2d
906 (Utah 1981).
126
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Frawley, 712 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D. Ohio
1989) (applying Ohio law).
121

2013

AUTOMATIC REVOCATION UPON DIVORCE

423

In Washington, for the property settlement exception to revoke an
ex-spouse’s beneficiary status, the decree must expressly divest the exspouse of any expectancy under the policy and a beneficiary change within
a reasonable time must exist for the designated ex-spouse to lose her right
to the proceeds.127
The property settlement agreement exception, likely a response to
the blunt application of the existing majority and minority rules, provides a
way for certain situations to opt out of the existing jurisdictional rule,
while still executing the insured’s intent. Each state can tailor the required
level of specificity for the property settlement agreement exception to what
it views as clear evidence of the insured’s intent.
VIII.

CONCLUSION: HOW TO DEVELOP MORE COHERENT
RULES IN THIS AREA OF LAW

The recent split of authorities in minority jurisdictions regarding
the retroactive application of automatic revocation statutes only adds
confusion to the existing dichotomy between majority and minority
jurisdictions and jurisdictions that have adopted the property settlement
agreement exception, contributing to more uncertainty as to whether or not
an ex-spouse still named as a beneficiary after having divorced the insured
will receive the policy’s proceeds. In this area, the courts must balance the
need to execute the insured’s intent, while upholding the nature of the
insurance contract. Because this issue arises only after the insured died and
can therefore no longer state his intended beneficiary, it remains more
important for clearer case law to exist regarding this matter when proactive
legal counseling can no longer help.
While the modern trend of adopting automatic revocation statutes
addresses the growing trend of asset transfer through nonprobate financial
instruments rather than the slow moving probate process,128 the majority
rule of upholding the existing text of the insurance contract executes a
verifiably true intent of the insured. In an attempt to garner more consistent
127
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case law on this issue, I would encourage legislatures enacting automatic
revocation statutes to at least avoid potential Contract Clause issues
altogether by not retroactively applying the statute. Retroactive application
of automatic revocation statutes only confuses an already dizzying area of
law.
Because of the pivotal nature of life insurance in providing for
families in the event of the death of a primary wage earner129, ensuring the
policy’s proceeds go to the correct beneficiary is the purpose of obtaining
the policy. Compounding on life insurance’s role in providing for loved
ones in the event of the insured’s death is the difficulty in not only not
having the correct beneficiary receive the policy’s benefits, but also having
an ex-spouse receive policy’s proceeds.
In most instances, the determination of a policy’s actual
beneficiary can take a substantial amount of time when insurance
companies must interplead both primary and contingent beneficiaries in a
lawsuit. Courts and state legislatures should recognize life insurance’s role
of providing immediate financial aid to families who have just suffered a
loss when determining whether to adopt either the majority or minority
rule in their jurisdiction or change existing precedent.
While legislatures and courts adopting either majority or minority
rule need to instill a sense of uniformity and equity to decisions in this area
of law, the role of life insurance in conjunction with the intricacy and
variation of each couple’s divorce proceedings require the court to take a
closer look at these matters. The court needs to decipher whether an
omission in a change of beneficiary after a divorce is a mistake of legal
form, and if so, whether the court can and should correct this mistake.
Ultimately, courts and legislatures are trying to address the intent issue.
Compelling policy reasons exist on both majority and minority
opinions on this issue. If a state wants to adopt the modern trend of the
minority rule by passing an automatic revocation statute, the action should
preferably come from the legislature to better represent the constituent
consensus and prevailing societal views on the relationships of ex-spouses
upon divorce. Either the majority rule of upholding the letter of the
insurance contract or the minority rule revoking an ex-spouse’s beneficiary
status applies as a default rule. However, the often intricate relationship
dynamic between divorced couples along with how and when the insured’s
129
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policy was executed require the court to look closer to decipher the
insured’s intent. Because the court is ultimately trying to decipher intent,
all states should adopt the property settlement exception. The property
settlement agreement, as a part of the divorce process, best captures the
insured’s intent on what he did or didn’t intend to give over to his exspouse. Because the property settlement agreement is executed when both
parties are represented by counsel, the court should recognize the insured’s
intent as evidenced by a higher level of specificity from the property
settlement exception over whatever the existing jurisdictional rule is. If the
insured meets a higher threshold of proof that he either did or didn’t intend
to have his ex-spouse remain his life insurance beneficiary, the court
should recognize this higher level of intent regardless of the existing
jurisdictional rule.
If the insured’s property settlement agreement meets the required
level of specificity to opt out of the existing jurisdictional rule, the courts
should accept that. This would allow the court, in certain instances where
the insured clearly intended (the guidelines about what level of specificity
should be outlined by the legislature) the opposite of what the existing
jurisdictional rule dictated, to better match the insured’s intent.
The courts and legislatures should have two goals in mind when
dealing with this area of law: executing the insured’s intent and uniformity.
The court should try to get the policy’s proceeds to the correct persons
while also uniformly applying the jurisdictional rule in order to give a
greater sense of certainty to those in the jurisdiction looking to challenge
the insurance company’s disbursement of a deceased’s life insurance
policy proceeds to an ex-spouse. This would not only allow for quicker
resolutions and fulfill one of the purposes of a non-probate asset like life
insurance – to quickly transfer wealth outside of the lagging probate
system to the intended beneficiary. State legislatures’ retroactive
application of automatic revocation statutes interfere with the uniform
applicable of the state’s rule in this area of law. Because of the Contract
Clause issue, states that choose to adopt the modern minority rule should
avoid making them retroactively applicable because the issue incites more
challenges to an insurance company’s dispersal of a policy’s proceeds,
creating more unsettlement in an already murky area of law.
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